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In the field of European studies, the notion of ‘differentiated integration’ (Stubb 1996) 
was developed in the late 1990s as an alternative to the crude membership/non-
membership dichotomy. While the theoretical benefits of this approach are broadly 
discussed in the existing literature, further empirical studies have been deemed necessary 
(Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). The Nordic states constitute a particularly 
interesting laboratory in order to study this phenomenon. Indeed, while these states share 
several socio-economic and political characteristics, they also differ in terms of their 
relationship with the European Union.  
Several studies on these relationships emphasise the relevance of certain contextual 
variables as key explanatory factors for the variation in attitudes between the Nordic 
states. However, there is also lack of analysis that looks into the domestic political features 
that these countries share. Furthermore, most studies in the field tend to ignore the 
respective government’s positions on European integration, and mostly adopt a top-down 
approach when focusing on the nation-state as a whole. Adopting a most similar systems 
design, this thesis aims to answer the following question: have Nordic government 
preferences on European integration been influenced by domestic political factors? In 
order to answer this question, four domestic variables are introduced and analysed: 
relative strength of parties in parliament; composition of government; type of 
government; and government ideology.  
Within this comparative framework, three Nordic countries have been selected: the first 
one belonging to the ‘inner core’ of the European Union (Finland);; while the second is 
located at its ‘outer core’ (Sweden);; and the third one serves as a control case as an ‘EU-
outsider’ which is still located in the Union’s ‘inner periphery’ (Norway). For each state, 
the analysis starts in the early 1990s, when ‘Europe’ developed into a politically salient 
issue in domestic politics. The focus is furthermore set on their respective government’s 
positions regarding five distinct policy areas: participation in the European Economic 
Area; application for European Union membership; participation in the Schengen Area; 
participation in the Economic and Monetary Union; and participation in European Battle 
Groups.  
The main findings of the thesis suggest that when analysing governments’ positions on 
(differentiated) European integration, the domestic political features should not be 
downplayed. For instance, the Swedish government’s opposition to participation in the 
EMU in 1997 is mostly explained by a lack of party consensus over this issue, unlike in 
Finland where a broad inter-party agreement was secured for this policy area. The analysis 
further suggests that studies on party and government preferences on Europe should 
focus on policy areas rather than on the issue of integration as a whole. Such a focus 
provides for better understanding of the nature of ‘Euroscepticism’ in the Nordic region 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Why do states participate in the process of regional integration? Studies on regionalism 
tend to focus on explaining why states seek membership within a regional organisation 
(see e.g. Baldwin 1993; Laursen 2003). In the case of European Union [EU] integration, 
several competing theories have been put forward to explain the position of national 
political elites. Until recently, however, the literature on EU integration has mostly 
emphasised elite views on membership (see e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). But 
the diverse responses to agreements between states and the European Union1 occurring 
in the 1990s has made the membership/non-membership dichotomy obsolete for fully 
understanding the relationship between states and the European Union.  
To go beyond this crude in/out dichotomy, we need further analysis of other modes of 
European integration covered by the notion of differentiated integration, which is an umbrella 
term encompassing various integration strategies sometimes referred to as ‘opt-ins’ and 
‘opt-outs’. As discussed by Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012: 293), “empirical analysis 
has been limited to a few important cases of treaty law (such as [Economic and Monetary 
Union] EMU and Schengen), but there are no comprehensive data sets”. An explanation 
for this gap in the literature is the fact that until the early 1990s and the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, discussions on differentiated integration were limited (Stubb 1996).  
The Nordic states2 (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) constitute 
illuminating examples for the study of differentiated integration. Indeed, even though “the 
Nordic countries together constitute a linguistic, cultural, economic, social, and political-
ideological area, of considerable homogeneity” (Andrén 1967: 8-9), each of them changed 
its relations and relationships with the EU institutions at a different pace and level. There 
is thus a strong divergence in terms of the Nordic experience of European integration. At 
the time of writing, three of the five states are members of the European Union. Finland 
(which joined in 1995) is considered as being close to the core of EU activity (Mouritzen 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of brevity and clarity, the use of the term ‘European Union’ is used as a synonym of 
‘European Community’ [EC]. 
2 The notion of ‘Nordic states’ shall not be confused with ‘Scandinavia’, which applies to only three Nordic 
states: Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
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and Wivel 2005), Sweden (1995) is commonly considered as an ‘Euro-outsider’ (Lindahl 
and Naurin 2005) and Denmark (1973) has opted out of three core EU policy areas 
(Economic and Monetary Union, aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
[CFSP], as well as the then Justice and Home Affairs [JHA] pillar) through the Edinburgh 
Agreement. As such, Denmark has operated one of the most visible and institutional 
forms of differentiation in the European Union (Miles 2010). The two remaining Nordic 
states, Iceland and Norway, are members of the European Economic Area [EEA] but 
currently remain outside of the European Union. Furthermore, both states negotiated a 
set of bilateral agreements giving them the right to participate in other policy areas that 
are not covered by the EEA agreement. Following the recent financial crisis, Iceland 
applied for EU membership for the first time in its history in 2009, but the centre-right 
cabinet appointed in 2013 decided to freeze accession talks with the European 
Commission. Norway, however, has no current prospect of joining the European ‘club’, 
despite four previous applications and various (in)formal agreements with Brussels. As 
emphasised by Egeberg and Trondal (1999: 134), Norway may be “even more sectorally 
penetrated or harmonized” than other EU members as far as policy harmonization is 
concerned, meaning that non-membership may still involve a great deal of integration. 
Rieker (2006: 284) even views Norway as a “class B member of the EU – a country that 
is well integrated into most policy areas, but lacking real political influence”. It is thus an 
interesting comparative enquiry to ask why states that are so similar have all adopted a 
different form of European integration. Adopting a most-similar systems design and 
focusing on government preferences, this thesis addresses this puzzle and aims to answer 
the following question: have Nordic government preferences on European 
integration been influenced by domestic political factors? 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. The first section contextualises this 
analysis by defining the notion of differentiated integration and explaining how this 
concept enables researchers to better understand the relationships between states and the 
European Union. The second section discusses the empirical focus of this work, the 
Nordic states, and examines why this region of Europe constitutes an interesting 
‘laboratory’ for the study of differentiated integration. The third section of the chapter 
finally outlines the structure of this thesis, highlights the central arguments made and 




1.1. Differentiated integration in the European Union 
 
1.1.1. What is differentiated integration? 
The notion of differentiated integration appeared in the academic literature in the mid-
1990s, following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and negotiations of several opt-
outs. Often used interchangeably with the notion of ‘flexible integration’ (see e.g. Kölliker 
2001; 2006; Warleigh 2002; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012), diverging views on its 
nature has led to the emergence of various definitions. A lack of consensus characterises 
the academic literature; some leading researchers even avoid offering an explicit definition 
on the term (see for instance Warleigh 2002; Andersen and Sitter 2006; de Neve 2007). 
The first attempt to grasp this ‘moving target’ was made by Stubb (1996: 283), who defines 
differentiated integration as “the general mode of integration strategies which try to 
reconcile heterogeneity within the European Union”.  
Challenging this definition, Kölliker (2001: 127) states that differentiated integration 
“constitutes the general term for the possibility of member states to have different rights 
and obligations with respect to certain common policy areas”. Similarly, Dyson and Sepos 
(2010: 4) define it as “>…@ the process whereby European States, or sub-units, opt to 
move at different speeds and/or towards different objectives with regard to common 
policies, by adopting different formal and informal arrangements, whether inside or 
outside the EU treaty framework, and by assuming different rights and obligations”. This 
extends Kölliker’s definition by including “formal and informal arrangements” in the 
framework of differentiation, which were first introduced by Andersen and Sitter (2006).  
Nevertheless, both definitions might be considered as too narrow, as the emphasis is put 
on member states (i.e. the demand side of differentiation), neglecting the power of 
supranational institutions to shape European integration (i.e. the supply side of 
differentiation). 
A recent contribution by Leuffen et al. (2013: 10) defines the EU as a system of 
differentiated integration, i.e. “one Europe with an organizational and member state core 
but with a level of centralization and territorial extension that vary by function”. This 
innovative approach puts differentiated integration at the same level as a federal state or 
an international organisation, by characterising it as a political system. In that sense, 
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defining differentiated integration as a political system might be controversial, as the 
notion itself is also used as a general term for different types of integration such as Europe 
à la Carte or Multi-Speed Europe (Stubb 1996; Warleigh 2002; Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig 2012). Furthermore, this definition still needs to be tested empirically. 
In sum, it is difficult to provide a single definition of differentiated integration. Since the 
emergence of this notion, views have strongly diverged and it might be tricky to suggest 
a commonly accepted definition. That is why, within the framework of the thesis, the 
retained definition of differentiated integration is the one used by Stubb, i.e. the general 
mode of integration strategies which try to reconcile heterogeneity within the European Union. Even 
though somewhat blurry, this general definition appears as the most consensual approach 
to assess the notion of differentiated integration.   
 
 
1.1.2. Categorising Differentiated Integration 
Alongside defining the notion of differentiated integration, several attempts to offer a 
typology were presented in the literature over the past twenty years. Stubb (1996) lists 
about 30 models and also classifies differentiated integration into three categories linked 
to general concepts of European integration: ‘time’ (or ‘temporal differentiation’), with 
‘Multi-Speed Europe’ as main concept;3 ‘space’ (or ‘territorial differentiation’), with 
‘Variable Geometry Europe’ as the main concept;4 and ‘matter’ (or ‘sectoral 
differentiation’), with ‘A La Carte Europe’ as main concept.5 
Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012) criticised this classification, underlining, for 
instance, the fact that differentiation always has territorial and sectoral impacts, and that 
purely functional conceptions are not included in this categorisation. As an alternative to 
Stubb’s work, they offer a categorisation into six dimensions: 
                                                          
3 Stubb (1996: 285) defines multi-speed Europe as a “mode of differentiated integration according to which 
the pursuit of common objectives is driven by a group of Member States which are both able and willing 
to go further, the underlying assumption being that the others will follow later”. 
4 “Mode of differentiated integration which admits to unattainable differences within the integrative 
structure by allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a hard core and lesser developed 
integrative units” (ibid.). 
5 “Mode of differentiated integration whereby respective Member States are able to pick-and-choose, as 
from a menu, in which policy they would like to participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a 
minimum number of common objectives” (ibid.). 
5 
 
1) Permanent v. temporary differentiation; 
2) Territorial v. purely functional differentiation; 
3) Differentiation across nation states v. multi-level differentiation; 
4) Differentiation takes place within the EU treaties v. outside the EU treaties; 
5) Decision-making at EU level v. at regime level (i.e. intergovernmental decisions); 
6) Only for member states v. also for non-member states/areas outside the EU 
territory.  
 
The authors also underline that empirical examples can be found for almost all models, 
suggesting that “differentiated integration comes in an astonishing variety of forms and 
>…@ the concepts of differentiated integration can and should be used systematically to 
describe these forms and their frequency” (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012: 297). 
The categorisation offered by the authors provides a meticulous way of analysing 
differentiated integration, which reflects the complex reality of European integration, as 
shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Holzinger  and  Schimmelfennig’s  categorisation  of  differentiated  integration 
Dimension  
1 Temporary Permanent 
2 Territorial Functional 
3 Differentiation at nation-state level Multi-level differentiation 
4 Only inside EU treaties Also outside EU treaties Only 
inside 
Also outside EU treaties 
5 EU decision-making Club decision-making (intergovernmental) 
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Another attempt at categorising differentiated integration was made by Leuffen et al. 
(2013), in addition to their definition outlined above. Basing their study on primary law, 
they start from the assumption that “the EU potentially covers the entire range of policies, 
but that each policy varies with regard to the level of centralization and the territorial 
extension” (ibid.: 12). They determine that differentiated integration is composed of two 
main categories: the variation in the level of centralisation across policies (vertical 
differentiation), and the variation in territorial extension across policies (horizontal 
differentiation). Furthermore, they classify horizontal differentiation into four sub-
categories: 
1) No horizontal differentiation: all EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member 
states. This was the case until the early 1990s, before differentiated integration 
was implemented through the Maastricht Treaty; 
2) External differentiation: EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member states, but 
non-member states can also adopt these rules. The European Economic Area 
illustrates this type of horizontal differentiation: all EU member states are 
members of the EEA, as well as three non-members – Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway. 
3) Internal differentiation: EU rules do not apply uniformly to all EU member states. 
For instance, this type of horizontal differentiation applies when EU member 
states decide to opt out from membership in a policy area. This is the case of 
Denmark (through the Edinburgh Agreement), the United Kingdom >UK@ (who 
opted out from several policies through the Maastricht Treaty) and Sweden (who 
has not joined the EMU). Another example of internal differentiation is the 
enhanced co-operation procedure, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
allowing at least one third of the EU member states to adopt a policy within the 
EU framework, without affecting states that are not willing to co-operate.  
4) Internal and external differentiation: EU rules from which some EU member 
states opted out, while non-member states opted in. An example of internal and 
external differentiation is the Schengen agreement: while Ireland and the United 
Kingdom opted out from this policy, four non-EU members (Iceland, 




In order to avoid semantic confusion and to understand differentiated integration within 
the context of this thesis, Leuffen et al.’s conceptualisation is retained. Furthermore, this 
thesis focuses on the territorial aspect of differentiated integration through the 
relationship between Nordic states and the European Union: the emphasis is thus put on 
the horizontal dimension of integration. In other words, this study analyses government 
positions on state participation in the process of European integration, and more particularly in policy 
areas where differentiated integration takes place. 
 
1.1.3. Evolution of horizontal differentiation in the European Union 
Figure 1.1 Evolution of horizontal differentiation over time                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Source: Leuffen et al. (2013). Analysis based on the 18 policy areas covered in 
European integration. 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of horizontal differentiation over time. Member states 
uniformly applied EU rules until the 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, the use of 
differentiated integration increased. As of 2010, more than half of EU policies are 
implemented in different ways. Moreover, one can observe a strong increase in external 
differentiation, which can mostly be explained by the fact that non-EU member states 
joined the Single Market (Leuffen et al. 2013).  
The issue of differentiated integration appeared only recently in EU official documents. 
While certain limited elements of (legal) differentiation are present in the Treaty of Rome 
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(see e.g. Hanf 2001), the idea of differentiated integration finds its roots in a report on the 
future of European integration written by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (1975), 
in which he laid the foundations of a ‘multi-speed Europe’ without explicitly mentioning 
this notion (Stubb 1996). The general concept of differentiation appeared for the first 
time in the primary Community law in 1986, as stated in Article 8c of the Single European 
Act (now Article 27 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]): 
When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out 
in Article 7a [now Article 26 TFEU, author’s note], the Commission shall 
take into account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing 
differences in development will have to sustain for the establishment of the 
internal market and it may propose appropriate provisions. If these 
provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a temporary nature 
and must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the 
internal market. 
Despite early publications based on the Tindemans Report and the Single European Act 
in the 1980s (see e.g. Wallace et al. 1983; Ehlermann 1984), academic discussions on 
differentiated integration arose in the early 1990s for three main reasons. First, several 
opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty were granted to the United Kingdom and Denmark 
in 1993, leading towards more institutionalised differentiation and raising questions on 
the future of European integration. Second, the end of the Cold War opened the door to 
the future ‘big bang enlargement’, creating new challenges for the future of European 
integration with the potential diversification of national interests (Centre for Economic 
Policy Research 1995). Finally, shortly after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, 
Ehlermann (1995: 1) outlined the fact that “the next Intergovernmental Conference will 
(and should) open the door for more possibilities of non-traditional differentiation”. 
Accordingly, discussions on the constitutionalisation of differentiated integration in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam arose. 
As mentioned above, horizontal differentiation started developing in the early 1990s 
following British and Danish opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty. However, as predicted 
by Ehlermann (ibid.), the Amsterdam Treaty constitutionalised differentiated integration by 
introducing the enhanced co-operation procedure. In addition, as emphasised by Leuffen 
et al. (2013: 27), “[u]nder the threat of non-ratification, recent treaties include or are 
accompanied by exemptions or other special clauses for individual member states”. The 
use of external differentiation also increased over time as the EU “has vastly expanded 
10 
 
and differentiated its institutional relations with third countries since the early 1990s” 
(ibid.). As of 2013, the latest use of differentiated integration relates to the European 
Fiscal Compact, signed on 2 March 2012 by all EU member states with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and Czech Republic and which came into force on 1 January 2013.  
As demonstrated in this sub-section, differentiated integration (and more particularly 
horizontal differentiation) is now a well-established phenomenon in the European Union. 
Furthermore, with recent calls for an even more flexible Union from several leading 
European political figures (see e.g. Cameron 2013; Hollande 2013), basing a study on this 
issue will largely contribute to the future of European studies. 
 
1.1.4. Horizontal differentiated integration and European integration 
theories 
Established theories of European integration tend to ignore differentiated integration. 
While older integration theories such as the classical versions of neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism can be excused as they were elaborated on at a time when 
differentiated integration was not an institutional reality, more recent theories resulting 
from neo-institutionalist perspectives (i.e. liberal intergovernmentalism, supranationalism 
and constructivism) did not fill this gap in the literature (Mattli 1999; Moravscik and 
Nicolaïdis 1999; Kölliker 2006; Leuffen et al. 2013). Nevertheless, some elements of those 
theories can help to understand the phenomenon, especially with regards to the demand-
side of differentiated integration (i.e. the conditions of state participation in a policy). 




Table 1.2 Conditions for state participation in EU policies, by integration 
theory 
Intergovernmentalism Supranationalism Constructivism 
x High international 
dependence 
x Mainstream preferences 
x Low compliance costs 
x Low autonomy costs 
x Small state 
x Weak ratification 
constraints 
x Strong transnational 
interactions 
x Strong supranational 
actors 
x Weak exclusive 
national identities 
x Mainstream idea 
x High legitimacy of 
European integration 
x Low politicisation 
x Weak ratification 
constraints 
Source: based on Leuffen et al. (2013) 
According to the intergovernmentalist perspective, small, highly dependent states with 
low autonomy and compliance costs and weak ratification constraint are considered as 
the most integration-friendly countries. The supranational approach determines that 
states with strong transnational interactions and high dependence on supranational 
organisations are more integration-friendly. Finally, the constructivist approach expects 
that “exclusive national identities, outlier ideas, high domestic politicisation and weak 
domestic legitimacy of European integration, and high domestic ratification constraints 
to be the most likely non-member or opt-out countries” (Leuffen et al. 2013: 107). 
Yet crucially all three different approaches neglect important factors linked to domestic 
developments. Government preferences on European integration constitute a decisive 
factor in shaping the relationship between a country and the EU. Accordingly, one of the 
main goals of this thesis is to contribute to the literature by assessing whether domestic 
political variables shape Nordic governments’ preferences regarding participation in the 
European integration process, especially where differentiated integration takes place. This 
study thus goes beyond the traditional membership/non-membership dichotomy. The 
following chapter will now explain why an analysis based on the Nordic states is relevant 




1.2. Why the Nordic states? 
As previously mentioned, the literature generally acknowledges strong cultural, political 
and socio-economic similarities between the Nordic states. Such similarities are covered 
by the notion of ‘Nordic community’, or Norden (Hansen 2002). Several authors outline 
the existence of a ‘Nordic model’ (Arter 1999; 2006; but 2008; Heidar 2004a; Christiansen 
et al. 2006; Hilson 2008; Götz and Haggrén 2009): in their views, the Nordic states share 
strong economic and/or political characteristics which differentiate them from other 
international communities. One might therefore expect a similar experience in terms of 
regional integration but this does not appear to be the case, as discussed in the 
introductory section. Accordingly, the Nordic area constitutes an interesting ‘laboratory’ 
for the study of European integration.   
This analysis does not evaluate or discuss the relevance of the so-called ‘Nordic model’. 
This notion is largely debated elsewhere, and its evolution is also controversial. For 
instance, in the late 1990s, Arter (1999) acknowledged the existence of a Nordic model of 
government, including seven main features. However, in 2008, he argued that there has 
not been a Nordic but rather a ‘Scandinavian model of government’, with the 1960s being 
its heyday, and that this notion is now a “receding memory” (Arter 2008: 166; see also 
Miles 1996). Instead of referring to the existence of a model, I use the notion of ‘Nordic 
variables’ as political characteristics historically shared by the five Nordic states and 
commonly accepted in the literature. These variables serve as basis for this analysis and 
are further discussed in Chapter 2. It is important to highlight that these characteristics 
are not unique to the Nordic region: they can also be found in other European countries 
as well. Furthermore, umbrella terms such as Lijphart’s definitions of ‘consensus’ and 
‘majoritarian’ democracies are not used as variables as such, as these cover several features 
that do not necessarily apply to all the Nordic states (Lijphart 1999; see also Arter 2006; 
Persson and Wiberg 2011). 
The following paragraphs analyse these ‘Nordic variables’, and determine whether they 




A parliamentary system of governance 
 
von Beyme (2000) points to how the Nordic countries have all adopted a parliamentary 
system of government,6 further defined as a system “in which the members of the 
parliament [MPs] determine the cabinet’s formation and where any majority of the MPs, 
at virtually any time, may vote the government ministers out of office” (Rasch 2011a: 
238). In other words, the government is politically accountable to the parliament. This 
might have an impact on the government’s position on European integration since, in a 
parliamentary system, the government is not likely to take a stand that will not be 
supported by the parliament. The government’s leeway is thus restrained by the legislative 
power. 
 
A strong tradition of dominant social democratic parties  
 
Arter (1999) and Brandal et al. (2013) observe that the parties that have historically been 
the largest in the Nordic states have tended to belong to social democratic party family, 
except in the case of Iceland. Taking into account that social democratic party leaderships 
are often considered as pro-European,7 it might be argued that this feature plays an 
important role in shaping the relationship between Nordic states and the European 
Union. This is particularly the case in terms of ‘membership’, as all Nordic states applied 
for EU membership while their social democratic parties were the largest parties in their 
respective parliaments.  
 
Representative democracies/moderate ‘working multiparty systems’  
 
The notion of a ‘working multiparty system’ covers the ability of parties to work together 
effectively, whether in government or opposition, to produce public policy (Rustow 1956; 
Arter 1999). In contrast to two-party systems used in countries such as the United States, 
multiparty systems offer democratic accountability, leading those systems to be 
characterised as representative democracies (Heidar 2004a). Since 1989, the amount of political 
                                                          
6 Some authors suggest that Finland move from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism following 
constitutional reforms which took place in 2000 (see for instance Rasch 2011b). This will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
7 This will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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parties represented in Nordic parliaments has varied between five (Iceland throughout 
the whole period) and ten (Finland, 1995-1999). According to Sartori’s original 
classification of multiparty systems, the Nordic states should be considered as ‘extreme’ 
multiparty systems,8 in which parties are strongly polarised and seek to mobilise voters at 
the extremes (Sartori 1976). However, the Nordic states may be better understood as 
examples of a ‘moderate’ multiparty system since parties tend to compete for the median, 
rather than the fringe, voter (Heidar 2004a).  These ‘working multi-party systems’ are thus 
likely to give birth to multiple coalitions of several parties. Regarding European 
integration, preferences of coalition partners might diverge: such divisions could play a 
significant role in the agenda-setting process.  
 
Similar and well-established party families predominantly compete on a left-right dimension  
 
Berglund and Lindström (1978) emphasised the existence of a ‘five-party model’ and 
determined that Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden all have parties belonging to the 
same party families: Conservatives, Liberals, Agrarians, Social Democrats and 
Communists. Furthermore, all those parties “fall along one dimension (left-right) defined 
in economic terms” (ibid.: 18). Since the late 1970s, major changes have taken place as 
new party families emerged as well as disappeared (Grendstad 2003). In order words, the 
Nordic party systems progressively switched from a traditional five-party model to a more 
complex figure with eight broad party types: Conservatives, Liberals, Agrarians, Social 
Democrats, Socialist Left (formerly Communists), Christian Democrats, Greens and 
Populist Right.9 Several studies have showed that these parties are still predominantly 
competing on an (economic) left-right dimension (Gilljam and Oscarsson 1996; 
Grendstad 2003; Arter 2008). Within the context of European integration, Hooghe et al. 
(2002: 985) demonstrated that this left-right division also structures party positions on 
integration: “[p]olitical parties located toward the Left extreme and the Right extreme –
                                                          
8 Extreme multiparty systems are defined by Sartori (1966) as systems with more than five parties; however, 
Lijphart (1977: 63) stated that Sartori later retreated from “drawing the dividing line between moderate and 
extreme multiparty systems at exactly the point of transition from a four-party to a five-party system”.  
9 The notion of ‘populist right party’ has been preferred to ‘far-right’, ‘extreme right’ or ‘radical right’. In 
the words of Widfeldt (2000a: 488), this notion defines political parties that “stand for political ideas 
normally considered as to the right, especially on economic issues but also on cultural issues. It also means 
that they are organised around one charismatic leader and they appeal to the ‘common man’ against the 




peripheral parties– are significantly more Euro-skeptical than parties toward the Center”. 
To put it differently, non-centrist parties will be more opposed to European co-operation 
than centrist parties. Accordingly, within the framework of this thesis, one might expect 
that party location on the left-right scale affects support for European integration.  
 
A tradition of minority and/or one-party governments  
 
By definition, and as developed above, a parliamentary system is a democracy in which 
the executive power must be endorsed by the parliament (Bogdanor 1984). However, this 
does not mean that governments have to be composed of parties representing an absolute 
majority within parliament. In some cases, governments might only be tolerated: these are 
minority government. Furthermore, (minority) governments might be composed of only 
one party, demonstrating the reluctance of other parties to enter formal coalitions (Strøm 
1986). Bergman (1993) and Rasch (2011b) established that the Nordic states have a strong 
tradition of minority and/or one-party governments.10 This situation might thus affect 
government positions as well: for instance, a pro-European minority government cannot 
act without the consent of a majority of MPs, which strongly restrains its powers and 





Under a corporatist policy-making mechanism, organised groups representing special 
interests are engaged in the political decision-making process (Sejersted 2001). 
Historically, this feature applied to the entire Nordic region (Bergman and Strøm 2011). 
In fact, Norway was even ranked as being the world’s most ‘corporatist’ country (Lijphart 
1999; Siaroff 1999). Even though corporatism has weakened across the Nordic region 
since the 1990s, it still remains a strong feature and continues to play an important role in 
public policy-making (Ingebritsen 1998; Blom-Hansen 2000; Arter 2008; Bergman and 
                                                          
10 It should be outlined that minority governments are more common in the three Scandinavian states 
(Denmark, Sweden and Norway) than in Finland and Iceland. In Finland, there has been no minority 
government since the mid-1970s. See Persson and Wiberg (2011). 
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Strøm 2011). It is thus likely that such organised groups may try to shape national policies 
regarding European integration. 
 
A strong economic cleavage but a historical prevalence of the centre-periphery divisions  
 
The original cleavage model (Rokkan and Valen 1964) aimed at understanding electoral 
behaviour by focusing on social and economic divisions within the Norwegian society. 
This theory was inspired by the 1962-1963 debates on a potential European Community 
membership. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) extended this model to define four types of 
cleavages in Western industrialised countries. The model argues that the “modern 
European party systems are shaped by a series of historical conflicts about state building, 
religion, and class that took place from the Protestant Reformation to the Industrial 
Revolution” (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 163-164). These traditional cleavages are: centre-
periphery; state-church; owner-worker and land-industry. Whereas the relevance, and 
role, of these cleavages is considered to have declined since the ‘earthquake elections’ in 
the 1970s,11 the division between the industrialised centre (where internationally 
competitive services are located) and the agrarian periphery (where internationally non-
competitive agriculture and sectors are located) is one of the most rooted division within 
Nordic societies (Aarebrot 1982). Referendums on EU membership illustrate this: 
whereas the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish ‘No’–vote predominantly came from the 
countryside, the ‘Yes’-vote tended to be in the big cities (Bjørklund 1996; 1997; Pettersen 
et al. 1996). In contrast, the Copenhagen area voted against membership in 1972 whereas 
the rest of Denmark voted largely in favour (Buch and Hansen 2002).  
 
A high level of electoral volatility 
 
Up until the late 1960s, voting behaviour was mostly explained by the cleavage model but 
elections held in the early 1970s significantly changed the situation, especially in Norway, 
Finland and Denmark (Arter 2008). Not only did the number of parties represented in 
parliament increase, but it also gave rise to an increased electoral volatility (or ‘voter 
dealignment’;; Knutsen 2004). Indeed, as opposed to the era of ‘frozen cleavages’ (Lipset 
                                                          
11 On the ‘earthquake elections’ and their impact on the Nordic political systems, see e.g. Dalton (1996), 
Knutsen (2004) and Arter (2008) 
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and Rokkan 1967) which roughly covered the period between the late 1920s to the late 
1960s, the proportion of party switchers increased drastically in the Nordic States, and 
this trend was confirmed through the years (see e.g. Kristjánsson 2004; Paloheimo and 
Sundberg 2005; Aardal and Stavn 2006). With regard to European integration, Valen 
(1973) and Pettersen et al. (1996) demonstrated that the issue of membership raised in the 
1970s and 1990s activated all traditional cleavages in Norway resulting in a low level of 
electoral volatility during the referendum. These findings were later confirmed in the 
Swedish and Finnish 1994 referenda (Bjørklund 1996).  
 
Regional co-operation and consensus  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the concept of ‘Norden’ (defined at the 
beginning of this section) was seen as an asset to enhance international co-operation 
(Andrén 1967).  Nordic co-operation thus predates the Treaty of Rome, and became an 
institutional reality when the Nordic Council was founded in 1952 (Wendt 1959). 
Amongst the major Nordic agreements made in this Council, it was decided to extend 
and deepen co-operation through the creation of a Nordic Passport Union, a forerunner 
of the Schengen agreement, in 1958. Further attempts to consolidate Nordic integration 
were made in the 1960s, e.g. with talks on the creation of a Nordic economic market 
(known as Nordek) and a Nordic Defence Union. However, such attempts were largely 
unsuccessful due to the significant overlap with other free trade agreements (such as the 
European Free Trade Agreement [EFTA]) and due to Denmark’s successful application 
for an EC membership (Andrén 1984). Elder et al. (1988) identified three facets of 
consensus regarding Nordic co-operation: first, in terms of security (the so-called ‘Nordic 
Balance’); second, in terms of preserving regional unity; and, finally, in terms of 
consolidating international peace and stability. The end of the Cold War significantly 
changed the rules, and by the early 1990s, all Nordic states (both through elites and the 
population) opted for a different relationship with the EU. The ‘regional consensus’ may, 
however, have influenced certain Nordic positions on European integration, especially in 






In the literature on international relations, the Nordic countries are characterised as ‘small 
states’ (Kelstrup 1993; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Arter 2000a; Ingebritsen 2006; Panke 
2010). Even though it is an uneasy task to give a definition on this notion (see for instance 
Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006), small states share characteristics which are relevant while 
studying their relationship with supranational institutions. In particular, joining such 
institutions imply a loss of independence and effective sovereignty (Keohane 1969), which 
are both important issues for small states.  
 
This section has outlined the major political characteristics shared by Nordic states, 
discussed through the notion of ‘Nordic variables’. The relevance of these variables - in 
the context of European integration - was then discussed. In sum, eleven key variables 
have been described:  
1) A parliamentary system of governance; 
2) A strong tradition of social democratic parties; 
3) Representative democracy;  
4) A working multiparty system;  
5) Similarly well-established party families predominantly competing on an 
(economic) left-right dimension;  
6) A tradition of minority and/or one-party governments;  
7) The use of corporatist policy-making procedures;  
8) A strong economic cleavage with a prevalence of the centre-periphery division;  
9) High levels of electoral volatility;  
10) Regional co-operation and consensus;  




1.3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This introductory chapter has laid the 
foundations of this study. It has outlined the theoretical background, the main research 
question and it has explained why the Nordic region constitutes a relevant empirical focus. 
In addition, this chapter has outlined the contribution that this work makes to the existing 
literature on European and Nordic studies by focusing on differentiated integration rather 
than on the traditional membership/non-membership debate.  
Chapter 2 introduces the research design and methodology used in this thesis. It is divided 
into five sections. The first section of this chapter discusses the research strategy and 
defines the four selected independent variables, stemming from the aforementioned 
‘Nordic variables’: relative strength of parties in parliament;; composition of government;; 
type of government; and government ideology. A total of five testable hypotheses are 
then formulated regarding the relationship between the Nordic governments’ positions 
on European integration and each of the independent variables. This section further 
justifies the selection of these four independent variables and explains why some of the 
‘Nordic variables’ have been dismissed. The second section of this chapter then discusses 
the cases selected to test the hypotheses put forward. Section three reviews the methods 
used for data collection. Finally, sections four and five examine methodological issues, in 
order to determine how to measure government positions on European integration as 
well as how to measure government ideology.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 analyse each of the three Nordic states selected as case studies, from 
the most integrated to the most segregated: Finland, Sweden and Norway. The chapters 
are divided into three sections: the evolution of the relationship between the state and the 
European Union; the national party system in the context of European integration; and 
the evolution of the governments’ positions on European integration throughout the 
period analysed (i.e. from the early 1990s onwards to 2010). Each of these three chapters 
concludes with a summary of the empirical findings with regard to the five hypotheses 
explored in this study. 
Chapter 6 offers a comparative analysis of all three case studies. Parties’ and governments’ 
positions on European integration are compared, and all the hypotheses formulated in 
the second chapter are revisited. The analysis shows that the composition of parliaments 
played an important role in shaping government positions on European integration in the 
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three countries selected. Furthermore, the comparative analysis determines that the 
hypotheses on the composition and the type of government are confirmed in most cases, 
with some notable exceptions. On the other hand, it appears that government ideology 
does not shape governments’ stances on Europe: as such, the hypothesis related to this 
variable is rejected. 
The final chapter builds on and concludes the analysis of Chapter 6 by summarising the 
findings of the thesis as a whole. It focuses on the empirical and conceptual contributions 
made to the discussion of differentiated integration and party/government preferences 
on Europe. Finally, the chapter considers how this work could be taken forward in the 





Chapter 2. Research design and methodology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the methodology and research methods used in 
order to examine the Nordic governments’ preferences on European integration. It 
prepares the ground for the empirical discussion presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and for 
the comparative analysis offered in Chapter 6. The chapter considers the main research 
question and formulates the five hypotheses explored in this study. It then focuses on the 
methodological aspects by introducing the cases selected, by discussing data collection 
and by reviewing the methods used to test the hypotheses.   
 
2.1. Research question and hypotheses 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis aims to explain differentiated integration in 
the Nordic states by focusing on government positions. Accordingly and as previously 
stated, the overarching question to be investigated is: have Nordic government 
preferences on European integration been influenced by domestic political 
factors? 
In order to answer this main research question, a most similar systems research design is 
applied. This research strategy, based on the work of Mill’s (1843) method of difference, 
is defined as the selection of “systems that are as similar as possible, except with regard 
to the phenomenon, the effects of which we are interested in assessing. The reason for 
choosing systems that are similar is the ambition to keep constant as many extraneous 
variables as possible” (Anckar 2008: 389;; see also Przeworski and Teune 1970; Meckstroth 
1975). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Nordic countries share a series of 
political characteristics, but nevertheless do not share the same experience in terms of 
European integration. This is not only because of different outcomes of the referendums 
on membership, but also because of different positions adopted by the governments. As 
a result, the use of a most similar systems design is relevant for the purpose of this study. 
Furthermore, such research design is often used in comparative Nordic studies (see e.g. 
Valen 1976; Jacobsson et al. 2004). 
Several aspects of the relationship between the Nordic states (as a whole) and the 
European Union have been extensively discussed in the literature. Most of these studies 
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use a top-down approach when assessing the impact of Europeanisation on domestic 
politics (Svåsand and Lindstrøm 1996; Bergman and Damgaard 2000; Damgaard 2000; 
Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003; Dosenrode and Halkier 2004; Jacobsson et al. 2004; Lægreid 
et al. 2004; Bergman and Strøm 2011; Aylott et al. 2013). Other themes that have been 
developed in the literature are mass-level Euroscepticism (Miljan 1977; Archer 2000; 
Raunio 2007); corporatism (Ingebritsen 1998; see below); national identity (Hansen and 
Wæver 2002); or more general comparative studies (Miles 1995; 1996; Arter 1999; 2008; 
Heidar 2004b; Hilson 2008). The range of such studies thus demonstrates the relevance 
of comparing Nordic countries in the context of European integration. Nevertheless, 
studies with a particular focus on Nordic governments are rare or largely focus on a single 
aspect, such as the sectoral approach explored by Ingebritsen (1998). More broadly, there 
seems to be a lack of analysis related to government positions on horizontal European 
integration. Most scholars tend to analyse party positions on integration as a whole (Hix 
and Lord 1997; Hix 1999; Ray 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks 
and Steenbergen 2004; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a), or focus on government positions 
on vertical integration (Aspinwall 2002; 2007; see below). In order to fill this gap in the 
literature, several Nordic variables (developed in section 1.2) are used as hypotheses to 
determine whether they influence governments’ positions on (horizontal) European 
integration. Table 2.1 summarises the approach used in this thesis. 
Table 2.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Independent (Nordic) variables Dependent variable 
a. Relative strength of parties in parliament  
Nordic governments’ positions on 
European integration 
b. Composition of government  
c. Type of government 
d. Government ideology 
 
A total of five hypotheses derive from the selected Nordic variables outlined above: 
Relative strength of parties in parliament: the dominant party attitude towards European 
integration in parliament is expected to shape the government’s position over this issue. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: If there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in the parliament, 
then the government will be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with 
the European Union. 
Composition of government: the dominant party attitude towards European integration in the 
government is expected to shape the government’s position over this issue. Accordingly: 
H2: If there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in the government, 
then the government will be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with 
the European Union. 
Type of government: the type of government (either minority or majority) is expected to shape 
the government’s positions over this issue. This variable leads to two hypotheses: 
H3: A minority government will avoid putting the issue of European integration 
on top of its agenda. 
H4: A majority government will conversely adopt a stronger position on European 
integration.  
Government ideology:12 this variable draws on Hooghe et al.’s (2002) findings on party 
ideology and support for European integration, which suggests that non-centrist parties 
are more opposed to European co-operation than centrist parties are (see section 1.2). 
Aspinwall (2002: 106) explored this hypothesis with regards to government policy choices 
in the Council of Ministers and in Intergovernmental Conferences (i.e. in terms of vertical 
integration), and suggested that “centrist governments support integration whereas 
government composed of more extreme parties oppose it”. But do these findings apply 
in the context of horizontal European integration? In order to answer this, the following 
hypothesis is considered:  
H5: Government’s support for European integration will decline as it moves 
further to either the left or the right.  
The five hypotheses are all related to context specific domestic political issues which have 
been discussed in the previous chapter. Whereas the ‘strong tradition of social democratic 
parties’ is covered by hypotheses 1 and 2, the presence of socio-economic cleavages and 
                                                          
12 Government ideology (or partisanship) is herein defined as the location of the government on the 
traditional left-right political spectrum (see section 2.5). 
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the high electoral volatility are not directly related to government positions regarding 
European integration. Indeed, these variables mostly affect voting behaviour and, to a 
lesser extent, the nature of the party system rather than shaping government preferences 
(see for instance Bjørklund 1996; Knutsen 2004; Aylott 2011). Furthermore, two 
additional variables have already been explored in the literature: the relevance of 
corporatism and the importance of national sovereignty for small states. According to 
Ingebritsen (1998: 10), a sectoral approach illustrates “how and why European integration 
mattered differently to each of the Nordic States”: for instance, she determined that 
Sweden joined the European Union because the capital-intensive manufacturing sector 
lobbied in favour of EU membership, while Norway did not join because its agriculture 
and fisheries would have been threatened by such a membership, and the oil sector 
guaranteed Norway a future outside the EU. This sectoral analysis offers interesting 
insights in order to explain integration and variation between the Nordic states. However, 
several criticisms have been raised, e.g., by Gstöhl (2005: 38): “in Norway […] the 
interests tied to the most important industry, oil and gas, were inconsequential in the 
membership issue, while marginal sectors such as fishing and farming mattered”. It can 
also be added that the recent case of Iceland’s application for European Union 
membership seems to contradict this theory, as the leading fisheries sector did not support 
the government’s decision to apply for an EU membership in 2009. As this variable has 
already been discussed elsewhere, it is not included as a separate hypothesis in this 
analysis. Similarly, existing studies have emphasised the particular relationship between 
smaller states and supranational organisations. Indeed, as joining an organisation such as 
the European Union implies a loss of national sovereignty and a delegation of power to 
the supranational level, the importance of national independence and self-determination 
can determine Nordic government positions regarding European integration, as outlined 
in several studies (Liska 1968; Keohane 1969; Hansen and Wæver 2002).  
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that contextual factors played an important role 
in shaping the Nordic states’ relationship with the European Union. These factors can be 
internal (e.g. the principle of neutrality and/or military non-alignment) or external (e.g. 
geo-political constraints or specific relations with third states). Such features clearly 
matter, but their role is discussed elsewhere in the literature. This thesis is interested in 
the less studied domestic political factors outlined above. Nevertheless, each analytical 
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chapter will start by offering a comprehensive summary of contextual factors that have 
influenced the country’s relationship with the European Union.  
In order to answer the main research question and test the five hypotheses which have 
been developed in this section, this study uses a variety of research tools drawing on both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The following sections will discuss the 
methodological aspects of this study. 
 
2.2. Case selection  
This study utilises three in-depth, case study analyses of Nordic states, based on a most 
similar systems research design. As the main research question investigates variation 
between Nordic states, the reasoning behind the choice of national case studies as 
research method seems evident.13 As discussed in the introduction, all five Nordic states 
have opted for different levels and forms of European integration. To illustrate this, 
Figure 2.1 maps each Nordic state’s position towards the European Union.  
 
Figure 2.1 ‘Circles’ of differentiated European integration and positioning 
of the Nordic states 
 
 
                                                          
13 Burnham et al. (2004: 55) argued that “[c]arefully selected multiple cases will provide a much more robust 
test of a theory and can specify the conditions under which hypotheses and theories may or may not hold”.  
26 
 
As a full member of the European Union, Finland belongs to its ‘inner core’, where there 
is no differentiated integration. Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, are members 
that have negotiated various types of opt-outs, and thus belong to the ‘outer core’, where 
internal differentiation occurs. Iceland and Norway form a third category and belong to 
the ‘inner periphery’. They can therefore be considered as ‘quasi members’, i.e. non-
member states that have signed a range of agreements with the Union, which would 
provide evidence for external (and, in some cases, internal) differentiation. The ‘outer 
periphery’ is composed of the EU’s ‘neighbours’ who do not actively take part in the EU 
framework and never sought membership, but who nevertheless signed a series of 
bilateral agreements with the Union (e.g. countries belonging to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy).  
For the purpose of this study, I decided to focus on three of the five Nordic states in 
particular: Norway, Sweden and Finland. Three reasons justify this selection. First, they 
all belong to different ‘circles’ of differentiated integration (see Figure 2.1). Second, all 
three states applied for membership in the early 1990s, while any similar concerns 
remained non-salient in Iceland until 2009. Third, Denmark joined the (then) European 
Community in 1972, at a time when the ‘earthquake elections’ took place in the Nordic 
states, while the EU remained a non-salient issue in Finland, Iceland and Sweden (Arter 
2008). Accordingly, the analysis will focus on the events that occurred between 1990-1991 
(when the issue became politically salient at the national level)14 and 2010. During these 
decades, the relationships between the three selected Nordic states and the EU changed 
drastically. Furthermore, as outlined in the previous chapter, differentiated integration in 
the European Union became an institutional reality from the 1990s onwards. 
In order to break with the conventional membership/non-membership dichotomy and 
with regards to the concept of differentiated integration, five distinct government policies 
will be analysed:  
1) application for European Union membership;  
2) participation in the Schengen area;  
3) participation in the European Economic Area;  
4) participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union;  
                                                          
14 In the cases of Sweden and Norway, a brief description of the general elections held in the late 1980s 
(before the EU issue became salient) will be given.  
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5) and participation in the European Union Battle Groups [EUBG].  
Such selection aims to offer a broad understanding of horizontal differentiated in the 
European Union. The following paragraphs give a brief historic overview of each policy 
and justify this selection.  
Application for European Union membership 
In all three of the selected cases, the issue of ‘membership’ became politically salient in 
the early 1990s. Norway had previously applied twice (see Chapter 5), whereas Sweden 
submitted its first application on 1 July 1991, followed by Finland on 18 March 1992. 
Norway subsequently submitted a new application for membership on 25 November 
1992. Within the framework of this study, analysing government positions on EU 
membership from the early 1990s onwards will thus be relevant. 
European Economic Area membership 
In April 1984, the Luxembourg Declaration paved the way for closer co-operation 
between EFTA members and the then European Community (Lazowski 2006). The 
notion of ‘Espace économique européen’ (or European Economic Space) was discussed 
within the framework of this Declaration, building the premises of the future EEA. This 
project was characterised as “dynamic” and “homogeneous”, meaning that “the same 
legal rules should apply in all the participating countries and that the [European Economic 
Space] should develop in step with the Community” (Gstöhl 2002: 149). The ratification 
of the Single European Act in 1986 pushed non-EC countries to demand closer co-
operation on economic issues. In 1988, all political parties represented in the Swedish 
Parliament were able to reach consensus on a common position, which stated that 
“Swedish citizens and Swedish companies should in no way be discriminated against” 
(Riksdag’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 1988; quoted and translated in 
Gustavsson 1998: 60). This declaration paved the way for negotiations on what became 
the European Economic Area, with other EFTA governments (including Finland, Iceland 
and Norway) sharing the same views as Sweden. On 17 January 1989, President of the 
European Commission Jacques Delors presented his work plan for the newly appointed 
Commission to the European Parliament, setting up the future of EFTA-EC relations as 
one of the top priorities on the agenda (Lazowski 2006). Delors’ goal, commonly known 
as the ‘1992 project’, was to extend the four freedoms (goods, services, capital and 
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mobility) to EFTA member states (Emerson et al. 2002). In other words, this would mean 
extending the Single European Market to EFTA members. This proposition was warmly 
welcomed by all EFTA countries and negotiations officially started on 20 June 1990 
(Lazowski 2006). Whereas the EEA negotiations proved difficult for the Nordic EFTA 
countries since it meant giving up a bigger part of their sovereignty, an agreement was 
eventually reached in 1992, and following ratification by their respective parliaments,15 the 
EEA came into force on 1 January 1994.16  
Nowadays, the EEA can be considered as a ‘meta-agreement’ and covers about 75 per 
cent of European legislation.17 Yet it constitutes “the most prominent case of acquis 
export outside the enlargement paradigm” (Magen 2007: 377). Policies that are not 
included in the EEA are the EU’s external relations, the common agricultural, fisheries 
and transport policies, budget contributions and regional policy, taxation as well as the 
Economic and Monetary Union. As of 2014, besides all 28 EU member states, three ‘EU-
outsiders’ are members of this economic area: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The 
two other Nordic countries selected within the framework of this analysis, Finland and 
Sweden, were initially members the EEA, but eventually joined the European Union in 
1995.  
With regards to elite preferences on European integration, the distinction between EEA 
and EU membership has been outlined in the existing literature (Egeberg and Trondal 
1999; Raunio and Wiberg 2000). However, such contributions did not discuss party and 
government positions on the EEA/EU: instead, they focus on individual MPs’ positions 
as well as administrative staff’s perceptions (in Norway). Furthermore, there is no data 
available for Finland. As such, analysing government positions on EEA membership will 
contribute to the existing literature on this issue.  
Participation in the Schengen Area 
The Schengen agreement falls within the scope of the European policy Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice [AFSJ], formerly known as Justice and Home Affairs, which 
                                                          
15 Switzerland did not join the European Economic Area following the outcome of a popular referendum 
held in December 1992 on this issue (Kux and Sverdrup 2000). 
16 On the functioning of the EEA, see e.g. Andersen (2000); Kux and Sverdrup (2000); Emerson et al. 
(2002); Gstöhl (2002); Eliassen and Sitter (2003); Eriksen (2011). 
17 As of 2010, a total of 4182 legislative acts applied to Norway through the EEA, which demonstrates the 
complexity and the diversity of the agreement (Norges offentlige utredinger 2012).  
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constituted the third pillar of the European Union prior to the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009. The Schengen agreement was implemented in all five Nordic states on 25 
March 2001. This agreement is an example of both internal and external differentiation, 
as some member states opted out while some ‘EU outsiders’, including Iceland and 
Norway, opted in. It should be noted that these countries have co-operated in this policy 
area since 1958, with the implementation of the Nordic Passport Union. Considered as 
the precursor of the Schengen Area, this Union between Denmark (including the Faroe 
Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden removed internal border checks for 
citizens of these countries. In practice, this means that Nordic citizens can work and reside 
in any Nordic state without the need of a work and/or residence permit. Joining Schengen 
has been analysed as a mean to secure the future of Nordic co-operation in this policy 
area (Eiríksson 2004; Archer 2005). As this agreement constitutes one of the key policies 
of the AFSJ in which all Nordic states (including the two ‘EU-outsiders’) participate, it 
has been selected for analysis. 
Participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union18 
As a non-member of the European Union, participation in the EMU is not relevant to 
Norway’s experience of (differentiated) integration: the EMU constitutes a policy area in 
which only internal differentiation takes place. However, it is interesting to analyse the 
difference between the Finnish and Swedish cases: in the late 1990s, the Finnish 
government committed to join first wave entrants in the Eurozone, while its Swedish peer 
opposed such policy (see Chapters 3 and 4). In 2003, the government of Sweden 
campaigned in favour of introducing the Euro but the electorate rejected this proposal in 
a referendum. As of 2014, Sweden has yet to adopt the Euro despite being legally bound 
to join the third and final stage of the EMU. Analysing the variance in government 
positions regarding participation in this third stage of the EMU is thus pertinent.   
Participation in the European Union Battle Groups 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy area covers a wide range of agreements at the 
European level. Despite being a non-member of the EU, Norway nevertheless 
participates in some of these policies. One of these is the European Union Battle Group 
                                                          
18 Within the framework of this analysis, ‘participation in the Eurozone’, ‘EMU membership’ and ‘adopting 




concept. Established in 2004 and implemented for the first time in 2007, an EUBG is “a 
combined arms battalion-size force package with accompanying combat support and 
logistics unites ready for rapid deployment to almost anywhere around the world” 
(Andersson 2006: 22). EUBGs operate under a United Nations mandate and are available 
on stand-by rotation for a period of six months during which they should be ready to 
deploy within a few days’ notice. Moreover, EUBGs are “capable of managing a full range 
of tasks from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping missions to high intensity combat 
operations” (ibid.). Participation is based on voluntary co-operation. In other words, 
states decide whether to participate in such groups or not, which would imply a certain 
degree of horizontal differentiated integration. One of these forces is the Nordic Battle 
Group [NBG], which operated for the first time in the first half of 2008 and a second 
time in the first half of 2011. Seven countries participate in this NBG: Sweden (operating 
as framework nation), Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland, and from 2015 onwards, Latvia 
and Lithuania. In addition, Finland participated in the EU Battle Group 107 between 
January and June 2007 together with Germany and the Netherlands. Participation in 
EUBGs is of particular political significance, as it consists of making troops available to 
EU-led operations. Such policy seems thus particularly relevant to study government 
positions on participation in the CFSP policy area.  
In a nutshell, these five policies cover a range of areas in which various forms of 
horizontal differentiated integration take place and, as such, it goes beyond the EU/EEA 
membership dichotomy, as the latter agreement does not cover politicised areas such as 
the AFSJ, the CFSP and the EMU. Furthermore, policy areas where differentiation does 
not take place, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy, 
will not be covered in this analysis. 
In order to address the thesis’ key research question and test the hypotheses, one must 
first answer two methodological questions. First, how do we measure government and 
party positions on European integration? Second, how do we measure ‘government 





2.3. Data collection 
Analysing government positions and ideology first requires one to examine the political 
parties themselves, since “[t]he idea that the policies of governments are affected by the 
policies of the parties that comprise them is at the heart of the theory of representative 
democracy” (Budge and Laver 1993: 499) and as “government partisanship reflects party 
positions and the power distributions amongst the parties in power” (Kim and Fording 
2002: 187). In addition, the hypotheses explored in this study also reflect on party attitudes 
on European integration, especially with regards to hypothesis 1 (on the composition of 
parliament) and hypothesis 2 (on the composition of government). Hence, the focus is 
first set on party positions and party ideology, before moving on towards government 
stances and partisanship.  
Three types of data sources are used. First, the academic literature on the Nordic states is 
extensive and offers a goldmine of data. The descriptive elements offered in Chapters 3, 
4 and 5 are mostly based on this academic literature. Second, in order to assess parties’ 
and governments’ positions on Europe, three kinds of official documents have been analysed: 
party manifestos for all well-established parties19 that took part in the general elections 
between 1990 and 2010; statements of government policies presented before national 
parliaments when cabinets were formed; and parliamentary voting records for each policy 
selected (see previous section). These official sources offer an accurate way to identify 
party and government priorities regarding European integration. As most of these 
documents are only available in the national language, most of them have been translated 
with the help of native Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian speakers. Third, in order to 
triangulate the data stemming from the official documents, a total of 26 semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted with political elites. At least one MP or official 
representative (i.e. policy adviser or spokesperson, including party leaders and secretaries) 
for most well-established national party has been interviewed. Each interviewee was asked 
neutral questions on the three following themes: the history and ideology of ‘their’ 
political party; the party’s position regarding European integration; and how integration 
was broadly perceived in their country. While discussions were recorded with the consent 
of interviewees, a summary of the key statements used in this analysis were transcribed 
                                                          
19 In this study, a party is considered as ‘well-established’ in the national party system if it has been successful 
in gaining parliamentary seats in two consecutive general elections.  
32 
 
and sent for approval. In all cases, no changes were requested nor suggested. Where 
appropriate, interview quotes are used to support statements on party positions on 
European integration. More information on the interviews conducted and the selection 
process are given in Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4.  
In short, government and party positions on European integration were assessed by 
invoking existing academic literature, official documents, and elite interviews. 
 
2.4. Explaining party and government support for 
European integration: a new conceptual framework 
As discussed in the previous section, assessing government positions on European 
integration first requires focus on the party level. In order to understand these party 
preferences, this section draws on the literature on party-based Euroscepticism.  
The notion of Euroscepticism is herein used as the starting point for the analysis of party 
and government preferences on Europe and encompasses the idea of “contingent or 
qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the 
process of European integration” (Taggart 1998: 366). Since the late 1990s, studies of 
party-based Euroscepticism have flourished. Amongst these, three approaches stand out. 
This section explores this existing framework, and will then justify the use of a hybrid 
approach to conceptualise party and government preferences on Europe. Beforehand, 
however, it is important to bear in mind that this thesis does not aim to complicate the 
existing literature by offering a new categorisation of Euroscepticism or elite preferences 
on European integration. Instead, I suggest a deconstruction of the extent of party and 
government support (or opposition) to European integration per policy area where 
differentiation can, and has, taken place.  
Existing framework 
In an early attempt to categorise Euroscepticism and based on the aforementioned 
definition, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) made a distinction between hard and soft 
Euroscepticism. In their words: 
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Hard Euroscepticism is where there is a principled objection to the EU and 
European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their 
countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the 
EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European 
integration as it is currently conceived.  
Whereas 
Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European 
integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of 
policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where 
there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s 
trajectory (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008b: 7-8). 
 
This distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism offers a valuable tool for 
separating out those parties that are strongly opposed to European integration (i.e. ‘hard 
Eurosceptics’) and those that show signs of contingent opposition (i.e. ‘soft 
Eurosceptics’), “with attitude towards a country’s membership of the EU being viewed 
as the ultimate litmus test of whether one fell into the first or second camp” (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2008c: 240).  
This approach has however been criticised by scholars in the field. Kopecký and Mudde 
(2002), e.g., have argued that the definition of soft Euroscepticism is too broad, and it is 
therefore difficult to classify political parties as either hard or soft Eurosceptics (see also 
Mudde 2012). They have subsequently suggested a new typology which takes into account 
two dimensions: ‘support for European integration’ (divided between ‘Europhiles’ and 
‘Europhobes’) and ‘support for the European Union’ (divided between ‘EU-optimists’ 
and ‘EU-pessimists’). Drawing on these dimensions, the authors developed four ideal-
type categories of party positions on Europe: 
x Euroenthusiasts: parties supporting the general ideas of European integration and 
believing that the European Union is or will soon become the institutionalisation 
of these ideas (e.g. parties defending a strong Europe or a federal vision of 
Europe); 
x Eurosceptics: parties supporting the general ideas of European integration, but 
that are pessimistic about the European Union’s current and/or future reflection 
of these ideas (e.g. parties defending an intergovernmental vision of Europe with 
more powers for national institutions); 
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x Eurorejects: parties subscribing neither to the ideas underlying the process of 
European integration, nor to the European Union (e.g. parties defending a 
Europe of independent states); 
x Europragmatists: parties not supporting nor opposing the general ideas of 
European integration, but supporting the European Union (e.g. parties not having 
affirm ideological opinion on European integration, but “assessing the EU 
positively as they deem it profitable for their own country”; Kopecký and Mudde 
2002: 303). 
Even though this conceptualisation is analytically useful and can be considered as more 
specific than Taggart and Szczerbiak’s,20 it has also been criticised for its lack of accuracy 
and terminological problems. As stated by Henderson (2008: 118), “[t]he major weakness 
in the argument is one of imprecise definitions. What their analysis lacks is a systematic 
statement of the substantive attitudes towards European integration which divide 
Europhobia from Europhilia. The dividing line which parties do not cross is not explicitly 
defined” (see also Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008c). Furthermore, it does not take into 
account party preferences towards horizontal differentiated European integration, which is 
the main focus of this thesis. As such, a pro-CFSP, but anti-EMU, party would thus be 
difficult to place into either of these categories.  
Another major contribution to the study of party preferences on European integration 
has been developed by the so-called Chapel Hill School21 and has inspired the approach 
used in the present study. In an analysis of party positions on Europe, Ray (1999) asked 
experts to evaluate party stances on a seven-point scale: strongly opposed (score 1), 
opposed (2), somewhat opposed (3), neutral or no stance on the issue (4), somewhat in 
favour (5), in favour (6), and strongly in favour (7). This offers a more nuanced 
interpretation of party support for European integration than the crude distinctions 
between pro- and anti-EU or European integration as a whole. Hooghe et al. (2002) 
conducted a similar expert survey and asked a set of questions that disaggregated (vertical) 
                                                          
20 Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008c: 242) accepted Kopecký and Mudde’s critiques: “>w@e accept that our 
definition of Soft party-based Euroscepticism may, indeed, have been too broad and included parties that 
were in essence pro-European integration. >…@ In particular, we accept the weakness of using attitudes 
towards EU membership as the key definitional variable separating different party positions towards 
Europe”. 
21 The term ‘Chapel Hill School’ has been used by Aspinwall (2007). Mudde (2012), on the other hand, uses 
‘North Carolina School’. 
35 
 
European integration into component policies.22 As such, the authors were able to 
determine a party’s support for European integration and how it varied per policy area. 
Hybrid framework 
The conceptual framework used herein can be considered as a hybrid version of the above 
ones, and takes into account the criticisms that have been raised. The method adopted is 
inspired from Hooghe et al.’s approach as party support for (horizontal) European 
integration is divided into five key EU policies or policy areas: EEA membership; EU 
membership; participation in AFSJ policies; participation in CFSP policies; and 
participation in the EMU. These are the reflection of the five government policies selected 
and discussed in section 2.2, and cover areas where horizontal differentiated integration 
has taken place. It includes EU membership, which is ultimately used by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak to distinguish the hard Eurosceptics from the softer ones, as well as EEA 
membership as an alternative to participation in the Union. It also draws on Kopecký and 
Mudde’s categorisation as it includes aspects relating to party support for European 
integration (beyond support for the European Union) in three policy areas where 
differentiation occurs (i.e. CFSP, AFSJ and EMU). Nevertheless, the aim of this 
framework is not to categorise party-based Euroscepticism as such as this is likely to lead 
to further semantic confusion. The intention is rather to offer a more accurate 
measurement tool to capture preferences on European co-operation in the three Nordic 
states and in the policies where differentiated integration has taken place. As such, it will 
be demonstrated that ‘party support for European integration’ varies in the selected policy 
areas. 
Based on the academic literature, party manifestos and elite interviews, party support for 
integration in the aforementioned policy areas is measured on a scale running from ++ 
to --, as described in Table 2.2. Such table is used to summarise party preferences on 
European integration in the three country case studies developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
                                                          
22 The EU policies selected by Hooghe et al. (2002: 967) are: “EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, 
EU asylum policy, EU employment policy, EU fiscal policy, EU foreign policy, and expanding the 
European Parliament’s power”. 
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Table 2.2. Conceptualisation of party preferences on European 
integration 
 Policy area a Policy area b Policy area c 
Party a x ++ means that the official party line stands in favour of 
participation in the policy area, and that there are no 
internal party divisions on this issue; 
x + means that the official party line stands in favour of 
participation in the policy area, but that there are internal 
party divisions on this issue; 
x 0 means that the party does not adopt an official position 
on participation in the policy area, or remains neutral on 
this issue; 
x - means that the official party line is opposed to 
participation in the policy area, but that there are internal 
party divisions on this issue; 
x -- means that the official party line is opposed to 
participation in the policy area, and that there are no 





The thesis ultimately aims to analyse government preferences on European 
integration. Hence, a similar scale is used to measure such positions and is used as 
a tool to compare the different Nordic governments (see Chapter 6 for the 
comparative analysis): 
 
x ++ means that the government as a whole is in favour of integration in 
this policy area; 
x + means that the government’s official position is in favour of integration 
in this policy area, but that there are some divisions amongst ministers; 
x 0 means that the government does not have an official position on this 
policy area, or remains neutral on this issue;  
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x - means that the government’s official position is against integration in 
this policy area (thus promoting differentiated integration), but that there 
are some divisions amongst ministers; 
x -- means that that the government as a whole is against integration in this 
policy area (thus promoting differentiated integration); 
x N/A means that a policy area or issue was not politically salient at that 
time. 
 
Such a scale presents a series of advantages. First, it constitutes a solid basis to compare 
party and government positions in the three case countries, thus paving the way for a 
subsequent comparative analysis. Second, it takes into account the internal divisions that 
are likely to prevail, the smaller intra-party factions that do not necessarily share the views 
of the official line, as well as coalition governments which may include a diverse set of 
parties with diverging preferences. Third, with regards to hypothesis 1 (on the relative 
strength of parties in parliament) and hypothesis 2 (on the composition of government), 
the method adopted herein will offer a comprehensive and more accurate way to 
determine whether parties are pro- or anti-integrationists in specific policy areas.  
However, this approach also raises certain questions and displays some limitations. For 
instance, by deconstructing support and opposition in specific policy areas, it can be 
interpreted as a way to further complicate the broader picture. Hence, as outlined by 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008c: 249): “how many extensions of sovereignty must a party 
oppose before it can be categorized as Eurosceptic?” This is why such categorisations will 
not be made in this thesis. Instead, and bearing in mind that some parties (and 
governments) are strongly divided on European issues, the method used will be more 
specific than the existing classification schemes are. Hence, in this analysis, parties and 
government will not be considered as ‘Eurosceptics’ or ‘Europhiles’, but as pro-
integrationists, anti-integrationists or divided on participation in the aforementioned 




2.5. Measuring government ideology 
The fifth hypothesis explored in this study states that a government’s support for 
European integration will decline as it moves further to either the left or the right. In 
order to test this hypothesis, one must first determine how to measure government 
ideology.  
This section explores the methods used to determine government positions on the 
traditional left-right scale. It first focuses on party ideology, and offers a review of the 
various techniques used in the existing literature, before moving on to discuss government 
ideology measurements.     
 
Measuring party positions on the left-right scale 
 
In order to study party (and government) ideology within the context of European 
integration, Hooghe et al. (2002) determined that two dimensional considerations of 
ideology can be considered: the basic left/right dimension and the ‘new politics’ 
dimension. The fomer dimension is divided into three models: 
x The regulation model, according to which “European politics is fused to the basic 
domestic competition between the Left, which pushes for common economic 
regulation across Europe, and the Right, which favors less regulation”; 
x The Hix-Lord model (based on Hix and Lord 1999), according to which “party 
positioning on domestic issues and party positioning on European issues are 
orthogonal to each other”; 
x And the Hooghe-Marks model, according to which “the Center-Left supports 
European integration in cohesion policy, social policy, unemployment policy, 
environmental regulation, and upgrading the European Parliament, whereas the 
Right supports market integration but opposes European reregulation” (Hooghe 
et al. 2002: 917-972). 
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In addition to the third model, the authors have introduced a “new politics” dimension 
to explain party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration, ranging 
from Green/Alternative/Libertarian (or GAL) to Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist 
(TAN). According to their study, “this dimension is the most general ande powerful 
predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration” (ibid.: 
966). The present study, however, decided to focus on the traditional left/right 
dimension, linked to developments at the domestic level. The existence of this second 
dimension explored by Hooghe et al. should nevertheless be borne in mind, as it 
constitutes an important part of the literature on European integration. 
 
The literature acknowledges three methods for measuring party ideology (Castles and 
Mair 1984; Budge et al. 1987; Laver and Hunt 1992; Laver and Schofield 1998; Kim and 
Fording 2002; Aspinwall 2007). The first one is expert judgements, which involves asking 
(mostly country) experts to locate parties in the left-right space;23 the second, which is 
used in the second part of this thesis to determine party positions on European integration 
per policy area, is analysis of party documents;24 and the third one is mass public opinion survey, 
consisting of analysing the results of large-scale surveys, such as the Eurobarometer 
surveys.25 The advantages and shortcomings of each method have been extensively 
discussed in the literature (see e.g. Laver and Schofield 1998; Ray 1999; Budge et al. 2001; 
Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Aspinwall 2007). 
Based on a broad expert survey, Castles and Mair (1984), and later Huber and Inglehart 
(1995), assessed party space and party locations in 42 societies including Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In 1999, the Chapel Hill School conducted a 
similar survey (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004); however, this dataset 
only focused on the member states, and thus excluded Norway. As a consequence, the 
latter dataset is incomplete for the purpose of this thesis. In addition, Huber and 
Inglehart’s survey was conducted at the beginning of the period analysed (1993) and the 
data do not enable us to trace the evolution of party ideology over time. Finally, such 
methods can also be considered as rather subjective as they mostly rely on the prior 
                                                          
23 This method is used and developed, e.g., in de Swaan (1973); Taylor and Laver (1973); Dodd (1976); 
Castles and Mair (1984); Huber and Inglehart (1995); Marks and Steenbergen (2004). 
24 See e.g. Budge et al. (1987); Laver and Budge (1992); Budge et al. (2001).  
25 See e.g. Inglehart and Klingemann (1976); Sani and Sartori (1983); Hix and Lord (1997).  
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knowledge of the experts (Laver and Garry 2000). For these reasons, the expert surveys 
are not used. 
Several large scale opinion surveys have been regularly conducted in the Nordic states. 
Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996), e.g., assessed the evolution of voters’ perception of party 
locations between 1979 and 1991, and Grendstad (2003) then conducted a similar survey 
in 1999. In this study, the use of this method has also been dismissed for two main 
reasons. First, datasets for the whole period analysed in this thesis are not provided for in 
the literature. Second, mass public opinion surveys do not reflect actual party positions 
on the left-right scale, but rather the population’s perception of party positions.  
In their detailed Comparative Manifesto Project [CMP], Budge et al. (2001) and then 
Klingemann et al. (2006) have also analysed Nordic policy preferences.26 A total of 55 
countries are included in this database, including all five Nordic states. Using a 
methodology based on Kim and Fording (1998; 2002), Klingemann et al. (2006: 5) have 
codified party positions on a scale from -100 to +100: “negative scores represent left 
positions and positive scores represent right positions. >…@ At the extreme (never in 
practice attained) a party devoting its entire programme to left-wing issues would score -
100: similarly a totally right-wing programme would score +100”. In order to determine 
party score on this CMP scale, a total of 56 categories were coded in the manifesto project; 
out of these categories, 26 were selected as capturing ideological tendencies (see Table 
2.3); for each party manifesto, the percentage of all statements comprised by each category 
is calculated; finally, in order to determine the party score on the -100/+100 CMP scale, 
the left content from the right content of the manifesto is subtracted.  
                                                          
26 An updated database is available on the CMP website: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/  
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Table 2.3 Categories from the Comparative Manifesto Project capturing 
ideological tendencies 
Right-wing categories Left-wing categories 
Military: Positive Decolonisation, Anti-imperialism 
Freedom, Human Rights Military: Negative 
Constitutionalism: Positive Peace 
Political Authority Internationalism: Positive 
Free Enterprise Democracy 
Economic Incentives Regulate Capitalism, Market 
Protectionism: Negative Economic Planning 
Economic Orthodoxy Protectionism: Positive 
Social Services Limitation Controlled Economy 
National Way of Life: Positive Nationalisation 
Traditional Morality: Positive Social Services: Expansion 
Law and Order Education: Expansion 
Social Harmony Labour Groups: Positive 
 Source: Klingemann et al. (2006) 
Such data is available for Finland, Sweden and Norway throughout the period analysed, 
and for each general election year. This information also enables researchers to trace the 
evolution of party ideologies over time: for instance, some right-wing parties could 
present a more left-oriented manifesto depending on the evolving domestic context. 
Moreover, such analysis is more accurate than the two aforementioned methods, as it 
directly relies on primary sources, i.e. party manifestos, which are also used in this study 
to determine party positions on European integration per policy area. As a result, party 
positions on the left-right scale are measured by using this method.  
Nevertheless, some shortcomings of this method have been outlined in the literature. 
Lowe et al. (2011), Benoit et al. (2012) and Geminis (2012) discussed its ‘centrist bias’: in 
their views, the saliency approach (i.e. dividing the difference of ‘right’- and ‘left’-coded 
content by the total number of text units) by necessity push towards the middle ground. 
This is due to the fact that “[t]he denominator will increase whenever the number of total 
text units increases, moving the resulting scale position closer to zero, even when the new 
text units are not in any way related to the scale in question” (Benoit et al. 2012: 606).  
Furthermore, according to Benoit and Laver (2006: 68), the left-right scale used in the 
Comparative Manifesto Project is “out of date”, and they illustrate this by examining party 
positions on environmental issues: “[i]f a party in the CMP dataset starts talking more 
about the environment and less about other content categories in the CMP left-right scale, 
then it will appear to be becoming more centrist”. Despite these criticisms, the CMP 
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database and method used to determine party positioning on the left-right scale is seen as 
the most appropriate one for the purpose of this study. 
 
Measuring government positions on the left-right scale 
 
Kim and Fording (2002) offered a review of the methods used to assess government 
partisanship. The first one is directly linked to election results, and takes into account the 
total amount of votes received by left- and right-wing parties. For instance, Cameron 
(1978: 1248) “summed the votes received in the previous national legislative election by 
all parties participating in the government (i.e. holding cabinet positions) and divided the 
total into the number of votes received by all Social Democratic, Socialist, Labor, 
Communist and smaller leftist parties that were participants in government”. This way of 
calculating government partisanship was mostly used in the 1970s. The second, developed 
in the mid-1980s, consists of calculating the percentage of ministries held by left- or right-
wing parties (Cameron 1984; Jackman 1987; Lange and Garrett 1987; Hicks 1988; Korpi 
1989; Alvarez et al. 1991). The third uses “the proportion of cabinet seats held by parties 
of the left minus the proportion of cabinet seats held by parties of the right” (Kim and 
Fording 2002: 189; see also Blais et al. 1996). While these three conceptualisations offer a 
clear distinction between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’, they cannot capture the intensity of 
ideology. In other words, they do not take into account the fact that some leftist (or 
rightist) parties will be more left- or right-oriented than others. In consequence, “these 
measures of government ideology based on dichotomous measures of party ideology are 
likely subject to significant measurement error” (Kim and Fording 2002: 189). As an 
alternative to these flawed methods and based on the Comparative Manifesto Project’s 
database, Kim and Fording (ibid.) suggested an equation to calculate government 
ideology: 
 
∑ {Ideologyi * (#Postsi/Total Posts)} 
Where:  
#Postsi = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i;  
Ideologyi = the ideology of party I (i.e. the value on the CMP scale); and 





Such a method would enable researchers to properly quantify government positions on 
the left-right scale. The results will fluctuate on the CMP scale, from -100  to +100, though 
such extremes are never in practice attained. In order to assess government partisanship 
with regards to hypothesis 5 (i.e. government support for European integration will decline as 
governments move further to either the left or right), three general categories are suggested:  
 
x Left-wing governments are governments whose ideology is comprised between -
100 and -11 on the CMP scale; 
x Centrist (or centre-oriented) governments are governments whose ideology is 
comprised between -10 and +10 on the CMP scale; 
x Right-wing governments are governments are governments whose ideology is 
comprised between +11 and +100 on the CMP scale. 
 
Such categories offer a balanced distinction between left-wing, centrist and right-wing 
governments. Taking into consideration the fact that party ideology in practice fluctuates 
between -50 and +50 (see e.g. Klingemann et al. 2006), it is considered that centrist values 
fluctuate between -10 and +10. Within the framework of this analysis, partisanship has 
been calculated for each government in each case country between 1990 and 2010. This 
data is available in Appendix 5. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the design and methodology of the research presented in this 
thesis. It has justified the use of a most similar systems research design and formulated 
five hypotheses stemming from the ‘Nordic variables’ discussed in the previous chapter. 
It has argued that whereas internal and external contextual factors have been discussed 
elsewhere, this work focuses on four domestic political factors: composition of 
parliament, composition of government, type and ideology of government. As such, this 
study aims at determining whether these domestic factors affect government positions on 
European integration.   
This chapter has also introduced the research methods used to answer the main research 
question. It has justified the case selection and the use of three in-depth country case 
studies (i.e. Finland, Sweden and Norway) with a particular focus on five key policies 
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where differentiated integration takes place (i.e. EEA membership, EU membership, 
participation in Schengen, participation in the third stage of the EMU and participation 
in EUBGs).  
The following three chapters will offer in-depth empirical analyses for the three selected 
country case studies. Chapter 3 will focus on Finland, which belongs to the ‘inner core’ 
of the European Union. Chapter 4 will analyse Sweden, which is located in the ‘outer 
core’. Finally, the fifth chapter will investigate Norway as country located in the ‘inner 
periphery’ of the EU. Each of these empirical chapters concludes with a section 
connecting the empirical findings to the five hypotheses explored. Chapter 6 will then 
offer a comparative analysis of the three case studies: in this chapter, the hypotheses 







Chapter 3. Finland 
 
3.1. Relations between Finland and the European Union: 
from  ‘belated  European’  to  proactive  member  state 
As of 2014, Finland’s relationship with the European Union is rather simple to draw. 
Indeed, as a full member since 1995, Finland belongs to the ‘inner core’ of the EU (see 
Figure 2.1). Furthermore, and unlike its Nordic neighbours, Finland is a full member of 
the Eurozone. However, this relationship has been historically challenged, mostly because 
of Finland’s geopolitical location between Europe and Russia (Arter 1999;; Aylott et al. 
2013). The aim of this section is to give a brief historical analysis of the evolution of 
Finland’s relationship with the European Union, from EFTA membership to joining the 
Eurozone.  
Box 3.1 Timeline:  Finland’s  major  steps  towards integration 
Date Agreement 
1961 Associate membership, European Free Trade Association 
1973 Free trade agreement with the European Economic Community 
1986 Full membership, European Free Trade Association 
1989 Membership, Council of Europe 
1992 Application for European Union Membership 
1994 Membership, European Economic Area 
1995 Membership, European Union 
1996 Membership, Schengen Area (implemented in 2001, jointly with the other 
Nordic states) 
1999 Joining the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union 
2007 Participation in the EU Battle Group 107 (ready for operations between 
January and June)  
2008 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
2011 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
 
As an ally to Germany during the Second World War, Finland had to accept terms of 
peace mentioned in the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947. As a consequence of those terms, 
Finland’s geopolitical position between East and West “led into a special relationship with 
the Soviet Union” (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003: 22), meaning that the country had to 
take account of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]’s interests in terms of 
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foreign policy. In order to compensate for this ‘special relationship’, the policy of 
neutrality has been introduced in the 1950s, and has been broadly accepted by the Finnish 
political elite. This neutrality could be perceived in the range of agreements signed by 
Finland and Western Europe between the 1950s and the late 1980s, becoming for instance 
a full EFTA member in 1986, twenty-six years after its foundation, and becoming the last 
Nordic state to join the association (see Box 3.1). For these reasons, Finland is often 
considered as a “belated European” (Arter 1995a: 364). Furthermore, due to this policy 
of neutrality, Finland did not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO].  
When discussions over the future European Economic Area arose in 1989, Finland 
welcomed this opportunity and political elites did not see it as a threat to the policy of 
neutrality. On the contrary, the economic incentives of EEA membership led to a large 
political consensus. Such membership was perceived compatible with Finland’s foreign 
affairs, especially since this policy area as well as agriculture and regional policies were not 
included in the agreement (Väyrynen 1993; Tiilikainen 1996). 
Due to Finland’s neutrality and relationship with the USSR, it could have been expected 
that an EU membership would have become conceivable following the Revolutions of 
1989 and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, which precipitated the formal 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Pesonen and Riihinen 2002). However, in 
practice, these events barely influenced Finland’s decision to apply. Instead, and besides 
domestic economic difficulties common to all Nordic countries in the early 1990s,27 
Sweden’s intention to apply for membership in October 1990 (see further Chapter 4) 
constituted the main event leading to discussions on the European issue in Finland. The 
membership option, nonetheless, was not raised during the 1991 general election 
campaign. The Finnish government eventually applied for a membership in March 1992 
(Sundberg 1992; Törnudd 1996; Mayes and Suvanto 2002; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003; 
see also section 3.3.1). In other words, Nordic influence shaped the Finnish government’s 
decision to apply for joining the EU. Similarly to Austria, Norway and Sweden, 
negotiations with the European Commission were facilitated by the recent EEA accession 
negotiations, covering about 75 per cent of the whole acquis communautaire. As a result, 
and despite minor difficulties on issues mostly related to the agricultural sector (Kivimäki 
1997), accession talks were concluded in one year and the agreement included the whole 
                                                          
27 On these economic difficulties, see Pesonen (1994); Arter (1995a); Aylott et al. (2013). 
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range of policy areas covered by the EU, without any opt-outs. A referendum on the 
accession treaty was then organised on 16 October 1994, and the Finnish population 
voted in favour of EU membership with a majority of 56.9 per cent.28 
Following its accession, several observers expected that Finland would behave as a 
‘reluctant European’ (in the words of Miljan 1977) by not pursuing an active European 
policy and fighting against the processes of deepening and widening European integration 
(Arter 1995a; Miles 1995). Furthermore, the principle of neutrality was seen as 
problematic, especially in terms of participation in a common foreign and security policy. 
Unlike its Nordic neighbours, however, Finland decided not only to be part of the inner 
core of the EU, but also to play an active role in Brussels by initiating policies. Four 
contextual factors explain this strong national involvement.  
First, while it was expected that Finland’s neutrality would be an obstacle to full 
participation in the CFSP, the Finnish government declared that such principle was 
compatible with this European policy (Ingebritsen and Larson 1997; Raunio and 
Tiilikainen 2003). Progressively, official political discourses replaced the notion of 
‘neutrality’ by ‘military non-alignment’, which now constitutes the hard core of Finland’s 
foreign policy (Törnudd 1996). However and despite some debates over this issue in the 
early 1990s, NATO membership has always been considered as infringing upon the 
principle of military non-alignment. 
Second, by seeking membership, Finland intended to use the European Union as a tool 
to exert and extend its influence amongst the Nordic states and, to a broader extent, in 
Western Europe. Indeed, while Finland was constrained by its ‘special relationship’ with 
the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, other states founded transnational consultative 
committees such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Regional Council (initiated by Norway) and 
the Council of Baltic Sea States (initiated jointly by Denmark and Germany). In order to 
break with the country’s reputation of ‘belated European’, the Finnish authorities decided 
to play a proactive role at the European level from early 1995 onwards. Accordingly, the 
Finnish government launched the Northern Dimension Initiative in 1997, which aims to 
                                                          
28 For constitutional reasons, a separate referendum was held in the Åland islands on 20 October 1994. 73.6 
per cent of the population voted in favour of joining the EU.  
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improve co-operation between the European Union and various regional organisations 
from Northern Europe (Arter 2000a). 
Third, Finland’s geopolitical position and identity as frontier state reinforced the 
willingness to play an active role in the European integration process, as well as to 
promote the democratisation of the Eastern region. Indeed, as mentioned above, Finland 
is located on the edge between East and West, and thus the government wanted the state 
to play a significant role in the new post-Cold War Europe, particularly in terms of 
communications between Russia and the EU. Accordingly, by joining the European 
Union, one of Finland’s initial goal was to convince Brussels to “assist the Russian 
economy, and to promote democratic institution-building in Russia and the Baltic states” 
(Ingebritsen and Larson 1997: 211). 
Fourth, especially during the first years that followed membership, Finland’s economy 
had recovered from a severe crisis that hit the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This offered incentives to deepen European integration and, in particular, to join the third 
stage of the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 (Mayes and Suvanto 2002). Even 
though all Nordic countries suffered from economic crises during this period, the Finnish 
case was the most striking one due to its dependence on the Soviet Union. 
These contextual factors contribute to explain why Finnish governments have opted for 
such a proactive role at the European level from 1995 onwards, to eventually become the 
most integrated Nordic country. In this study, the emphasis is set on domestic political 
variables (i.e. the relative strength of parties in parliament, the composition and type of 
government, as well as its ideology) in order to provide a clear and concise comparative 
analysis. The next section will now explore the Finnish political system within the context 
of European integration, and will give an overview of each well-established political 
party’s position on this issue.  
 
3.2. The Finnish Party System and European Integration 
Unlike its Nordic neighbours (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) but as Iceland, Finland is 
a republic. The head of state is a democratically elected president for a renewable six-year 
mandate (since 1994). In the past decades, the Finnish political system has evolved from 
semi-presidentialism (with dual leadership shared by the president and the prime minister) 
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to a (nearly)29 parliamentary system of government following a constitutional reform 
introduced in March 2000 (Nousiainen 2001). Whereas the powers of the president were 
relatively strong until the end of the 1990s (Anckar 2000), the new constitution has 
empowered the Finnish national parliament (the Eduskunta), leaving the president with 
mostly representative and symbolic competences.30 Four reasons have been raised in 
order to justify these constitutional changes. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
led to major changes in the nature of Finland’s foreign policy, and to a depersonalisation 
of this policy field. Second, (majority) coalition governments became increasingly stable 
from the 1980s onwards, reducing the need for presidential intervention in day-to-day 
politics. Third, the strong presidential role played by Urho Kekkonen, President of 
Finland between 1956 and 1982, did not please political parties who called for 
constitutional reforms to restrict presidential competences as early as the 1980s. Finally, 
Finland’s membership in the European Union has changed the nature of foreign affairs, 
implying the need for the government to play a more proactive role in foreign policy and 
to increase parliamentary accountability (Paloheimo 2003).  
Nevertheless, it appears that the role of the prime minister (and, more generally, of the 
government) in foreign policy has been decisive prior to the constitutional reform of 2000, 
including when the Finnish government decided to apply for an EU membership. Indeed, 
the initiative came from Prime Minister Esko Aho, and not from the president’s office 
(see further section 3.3.1). Furthermore, all Finnish interviewees mentioned that since 
Finland’s intention to join the European Economic Area in the early 1990s, the prime 
minister has taken the lead in shaping the governments’ positions on European 
integration. Therefore and for the sake of comparative research, the role and position of 
the president in terms of shaping Finland’s relationship with the European Union will not 
be analysed for this study, as the main research question focuses on government positions. 
The analysis of the Finnish case starts with the parliamentary election of 1991, as the 
European issue became salient during this election campaign. Since then, a total of eight 
parties have been successful in securing seats in the Eduskunta. These parties are: the 
conservative National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus, KOK); the Social Democratic 
                                                          
29 The Finnish political system still shows minor features of semi-presidentialism, such as the right for the 
president to appoint some top civil servants (Nousiainen 2001; Paloheimo 2003).  
30 For a detailed evolution of the prerogatives of parliament, government and president in the Finnish 
constitution, see Paloheimo (2003). 
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Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP); the agrarian Centre Party (Keskusta, 
KESK);; the liberal Swedish People’s Party (Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue, or in Swedish 
Svenska folkpartiet i Finland, RKP); the Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit, KD, 
formerly named Christian Union, Suomen Kristillinen Liitto, until 2001); three ‘new politics’ 
parties, the Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, VAS), belonging to the socialist left party family; 
the Green League (Vihreä Liitto, VIHR, also sometimes referred to as Green Association); 
and the populist right Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset, PS; formerly translated in English as 
‘True Finns’). The Finns Party is the only party that has never been appointed at the 
executive level. Table 3.1 summarises the score of those parties in general elections held 
during the period analysed. 
Table 3.1 Percentage vote for Finnish political parties in parliamentary 
elections, from 1991 to 2007  
 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 
Centre Party (KESK) 24.8 19.8 22.4 24.7 23.1 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) 22.1 28.2 22.9 24.5 21.4 
National Coalition Party (KOK) 19.3 17.9 21.0 18.5 22.3 
Left Alliance (VAS) 10.0 11.2 10.9 9.9 8.8 
Green League (VIHR) 6.8 6.5 7.3 8.0 8.5 
Swedish People’s Party (RKP) 5.5 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.6 
Rural/Finns Party (SMP – PS) 1 (4.85) (1.3) 1.0 1.6 4.1 
Christian Democrats (KD) 3.0 3.0 4.2 5.3 4.9 
Others 3.5 6.9 5.3 2.3 2.3 
Turnout 72.1 71.9 68.3 69.7 67.8 
Source: Sundberg (1992; 1996; 2000; 2004; 2008). 
1 The Finns Party ran for election for the first time in 1999, succeeding the Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun 
Puolue, SMP) – see section 3.2.6.3. 
 
 
This section gives a brief history of each of these parties and analyses the evolution of 
their position on European integration according to the methodology previously outlined 
(see section 2.4). In order to offer a relevant comparative tool, this section is divided into 
one sub-section per party family for each empirical chapter. The final sub-section then 
offers a broad comparison between all well-established parties in terms of preferences 




3.2.1. Conservative Party 
The National Coalition Party is a centre-right conservative type of party, founded in 1918. 
With the Social Democratic and Centre parties, it is considered as one of the ‘big three’ 
of Finland, which shared between 57.5 per cent (in 1962) and 67.8 per cent (in 2003) of 
votes altogether (Arter 2012). However, between 1966 and 1987, KOK was excluded 
from coalition governments because of Moscow’s influence over Finnish domestic 
politics (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003). The party is ideologically close to the Centre Party 
and, to a lower extent, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party.31 At the 
Nordic level, KOK co-operates with its conservative peers mostly through the Nordic 
Council.32 At the European level, it is a member of the European People’s Party. Between 
the 1991 and 2007 general elections, the electoral score of the party fluctuated between 
17.9 per cent (in 1995) and 22.3 per cent (in 2007).  
The National Coalition Party has always been supportive of European integration, despite 
being opposed to the concept of European federalism (Johansson and Raunio 2001). It 
can even be argued that it is the most united party on this issue, as well as the most pro-
European party of Finland. Advocating an EU membership above the EEA from 1991 
onwards (Kansallinen Kokoomus 1991), the party has also been supporting developments 
in the CFSP and the AFSJ (mostly through participation in the Schengen Area). When 
the issue became salient in the late 1990s, KOK unilaterally supported participation in the 
third stage of the EMU, outlining its economic benefits and its effects on the inflation. 
On this issue, the party did not call for the organisation of a referendum, as it was the 
case in Sweden (see further Chapter 4).33 However, the party has been more critical 
towards the Common Agricultural Policy as well as regional/structural policies, arguing 
in its 1999 and 2003 manifestos that these policies were not successful in Finland 
(Kansallinen Kokoomus 1998; 2003). Nevertheless, the National Coalition Party can still 
                                                          
31 “We have a very strong positive opinion about the Centre Party. I think we are quite close to them. The 
Christian Democrats, the Swedish People’s Party too. For them, language is an important issue, but within 
the party, they have a very similar line to us” (Interview with a MP and a spokesperson from the National 
Coalition Party, 14 May 2013). 
32 “I am member of the Nordic Council, and we have a Conservative group, in which there is our party, the 
Moderates, Høyre.  In Denmark, there is no similar party in the Conservative group.” (ibid.).  
33 “I think that was a natural way, because we were already in the European Union, so it was the right choice 
to solve that issue in the parliament” (ibid.). 
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be considered as a pro-EU party that does not see differentiated integration as an option 
for Finland. 
 
3.2.2. Social Democratic Party 
The Finnish Social Democratic Party, founded in 1899, is the oldest and historically largest 
party of Finland, having gained an average of 25 per cent of votes in parliamentary 
elections since the end of the Second World War (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003). 
Considered as a centre-left party, SDP closely co-operates with other Nordic social 
democratic parties and, in the European Parliament, is part of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats. At the national level, the party is ideologically close to the Left 
Alliance, but co-operates closely with the two other parties of the ‘big three’, i.e. the 
National Coalition and the Centre parties.34 During the period analysed, the party’s 
electoral performance at the national level fluctuated between 21.4 per cent (in 2007) and 
28.25 per cent (in 1995, which is also the largest electoral score ever obtained by a political 
party since Finland’s independence). 
The Social Democratic Party’s on European integration has been largely positive. In 
November 1991, while being the largest political party in opposition and shortly before 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the party demanded that Finland apply for an EU 
membership, while this option was not yet considered by Esko Aho’s cabinet (see section 
3.3.1). Even though this decision was not unanimous within the party leadership, there 
were no major challenges and members opposed to such policy did not create a faction 
inside the party, as Labour members did in Norway (Johansson and Raunio 2001; on 
Norway, see Chapter 5). Despite being in the opposition then, the party thus fully 
supported the government’s decision to apply for an EU membership and campaigned 
for the Yes-side in 1994. The party was also the first one to position itself in favour of 
Finland’s participation in the third stage of the EMU: as early as 1993, the party executive 
committee stated that the EMU supports long-term economic growth and is in Finland’s 
interest. In 1997, the party congress almost unanimously voted in favour of joining the 
                                                          
34 “Originally, the Left Alliance is close to us as we belong to the same mother party. […] In order to 
understand the Finnish system, you just need to understand that we do not have a two-block system like in 
Sweden for instance. […] You have to be prepared that two or three of the biggest parties might form the 
basis of the government” (Interview with a spokesperson from the Social Democratic Party, 15 May 2013). 
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third stage of the EMU (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue 1998). The party has also 
supported Schengen membership and further co-operation in the AFSJ. The only policy 
area in which SDP showed some signs of reluctance is the CFSP, as the party does not 
want the EU to develop a common defence policy (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003; Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue 2003). Nevertheless, the party does not promote 
differentiated integration for Finland. In sum, SDP wants Finland to play an active role 
at the European level and thus to be part of the EU’s ‘inner core’.  
 
3.2.3. Agrarian Party 
The Centre Party is an agrarian, moderate party located at the centre of the political 
spectrum and founded in 1906 as a countryside movement. Since then, the party has been 
more powerful in the countryside areas. However, unlike other its Nordic counterparts 
and despite being qualified as agrarian, KESK was not originally an interest group for 
farmers but a party based on the urban-rural cleavage (Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003).35 
Ideologically close to the Swedish People’s Party at the national level,36 the party also co-
operates closely with its Nordic counterparts (Venstre in Denmark, and both Centre 
parties in Norway and Sweden). At the European level, KESK belongs to the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe [ALDE]. During the period analysed, except in 1999 
by a small margin of 0.5 per cent, KESK has been Finland’s largest party represented in 
the Eduskunta, with electoral results fluctuating between 22.4 per cent (in 1999) and 24.8 
per cent (in 1991). 
According to many analysts (Väyrynen 1993; Raunio and Tiilikainen 2003; Raunio 2005; 
Aylott et al. 2013), the Centre Party has been the party that suffered the most from 
divisions on the issue of European integration in Finland. Indeed, most of its supporters 
but also elite members were strongly opposed to an EU membership in the early 1990s. 
The main reason to explain this division is the legacy of the party’s charismatic Leader 
and former President of Finland Urho Kekkonen, who led the country for more than 25 
years under the powerful influence of Moscow (Väyrynen 1993). As a result, whereas 
                                                          
35 “We are a very strong party amongst farmers but […] from the beginning, our ideology was not to become 
an interest group for farmers. The ideology has something to do with the relations concerning individual 
responsibility and social responsibility. […]” (Interview with a spokesperson from the Centre Party, 16 May 
2013). 
36 “If you look at the history, the Swedish People’s Party is very close to us” (ibid.). 
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some party members called for a change in the party’s position on European co-operation, 
others wanted to keep the traditional stance and to preserve the whole concept of 
neutrality. These internal divisions were perceived in the party platform presented in 1990: 
“[w]hile participating in the European integration project, Finland needs to maintain its 
political and economic independence along with its national characteristics. Economic 
independence has its political dimension as well. Only a truly independent country can be 
neutral” (Keskusta 1990).37 This party platform did not call for joining the European 
Union, but for Finland to be an ‘active European’ (aktiivinen Eurooppalainen). Despite some 
internal divisions, the party seemed to support the EEA agreement as an alternative to 
becoming a full member of the EU. However, in 1994, the then Party Leader and Prime 
Minister Esko Aho threatened to resign from both posts should the Centre Party oppose 
membership at the annual party congress: this enabled him to secure a two-thirds majority 
in favour of joining the European Union, mostly due to his political influence and despite 
strong opposition from several senior party figures (Raunio 1999; Johansson and Raunio 
2001; Batory and Sitter 2004).38 Hence, the (official) party stance towards European 
integration switched from an anti- to a pro-EU membership vision in 1994. Besides the 
importance of Aho’s ‘ultimatum’, the possibility to enhance and influence international 
security under the CFSP and the economic advantages of derogations obtained from the 
Common Agricultural Policy were perceived as beneficial for Finland, according to KESK 
members (Miles 1995; Batory and Sitter 2004).39   
Following Finland’s accession to the EU and after having been relegated to the 
opposition, KESK changed its position regarding European integration to return to a 
“soft Eurosceptic stance” (Batory and Sitter 2004: 540), without calling for a form of 
disintegration. Accordingly, from November 1995 onwards, the party has outlined the 
importance to maintain the EU as an intergovernmental organisation, with an institutional 
status quo (i.e. a strong Council) and no additional transfer of competencies to Brussels. 
                                                          
37 Author’s translation. “Euroopan yhdentymiseen osallistuessaan Suomen tulee säilyttää sekä poliittinen 
että taloudellinen itsenäisyytensä ja kansallinen omaleimaisuutensa. Taloudellisella itsenäisyydellä on 
poliittinenkin ulottuvuus. Vain tosiasiassa itsenäinen maa voi olla puolueeton” 
38 As mentioned by one interviewee: “I think that the Congress would have voted against if [Esko Aho] 
would not have said he would leave. The majority of party supporters were against EU membership” 
(Interview with a MP from the Centre Party, 22 May 2013). 
39 This affirmation on the Common Agricultural Policy can be contested, as the main primary producers’ 
interest group closely linked to the party, the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners 
(MTK), always campaigned against membership. This constituted a factor explaining internal division 
within the party leadership (Raunio 1999; Raunio and Wiberg 2000).  
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The party has also opposed further developments related to the CFSP, supported military 
non-alignment and the prevalence of the United Nations as the main actor in terms of 
peacekeeping operations (Keskusta 1994; 1999; 2002; Raunio 1999). In September 1997, 
KESK decided at a party congress to oppose participation in the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. As outlined by an interviewee, “this was a rather easy 
decision, as not many MPs in my party would have preferred to vote for joining the EMU, 
because we were not in the government, and because the actual decision to join the 
European Union was so difficult”.40 Nevertheless, following the outcome of the 
parliamentary vote on this issue on 17 April 1998 (see further section 3.3.2.1), KESK 
stated that it would not seek to withdraw from the EMU in the future (Raunio 1999). The 
party supported Schengen membership, seeing police and judicial co-operation as a step 
in the right direction. Finally, the party has been sceptical towards the Common 
Agricultural Policy and regional policies, mentioning in the late 1990s that in these policy 
areas, “financial resources can and must be distributed in the direction of the member 
states” (Keskusta 1999).41 As such, KESK wanted to reform these policies rather than 
promoting horizontal differentiation. 
In sum, KESK’s position on European integration for the past twenty years can be 
summarised as such: opposed to joining the EU in the early 1990s; officially pro-
membership during the referendum debate (1994), status quo and against deepening 
integration after 1995.  
 
3.2.4. Liberal Party 
The Swedish People’s Party of Finland is an ethno-regionalist liberal party42 founded in 
1906 in order to represent and promote the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority 
living in the bilingual Finland. Ideologically close to the National Coalition Party, RKP is 
mostly influenced by Swedish politics and thus co-operates with non-socialist parties in 
                                                          
40 Interview with a MP from the Centre Party, 22 May 2013. 
41 Author’s translation: “Mm. alue- ja maatalouspolitiikassa päätöksentekoa ja varainkäyttöä voidaan ja niitä 
tulee hajauttaa jäsenmaiden suuntaan”. 
42 In order to offer a balanced comparative analysis between the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian party 
systems, the Swedish People’s Party is considered as belonging to the liberal party family within the 
framework of this study. Several studies categorise RKP as a liberal party (see e.g. Gilljam and Oscarsson 
1996; Grendstad 2003; Downs and Riutta 2005). However, it should be borne in mind that unlike other 
Nordic liberal parties, RKP also has an ethno-regionalist identity (Arter 2008).  
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Sweden (i.e. the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the 
Moderate Party) as well as with the liberal parties of Denmark and Norway.43 In the 
European Parliament, the party is represented in the ALDE group. Throughout the 
period analysed, the Swedish People’s Party participated in the various coalition 
governments, and its electoral score in parliamentary elections remained relatively stable, 
varying from 4.6 per cent in 2003 and 2007 to 5.5 per cent in 1991.  
Like the National Coalition Party, RKP has consistently been in favour of European 
integration, and this party position has not been challenged by most party members. As 
early as 1988, the party stated its willingness to promote pan-European co-operation 
(Svenska Folkpartiet i Finland 1988). In 1991, the party suggested that Finland should 
apply for EU membership if Sweden does so, stating that “Finland shall under no 
circumstances be isolated, either from Scandinavia or Europe as a whole” (Svenska 
Folkpartiet i Finland 1991).44 In 1997, the party congress voted in favour of EMU 
membership, and welcomed developments in terms of foreign and security policy as well 
as judicial affairs. Similarly to other Finnish political parties, RKP has supported a partial 
transfer of agricultural powers back to the member states, as well as increasing the EU’s 
powers in terms of environmental policies (Johansson and Raunio 2001). Finally, it should 
be noted that the party campaigned against the principle of multi-speed integration as 
included in the Amsterdam Treaty, thus formally opposing the concept of differentiated 
integration in the European Union (Raunio 1999). In sum, the party support Finland’s 
position in the ‘inner core’ of the EU. 
 
3.2.5. Christian Democratic Party 
The Finnish Christian Democratic Party was founded in 1958 by the Christian faction of 
the National Coalition Party, influenced by the success of the Norwegian Christian 
Movement (Arter 1980; Karvonen 1993). Despite being depicted as a centre-right political 
                                                          
43 “We focus on international politics and questions that are international. So we tend to co-operate with 
the non-socialist parties of Sweden: the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party, Folkpartiet and Moderata. 
We can say that we have international contacts with those parties in Sweden. (…) In Denmark, Venstre and 
Radicale Venstre are the two parties that belong to our family, and in Norway it is Venstre” (Interview with 
a spokesperson from the Swedish People’s Party, 15 May 2013).  
44 Author’s translation: “Finland får under inga omständigheter isoleras, varken från Norden eller Europa 
som helhet”.  
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party (Giljam and Oscarsson 1996), some members of the party leadership do not 
consider KD as ideologically close to any particular party in Finland, and generally co-
operates with left-wing parties on social topics and with right-wing parties on economic 
terms.45 At the Nordic level, KD co-operates with parties belonging to the Christian 
democratic family, while in the European Parliament, the party belongs to the European 
People’s Party. Furthermore, it should be noted that during the 2009 European elections, 
KD formed an alliance with the Finns Party. At the national level, its electoral score 
throughout the period analysed fluctuated 3 per cent in 1995 and 5.3 per cent in 2003. 
Despite these low results, the party was included in the Aho cabinet in 1991. 
Together with the Rural Party (which later gave birth to the Finns Party), the Christian 
Democrats were opposed to an unconditional EU membership when the debate became 
salient in the early 1990s. Indeed, the party mentioned that Finland’s attitude towards 
European integration “requires serious and careful consideration” (Suomen Kristillinen 
Liitto 1991).46 Following the 1994 referendum, the party criticised developments at the 
European level both in terms of deepening and widening European integration, but did 
not campaign for withdrawing from the Union: as such, the party accepted the electorate’s 
decision to join the EU. The party opposed participation in the EMU (until the 
government decided to join the Eurozone from 1999 onwards) as well as developments 
in various policies such as defence, regional policy as well as the Common Agricultural 
Policy. However, KD has welcomed European co-operation in the fields of energy, the 
environment, human rights, the fight against international crime and promoted co-
operation in terms of political transparency, good governance and ethical issues such as 
the protection of life.  
Broadly speaking, since the debate arose, KD has promoted European co-operation 
between independent states and, where appropriate, co-operation on an 
intergovernmental basis (Suomen Kristillinen Liitto 1995; 1998; Kristillisdemokraatit 
2002; 2006). While the party leadership is mostly united on this issue, an interviewee stated 
                                                          
45 “On social topics, we are sometimes close to the Social Democrats or even to the Left Alliance and the 
Greens. On economic and business-related decisions, it is easier to for us to be close to the National 
Coalition Party and the Centre Party. Our position is changing depending on what decisions we need to 
take” (Interview with a MP from the Christian Democrats, 14 May 2013).  
46 Author’s translation: “Päätettäessä maamme suhtautumisesta Euroopan yhdentymiseen edellytämme 
vakavaa ja huolellista harkintaa”. 
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that grass-root supporters show signs of division over the evolution of the party position 
on Europe.47 
Despite their initially strong opposition to an EU membership in the early 1990s, the 
Christian Democrats have thus defended an intergovernmental vision of Europe since 
1994. KD favours co-operation in a series of issues that are not limited to national 
borders, but also criticises developments which, in the party’s views, does not bring any 
added value at the national level. Hence, despite not campaigning for withdrawing from 
the EU, the party has been rather opposed to European integration since the 1994 
referendum, and has promoted disintegration in its party manifestos.  
 
3.2.6.  ‘New Politics’ Parties 
In Finland, as mentioned by Zilliacus (2001: 27), two main political parties have 
established themselves in the national political landscape following two waves of new 
politics: 
The first wave of new politics, represented by the student radicalism of the 
1960s, was in Finland caught principally by the Communists, who managed 
to hold on to the majority of new radicals for much of the 1970s. The second 
wave of new politics in Finland, manifested in the independent anti-nuclear, 
environmental and feminist movements of the late 1970s, was transformed 
into the Green movement, which took on the leading role of anti-
establishment politics from the early 1980s onwards.  
 
Following several transformations in the late 1980s and early 1990s, those two main 
political movements gave birth to well-established political parties within Finland’s party 
system: the Left Alliance and the Green League. In addition to Zilliacus’ analysis, one 
populist right party, the Finns Party, should be added to this category of ‘new politics’ 
parties.  
                                                          
47 “These years, our leaders have been more open-minded in terms of economic views and other EU-related 
topics […]. There has been some movements: people who have become disappointed with our new party 
line” (Interview with a MP from the Christian Democrats, 14 May 2013).  
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3.2.6.1. Socialist Left Party 
The Left Alliance is a left-wing political party founded in 1990 following the merger of 
the Communist Party of Finland (Suomen Kommunisten Puolue) and the Finnish People’s 
Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liito). Mostly inspired from the Danish 
Socialist People’s Party, the party tried to break with its communist past to adopt a Red-
Green stance, especially with the then imminent end of the Cold War (Zilliacus 2001; 
Dunphy 2007). In Finland, VAS is ideologically connected the Social Democratic Party, 
and co-operates with other Nordic socialist left parties through the Nordic Green Left 
Alliance. At the European level, the party is a member of the European United Left-
Nordic Green Left, despite not having being represented in the European Parliament 
between 2009 and 2014. Between the 1991 and 2007 general elections, the party obtained 
between 8.8 per cent (in 2007) and 11.5 per cent (in 1995) of votes, making it the fourth 
largest party of Finland. At the executive level, VAS participated in both mandates of the 
Lipponen government between 1995 and 2003. 
Since its creation, the Left Alliance’s position on European integration has been rather 
mixed, and this issue has led to major internal divisions at all levels (Raunio 1999; Raunio 
and Tiilikainen 2003; Dunphy 2007). The programme adopted during the party’s inaugural 
meeting in April 1990 illustrates such divisions, stating that “[t]he Finns must clarify their 
position on European integration” (Vasemmistoliitto 1990).48 In the same programme, 
the party gave a series of preconditions for being in favour of the integration process, 
including the safeguarding of parliamentary powers and of Finland’s foreign and security 
policy, as well as the prevalence of the existing welfare structures at the national level. 
When the issue of membership arose, the party failed to adopt an official position on this 
issue, despite most of its members campaigning for the No-side in 1994 and only 24 per 
cent of them voting in favour of EU membership, mostly due to opposition to the 
neoliberal aspects of the EU (Paloheimo 2000).49 However, following the outcome of the 
                                                          
48 Author’s translation: “Suomalaisten on selvitettävä kantansa Euroopan integraatioon”. 
49 As stated by an interviewee, “(…) when we had a referendum over membership, the majority of members 
of the party were against membership, and were actually campaigning for the no side before the referendum. 
But after the referendum, the party accepted the result and adopted a policy to try to reform the European 
Union from within. But still: the Left Alliance has been very sceptic of the neoliberal policies and principles 
upon which the Union has been based on. It makes it difficult to reform the Union from within when the 
core principles of the Union are based on market freedom and so on” (Interview with a policy adviser from 
the Left Alliance, 14 May 2013). See also Raunio (1999: 148-149): “[t]his resistance is mainly explained by 
ideology: the market-driven logic of the integration project is rather distant from the worldview of the 
average VAS voter”.  
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referendum, the party decided to accept the electorate’s decision. In the 1995 manifesto, 
VAS mentioned its willingness to develop the EU into a “pan-European 
intergovernmental union” (Vasemmistoliitto 1995)50 and to promote social policies (the 
expression ‘Social Europe’, Sosiaalinen Eurooppa, being mentioned in all party manifestos). 
In 1997, the party adopted a resolution to reform the European Union, consisting of 
increasing the powers of the European and national parliaments (especially vis-à-vis the 
Commission); giving more power to Brussels on social, environmental and taxation 
policies “where majority voting should be the general decision rule” (Raunio 1999: 149); 
and by partially transferring competences back to the member states in terms of 
agricultural policies.51 Like other Finnish parties, the Left Alliance has opposed 
developments relating to the CFSP, without promoting any forms of horizontal 
differentiated integration.  
One interesting aspect of the Left Alliance’s European integration policy is its position 
on participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. While the party 
opposed such policy in the short run in its 1995 and 1996 manifestos, the government’s 
intention to join the third stage of the EMU by the beginning of 1999 challenged the 
party’s position. As VAS was part of the Lipponen cabinet, the leadership organised an 
internal vote in order to let its members decide whether or not the party should continue 
in the government, and thus accept the decision of joining the third stage of the EMU. A 
slight majority of party members (52.4 per cent) voted in favour of a membership (Raunio 
1999; see also section 3.3.2). As outlined by an interviewee, “the majority of the more 
Eurosceptic party supporters felt that they were pressured to accept EMU membership, 
as otherwise the Left Alliance would have had to leave the government”,52 thereby 
providing an explanation for the ideological switch that occurred within the party. In 
subsequent years, the party did not substantially change its stance towards European 
integration. In short, throughout the period analysed, the Left Alliance struggled to adopt 
a consistent position on the issue of European integration, which now varies per policy 
area.  
                                                          
50 Author’s translation: “Vasemmistoliitto toimii EU:n kehittämiseksi yleiseurooppalaisena valtioiden 
välisenä liittona”. 
51 This call for a partial disintegration of agricultural policies, however, has not been mentioned in 
subsequent party manifestos. 




3.2.6.2. Green Party 
The Green League is a centre-oriented party founded in 1987 by various social 
movements, including the Green feminists, the Green society, the Green disabled 
movement and the Association of Environmental Politics (Zilliacus 2001). At the 
domestic level, VIHR is open to co-operation with almost all parties in Finland.53 At the 
Nordic level, the party co-operates very closely with its Swedish counterpart. VIHR is a 
member of the European Green Party and is represented in the European Parliament 
under the Greens/European Free Alliance group. In the words of Raunio and Tiilikainen 
(2003: 52), “[o]f the Finnish parties, the Green League has probably been most influenced 
by such transnational party activities”. The party’s electoral score at the national level 
fluctuated between 6.5 per cent in 1995 and 8.5 per cent in 2007. VIHR was represented 
in the Lipponen government between 1995 and 2003 as well as in the Vanhanen 
II/Kiviniemi cabinet between 2007 and 2011. 
Until the late 1990s, the Green League’s position on European co-operation was quite 
similar to the one chosen by the Left Alliance.54 When the European issue arose in the 
early 1990s, the party leadership failed to take a position due to internal divisions; 
nevertheless, it expressed strong reservations on participation in the future EEA in the 
1990 party manifesto by stipulating, e.g., that “[t]he social and ecological consequences of 
the European Economic Area are not consistent with the objectives of the 
Greens/European Free Alliance” (Vihreä Liitto 1990).55 Following the outcome of the 
referendum, the party opted for a partial opposition to the process of European 
integration, mostly calling for making the EU’s decision-making structures more 
democratic, transferring part of the agricultural policies to the national level and increasing 
European competences in terms of environmental and energy policies (Vihreä Liitto 1994; 
1998). The party has also opposed developments towards a common defence policy, and 
                                                          
53 “I would not say that we are close to any party. We are close to different parties in different agendas so 
it differs. And we are also open to co-operation with almost all parties” (Interview with a policy adviser 
from the Green League, 22 May 2013). 
54 However, it should be noted that the position of party members is much more mixed than in the case of 
VAS, with 55 per cent voting in favour of EU membership in 1994 against 24 per cent of Left Alliance 
members (Paloheimo 2000). 
55 Author’s translation: “Euroopan talousalueen sosiaaliset ja ekologiset seuraukset eivät sovi yhteen 
vihreiden tavoitteiden kanssa”. 
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did not call for horizontal differentiated integration. Like VAS, while the party’s initial 
position on EMU membership was rather negative (with the party calling for its 
postponement), its participation in the Lipponen cabinet has also resulted into an 
“ideological U-turn” on this matter (Raunio 2008: 174). In 1998, the party council voted 
in favour of EMU membership with 31 votes for and 13 against (Johansson and Raunio 
2001; see also section 3.3.2). Since the 2000s, the party has become much more pro-
European and has progressively abandoned its ‘anti-Europe’ stance, adopting for instance 
a statement in favour of a decentralised federal Europe, “for a strong Europe of the 
regions” (Vihreä Liitto 2002).56 In the party manifesto for the 2003 general election, VIHR 
called for major European developments in terms of crisis management, while still 
defending Finland’s principle of non-alignment (Vihreä Liitto 2003). In sum, the Green 
League’s position on European integration has changed through time, from being strongly 
divided to becoming rather pro-EU in recent years, with some signs of variation in 
support depending on the policy area.  
 
3.2.6.3. Populist Right Party 
The Finns Party was founded in 1995 following the Rural Party’s bankruptcy.57 Despite 
sharing some similarities with far-right nationalist and anti-immigration parties (Arter 
2010), PS is considered as a centrist party by both academics (Ruostetsaari 2003; Jungar 
and Jupskås 2011; Raunio 2012) and the party leadership.58, 59 Historically linked to the 
Centre Party, the Finns Party closely co-operates with the Danish People’s Party60 and is 
part of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group in the European Parliament. At 
                                                          
56 Author’s translation: “Kohti vahvaa alueiden Eurooppa – kannanotto EU:n kehittämiseen”. 
57 The Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP) was an anti-establishment party founded in 1959 
by a splinter group from the KESK. Despite opposition from the party leadership, the Finns Party is best 
viewed as a successor party from SMP, as it shares the same values and was founded by former SMP leaders 
(Arter 2010).  
58 “According to research conducted at the University of Tampere, we are located between the Centre Party 
and the Social Democrats. We agree with this, as we work for social welfare in Finland” (Interview with a 
MP and a policy adviser from the Finns Party, 17 May 2013).  
59 “We are a centrist party. I am personally more located to the right in terms of finance, but as a whole, we 
are a centrist party” (Interview with a MP from the Finns Party, 17 May 2013). 
60 “In the Nordic Council, we are in the same party group as the Danish People’s Party, and we are in the 
same group in the European Parliament as well. We do not co-operate with other parties in the Nordic 
States” (Interview with a MP from the Finns Party, 21 May 2013). 
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the time of writing and despite a major breakthrough in the 2011 general election,61 this 
is the only well-established Finnish party that has not been represented in the government 
since its creation. Throughout the period analysed, the Finns Party (and, until 1995, the 
Rural Party) gained between and 1 per cent (in 1999) and 4.85 per cent (in 1991) of votes 
in national elections. 
PS has consistently been opposed to further European integration, insisting on its 
drawbacks in each party manifestos; however, while its parent party fiercely opposed EU 
membership in the early 1990s, the Finns Party did not suggest a withdrawal in its original 
manifesto. The party has never mentioned its willingness to leave the European Union, 
nor even called for differentiated disintegration. Accordingly, an interviewee declared that 
such possibility has never been considered, and summarised the party line towards 
European integration by stating that “[w]e would like to remain part of the European 
Union. We are not supporting the exit line, not at the moment. We would like to renew 
the Union, to make it work better. If the Commission does not want to do it, then we 
might have to change our line, but at the moment we would like Finland to remain in the 
Union”.62 The party has been strongly opposed to participation in the third stage of the 
EMU: following Finland’s membership in 1999, the party remained critical of this policy 
choice but has never called for leaving the Eurozone. In addition, PS has also been critical 
of developments relating to the CFSP, the AFSJ and the Common Agricultural Policy 
without, however, calling for a form of disintegration. In short, and despite common 
beliefs, PS has not been opposed to Finland’s participation in the European Union, 
despite calling for major reforms. 
                                                          
61 In 2011, the Finns Party became the third largest party of Finland with 19.1 per cent of votes (+15 per 
cent in comparison with 2007) and gaining a total of 39 MPs (+34). For an analysis of this breakthrough, 
see Arter (2012).  
62 Interview with a MP from the Finns Party, 21 May 2013. 
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3.2.7. Party positions - summary 
Table 3.2 Finnish   parties’   positions   on participation in European 
integration (1991 – 2010), by selected policy area 
 EU EEA (until 1995) CFSP AFSJ EMU 
KOK ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
SDP ++ ++ + ++ ++ 
KESK 
- (until 1994) 
+ (after 1994) + - + 
- (until 1999) 
0 (after 1999) 
RKP ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
KD 
-- (until 1995) 
+ (after 1995) + - - 
-- (until 1999) 
0 (after 1999) 
VAS 
0 (until 1995) 
+ (after 1995) + - + 
-- (until 1998) 
+ (after 1998) 
VIHR 
0 (until 1995) 
+ (after 1995) - + + 
- (until 1998) 
+ (after 1998) 
PS 
-- (until 1995) 
+ (after 1995) -- -- -- -- 
++ = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 + = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
0 = neutral or no official position on participation in this area 
 - = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
 -- = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 
Based on interviews and manifesto analysis, Table 3.2 gives a general summary of the 
well-established parties’ positions on Finland’s participation in European integration for 
each selected policy area. This table demonstrates the variety of party positions, even 
though according to Raunio (2008: 168), “Finnish parties have been remarkably solid in 
their support for integration”, especially from a comparative perspective (see further 
Chapter 6). Party positions on Europe can be divided into three categories: KOK, SDP 
and RKP have mostly been in favour of participation in all policy areas; KESK, VAS and 
VIHR have been in favour of European integration in some policy areas, while being 
divided on the function of the European Union in Finland; and KD as well as PS have 
consistently been opposed to further European integration. Three main sets of 
conclusions can be given. First, none of the well-established political party in Finland has 
ever called for withdrawing from the Union after the outcome of the referendum in 1994, 
even the most reluctant ones (i.e. KD and PS; see Raunio 1999). This means that 
European co-operation has been broadly accepted in Finland’s political sphere. Second, 
some political parties have changed their position regarding European integration in some 
policy areas (mostly on participation in the EMU) to adopt a more positive view. This will 
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be explored further in the next section of this chapter. Third, with the (partial) exception 
of agricultural policies which are not analysed in this study,63 it appears that differentiated 
disintegration64 has not been considered as viable option by any parties, including the most 
reluctant ones. Accordingly, throughout the period analysed, political parties did not 
propose a ‘cherry-picking’ position on European integration. Instead of campaigning in 
favour of disintegration, reluctant parties campaigned (especially KD and PS) against 
deepening European integration and ultimately seemed to accept government decisions.  
The following section will now analyse government positions on European integration, 
from 1991 (the Aho I cabinet) to 2010 (the Kiviniemi cabinet).    
 
3.3. Finnish governments and their positions on European 
integration (1991 – 2010) 
Between 1991 and 2010, five general elections were held, and five different governments 
were composed. All cabinets were majority coalition governments composed of three to 
five political parties, as outlined in Table 3.3. Furthermore, it should be added that all 
coalitions included at least two of the ‘big three’ political parties, i.e. the Social Democratic 
Party, the National Coalition Party and/or the Centre Party. 
                                                          
63 As stated in Chapter 2, the Common Agricultural and Fisheries policies are not analysed in this study as 
differentiated integration does not take place in these policy areas. 
64 Differentiated disintegration is here understood as the political decision to withdraw from participation 
in one or several European policies. 
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Table 3.3 List and characteristics of Finnish cabinets, 1991 – 2010
Dates Cabinet Parties included Government position on a 
left-right scale (Kim and 
Fording index) 
Percentage of government’s 
share of MPs  
26 April 1991 – 20 June 1994 Aho I  Centre Party 
National Coalition Party 
Swedish People’s Party 
Christian Democrats 
-1.59 57.5 
20 June 1994 – 13 April 1995 Aho II Centre Party 
National Coalition party 
Swedish People’s Party 
-2 53.5 
13 April 1995 – 15 April 1999 Lipponen, first 
mandate 
Social Democratic Party 
National Coalition Party 




15 April 1999 – 17 April 2003 Lipponen, second 
mandate 
Social Democratic Party 
National Coalition Party 




17 April 2003 – 19 April 2007 Jäätteenmäki / 
Vanhanen I 
Centre Party 
Social Democratic Party 
Swedish People’s Party 
-1.23 58.5 
19 April 2007 – (22 June 2011) Vanhanen II / 
Kiviniemi 
Centre Party 
National Coalition Party 





The aim of this section is to analyse government positions taken on European issues, and 
to explain why they decided to adopt a particular stance on participation in EU policies. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the emphasis is put on five main policies: EEA membership, 
application for an EU membership, participation in the Schengen area (as part of the 
policy Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), participation in the third stage of the EMU, 
and participation in the EU Battle Groups (as part of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy area). This section will conclude with a summary of the key empirical findings for 
Finland with regard to the five hypotheses tested in this study.  
 
3.3.1. Aho I and II (26 April 1991 – 13 April 1995) 
The March 1991 election campaign was atypical, due to the outbreak of the Gulf War. 
The main issues raised by the ruling parties (i.e. KOK, SDP, RKP and SMP) were related 
to economic policies, the agriculture, the environment, but also the future of Finland’s 
experience of European integration through negotiations related to the future EEA 
agreement. The campaign was mostly driven by the Centre Party, which successfully based 
its strategy on the electorate’s dissatisfaction with the sitting government while adopting 
a low profile “in order not to offend any of its potential coalition partners to the left as 
well as to the right” (Berglund 1991: 335). 




















Source: Sundberg (1992) 
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Consequently, KESK and its leader Esko Aho emerged as the winners of this general 
election, with a total of 55 seats (+15 compared to the previous election held in 1987). All 
the parties sitting in government lost seats (-13 for KOK, -8 for the SDP, - 2 for the SMP 
and -1 for the RKP). As a result, President Koivisto appointed Aho to form a cabinet. 
Following negotiations with all party leaders, a centrist65 surplus majority coalition 
government66 was sworn on 26 April 1991, with KESK, KOK, RKP and KD holding 
ministries and accounting for 57.5 per cent of parliamentary seats.  
Whereas EU membership was still off the agenda and despite variations in the parties’ 
attitudes on this issue, the Aho I cabinet adopted a rather positive stance towards 
European integration in the coalition agreement. The government welcomed 
developments related to the future EEA and mentioned the willingness to negotiate a 
“balanced agreement” (Sundberg 1992: 397). As stated in the government programme, 
“[t]he aim [of EEA negotiations] is to ensure, as far as possible, that Finnish individuals 
and citizens have equal access to the European Single Market and that EFTA countries 
have the possibility to influence the development of the economic legislation” 
(Government of Finland 1991).67 Broadly speaking, EEA negotiations did not appear as 
a threat and the final negotiated agreement was welcomed by the majority of political 
elites, as it did not endanger Finland’s policy of neutrality nor the national decision-
making system. The vote on EEA membership took place on 27 October 1992. 154 MPs 
voted in favour and 12 voted against (see Table 3.4), demonstrating the overwhelming 
political consensus on this issue. The only parties that showed some reluctance towards 
the EEA agreement were the Rural Party and the Green League, both standing in the 
opposition.  
                                                          
65 As Aho I’s value on Kim and Fording’s index of government partisanship is -1.59, it is considered as a 
centrist government.  
66 A surplus majority coalition government is defined as a government from which “a party can be removed 
[…] without endangering its majority status” (Clark et al. 2008: 180). 
67 Author’s translation: “Tavoitteena on sen avulla turvata suomalaisille henkilöille ja yrityksille 
mahdollisimman tasavertainen asema eurooppalaisilla sisämarkkinoilla sekä EFTA-maille riittävät 
vaikutusmahdollisuudet talousaluetta koskevan säännöstön kehittämistyössä”. 
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Table 3.4 Eduskunta’s  vote  on  the  European Economic Area agreement, 
per party68 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
KOK 39 32 0 7 
SDP 48 39 0 9 
KESK  55 44 0 11 
RKP 12 10 0 2 
KD 8 7 1 0 
VAS 19 16 1 2 
VIHR 10 4 5 1 
SMP 7 1 5 1 
Other 1 1 0 0 
TOTAL 199 154 12 33 
Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
As mentioned in section 3.1, Sweden’s application for an EU membership, which was 
submitted on 1 July 1991 (see Chapter 4), had a direct impact on the government’s 
position on European integration. Discussions on a potential application for full 
membership arose within the government over the summer, until the formal decision to 
apply was presented before the Eduskunta in March 1992. Four reasons explain why the 
government took eight months to reach a decision on this issue. First, the issue of 
European integration was rather new and the political elites had to adapt to this novelty. 
Second, international co-operation had been traditionally dealt in economic terms (e.g. 
through EFTA or the EEA), with few discussions on political integration (Raunio and 
Tiilikainen 2003). Third, there were on-going negotiations regarding the future EEA 
agreement, which constituted the main priority of the Aho I cabinet. Finally, there was a 
clear lack of consensus over a potential EU membership amongst the parties sitting in 
government. The latter factor deserves a particular attention within the framework of this 
thesis.  
As emphasised in the previous section, RKP and KOK (both accounting for 45 per cent 
of the parliamentary seats within the cabinet) were fully supportive of joining the 
European Union, while KESK (48 per cent) was divided on this issue and KD (7 per 
cent) was unanimously against. In other words, there was no clear pro-membership 
majority within the government, and applying for an EU membership was a difficult 
                                                          
68 As written in the Constitution of Finland, the Speaker of the parliament (at that time Illka Suominen, 
KOK) does not participate in debates or votes in plenary sessions, and is thus not included in the list of 
MPs. Only one MP abstained from voting (Puhakka, KESK), while others were absent.  
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decision to take in terms of political cohesion in the cabinet. In an attempt to solve this 
problem, KESK Party Leader and Prime Minister Aho pledged to hold a referendum on 
EU membership to avoid a split within his party (Sundberg 1993). Despite the fact that 
such referendum was not legally binding,69 this decision was politically important as 
Finland did not have a tradition of direct democracy, unlike its Scandinavian neighbours. 
The Christian Democrats were most critical and disagreed over the decision to apply for 
a membership, putting the raison d’être of their participation in this surplus majority 
coalition at risk. 
On 18 March 1992, a series of votes regarding a potential application for EU membership 
took place in the Eduskunta. A total of seven government proposals were presented, all 
ranging from an ‘absolute yes’ to an ‘absolute no’ (Sundberg 1993). The government’s 
proposal in favour of an application with some reservations received 108 votes in favour 
and 55 against (see Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Eduskunta’s  vote  on  the  government’s  proposal  to  submit an 
application for European Union membership (with some reservations), 
per party70 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions
/Absents 
KOK 39 39 0 0 
SDP 48 0 47 1 
KESK  55 53 0 2 
RKP 12 11 1 0 
KD 8 4 0 4 
VAS 19 0 0 19 
VIHR 10 0 6 4 
SMP 7 0 1 6 
Other 1 1 0 0 
TOTAL 199 108 55 36 
       Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
However, due to technical peculiarities linked to this multiple vote, it is rather difficult to 
provide a clear picture of the division of votes within the Eduskunta, especially since the 
                                                          
69 To possibility to hold consultative referendums was added in the Constitution of Finland in 1987 (section 
53, stating that “The decision to organise a consultative referendum is made by an Act, which shall contain 
provisions on the time of the referendum and on the choices to be presented to the voters”).  
70 This vote concerns one of the seven government’s proposal presented in the parliament, all ranging from 
an absolute yes to an absolute no. The selected proposal could be summarised in those terms: yes to an 




pro-EU Social Democrats were in the opposition and voted against some of these 
proposals. According to Kuosmanen’s (2001) estimation, 133 MPs (mostly from KOK, 
SDP and RKP) voted in favour of EU membership, while 60 were against (mostly from 
SMP, VAS, VIHR and coalition partner KD). Despite Aho’s pledge to hold a referendum 
over this issue, the Centre Party remained strongly divided, and 22 of its 55 MPs 
positioned themselves against membership (Karttunen 2009). In sum, the government’s 
proposal to submit an application for EU membership eventually received two thirds of 
the votes in the Eduskunta. An internal conflict occurred in the government as KD 
Minister Kankaanniemi abstained from voting. While he was close from being expelled 
from the government, the conflict was (temporarily) solved when Kankaanniemi 
promised Prime Minister Aho to support the government’s position over this issue in the 
future, despite the party’s diverging views (Sundberg 1993). Furthermore, the cabinet 
cautiously avoided committing to the membership option before completing the 
accession talks with Brussels. 
In April 1994, the negotiations were completed, with minor difficulties encountered in 
sensitive policy areas such as the agriculture and foreign policy. An accession treaty was 
ready to be signed by the government in June.71 However, the Christian League expressed 
their disapproval of the agreement. Consequently, the party and its minister 
Kankaanniemi left the government and moved to the opposition, formally creating the 
Aho II cabinet consisting of KESK, KOK and RKP (Sundberg 1994). In other words, 
the only (united) anti-membership party’s participation in the government was 
incompatible with the decision to sign the accession treaty, notwithstanding the 
organisation of a referendum over this issue. In practice, this change in the composition 
of the cabinet did not affect its nature: it remained a centrist majority coalition, and its 
cohesion in terms of European integration policy was strengthened despite internal 
divisions within the Centre Party.  
Before the referendum campaign started, all parties held congresses to choose which 
position to adopt. In order to maintain the government’s political cohesion, Aho 
threatened to resign from the government if the Centre Party congress voted against 
membership, and eventually secured a two-thirds majority in his favour. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
71 On accession negotiations and the referendum campaign see e.g. Arter (1995a), Tiilikainen (1996), 
Ingebritsen and Larson (1997), Raunio and Tiilikainen (2003).  
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party remained split and former Party Leader Paavo Väyrynen became the head of the 
anti-EU fraction within KESK.72 Three profiles emerged from the various congresses: 
parties in favour of an EU membership (KOK, SDP, RKP and the divided KESK), 
parties opposed to an EU membership (SMP and KD), and parties who failed to adopt 
an official position (VAS and VIHR; see sections 3.2.6.1 and 3.2.6.2). The referendum 
was held on 16 October 1994, and a majority of 56.9 per cent of the electorate voted in 
favour of joining the European Union (with a turnout of 70.8 per cent). Consequently, 
the Eduskunta approved the accession treaty, with 152 MPs following the referendum 
result and 45 against (mostly from SMP, KD and a minority of KESK representatives).73  
 
3.3.2. Lipponen (13 April 1995 – 17 April 2003) 
3.3.2.1. First mandate (1995 – 1999) 
Figure 3.2 Composition of the Eduskunta following the 1995 election, per 
seats 
Source: Sundberg (1996). 
                                                          
72 This division within the Centre Party has been illustrated by the party members’ voting behaviour: 36 per 
cent of KESK members voted in favour of membership while 63 voted against, thus contradicting the 
official party position (Sänkiaho 1994).  
73 In an attempt to reverse the outcome of the vote, MPs opposed to EU membership delayed the vote in 
the parliament, discussing about the legitimacy of the referendum and hoping for a rejection of membership 



















Following a campaign centred on the deep economic crisis that hit the country for the 
past few years and that led to an unemployment rate close to 20 per cent, the main 
opposition party, i.e. the Social Democratic Party, won the 1995 election with a total of 
63 seats (+15 compared to 1991), becoming the largest party represented in the 
Eduskunta. The Centre Party, on the other hand, lost 11 seats. The two other ruling 
parties, the National Coalition Party (-1 seat) and the Swedish People’s Party (status quo), 
remained stable. It should be noted that European integration issues (both in terms of 
EMU membership and developments of the CFSP) were left off the table, mostly because 
they were not perceived as vote-winners by party leaderships in this election (Arter 
1995b). 
Shortly after the elections, President Ahtisaari (social democrat) appointed SDP Party 
Leader Paavo Lipponen to form a new government. As emphasised by Sundberg (1996: 
327), “[t]he aim was to form a strong majority cabinet with the capacity to lead the country 
out of the economic crisis and to protect national interests in the European Union”. In 
order to achieve these goals, Lipponen decided to form a surplus majority government, 
consisting of five parties of both left and right sides of the political spectrum: SDP, KOK, 
VAS, RKP and VIHR. In terms of representation in the parliament, this centrist ‘rainbow 
coalition’ accounted for 72.5 per cent of MPs, leaving KESK, KD, SMP and the short-
lived Progress Party (Nuorsuomalaiset, also translated as ‘Young Finns’) in the opposition. 
While such a surplus majority government was not perceived as a necessity, “[t]he 
inclusion of surplus parties was for [SDP] related both to benefits and to low costs with 
regard to both policy and office seeking in the shorter as well the longer term” (Jungar 
2002: 79).  
In terms of party positions on European integration, the government was divided: while 
SDP, KOK and RKP were broadly pro-integrationist parties, VAS and VIHR were more 
reluctant. As EMU and Schengen memberships were to appear on top the cabinet agenda, 
the coalition agreement took a rather pro-integrationist stance by stating, e.g., that Finland 
was ready to fulfil the criteria for joining the Monetary Union, despite the reluctance of 
some parties within the coalition (Sundberg 1996). The following paragraphs analyse 




In June 1995, while negotiations to include all Nordic countries in the Schengen 
agreement were underway, the Finnish government made a formal request for observer 
status (van der Rijt 1997). As in Sweden and Norway (see Chapters 4 and 5), Schengen 
membership was seen as a mean to preserve Nordic co-operation and thus did not face 
major opposition within the government and within the parliament. Following the 
decision to include Schengen within the framework of the European Union at the 
Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, the Eduskunta voted in favour of Schengen 
membership on 15 June 1998, with 119 MPs in favour and 3 against (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 Eduskunta’s  vote  on  participation in the Schengen area, per 
party74 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions
/absents 
KOK 38 25 0 13 
SDP 62 31 0 31 
KESK  45 25 1 19 
KD 6 4 1 1 
RKP 12 7 0 5 
VAS 19 15 0 4 
VIHR 9 8 0 1 
PS 1 0 1 0 
Other 7 4 0 3 
TOTAL 199 119 3 77 
  Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
This vote reflects the low level of political conflict regarding the Schengen membership 
issue, with only three MPs voting against. Even amongst the reluctant Christian 
Democrats, a majority of representatives voted in favour of such membership. As stated 
above, one of the main reasons for this generally positive attitude towards this policy was 
the fact that such membership would secure the future of Nordic co-operation in this 
field (through the Nordic Passport Union), following Denmark’s decision to join 
Schengen in the early 1990s (Zaiotti 2013).75 As close co-operation with the Nordic states 
constituted one of the main priorities of all political parties in terms of foreign policy, the 
decision to join Schengen did not lead to major opposition amongst elites. 
                                                          
74 The number of MPs per party slightly differs from Figure 3.2 due to defectors and splinter groups. The 
Speaker of the parliament was Riitta Uosukainen (KOK).  
75 On the Nordic Passport Union and Nordic co-operation in this field, see e.g. Neumann (2000); Bonnén 
and Søsted (2003). 
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In contrast, participation in the third stage of the EMU was seen as controversial both 
within the government and the parliament. Whereas the ‘rainbow coalition’ agreement 
stated that one of its central objectives was to meet the convergence criteria to eventually 
join the Eurozone, two ruling parties were particularly sceptical of such policy. Indeed, 
while SDP, KOK and RKP were fully supportive, VIHR and especially VAS were hesitant 
and believed that such issue should be decided by a popular referendum, as for the 
membership issue in 1994. As discussed in sections 3.2.6.1 and 3.2.6.2, the latter parties’ 
participation in the rainbow coalition was at risk, and their members had to make a choice: 
either to support the government’s position on participation in the EMU and stay in the 
government, or to refuse to change the party’s stance and thus join the opposition. Due 
to the nature of the coalition (i.e. surplus majority), both parties could have left the 
government without threatening its raison d’être: as of 1998, a coalition consisting of only 
pro-EMU parties (KOK, SDP and RKP) would have accounted for 56.5 per cent of MPs. 
Following internal votes in 1997, both VAS and VIHR decided to support participation 
in the EMU, thus remaining in the rainbow coalition. The main reason for this switch was 
that for both parties, the costs of opposition were greater than the benefits. More 
precisely, the main goal sought by VAS and VIHR, as small young parties, was “to develop 
into credible parties of government that would be more attractive to voters as well as to 
other government parties in the future” (Jungar 2002: 74). These parties’ ideology thus 
did not play a role in shaping their final decision.  
Within the Eduskunta, positions on participation in the EMU were split on a government-
opposition basis. Following VAS and VIHR’s decision to support the government’s 
position, KESK, KD and PS were the only parties to stand against such policy. The main 
argument raised by the Centre Party was that since Denmark and Sweden76 were opposed 
to join the Eurozone as early as 1999, Finland should adopt the same position in order to 
safeguard Nordic co-operation (Sundberg 1998). The party also called for a popular 
referendum on the issue, but Prime Minister Lipponen dismissed such possibility when 
the debate arose. Table 3.7 confirms this division between government and opposition, 
with only 6 MPs from the majority voting against EMU membership (3 from VAS and 2 
                                                          
76 The Swedish government’s decision not to join the third stage of the EMU in the late 1990s will be 
analysed in Chapter 4. 
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from VIHR, the most reluctant parties) and 2 MPs from the opposition in favour on 17 
April 1998.  
Table 3.7 Eduskunta’s   vote   on   participation in the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, per party77 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions
/absents 
KOK 38 38 0 0 
SDP 62 60  1 1 
KESK  45 0 43 2 
RKP 12 12 0 0 
KD 6 0 6 0 
VAS 19 16 3 0 
VIHR 9 7 2 0 
PS 1 0 1 0 
Other 7 2 5 0 
TOTAL 199 135 61 3 
Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
In sum, while participation in the Schengen area did not lead to major conflicts within the 
government and the parliament, the issue of EMU membership strongly divided political 
actors, to the point of putting the participation of VAS and VIHR in the coalition at risk.  
 
3.3.2.2. Second mandate (1999 – 2003)  
On 21 March 1999, a new general election was held in Finland. The campaign surrounding 
this election has been described as relatively quiet, mostly due to the fact that the outgoing 
government consisted of a surplus majority coalition, leaving little room for the 
opposition (Sundberg 2000). Furthermore, the economic record of the outgoing 
government was rather satisfactory, as Finland recovered from the deep recession that hit 
the country in the early 1990s (Arter 2000b). 
                                                          
77 See footnote 66.  
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Figure 3.3 Composition of the Eduskunta following the 1999 election, per 
seats 
 
Source: Sundberg (2000). 
Despite a loss of 12 seats compared to the 1995 election, the Social Democratic Party 
remained the largest party represented in the Eduskunta, with a total of 51 seats. KOK 
gained a total of 46 seats (+7) while KESK, the largest party in opposition, gained 48 
(+4). In sum, the election results facilitated the renewal of the centrist Rainbow Coalition. 
As in 1995, SDP Party Leader and outgoing Prime Minister Lipponen was appointed by 
President Ahtisaari to form a new government. On 15 April 1999, the Lipponen cabinet 
was renewed for a second mandate, consisting of the same coalition partners as the 
previous government (SDP, KOK, RKP, VAS and VIHR). This new surplus majority 
government accounted for a share of 70 per cent of MPs, and was still considered as 
centrist (+6.38 on Kim and Fording’s scale of government partisanship).  
In terms of European policy, the government reiterated its willingness to use “the 
opportunities offered by the European Union to promote European co-operation in the 
fields of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and market economy” 
(Government of Finland 1999).78 The short-term objectives of the Lipponen government 
were to prepare the upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union (from 
July to December 1999); to keep on promoting the Northern Dimension Initiative, which 
                                                          
78 Author’s translation: “Suomi käyttää täysipainoisesti hyväksi Euroopan unionin tarjoamia 
mahdollisuuksia edistää eurooppalaista yhteistyötä demokratian, ihmisoikeuksien, oikeusvaltion ja 

















had been suggested by the Finnish government in 1997 (Antola 1999; see also Gebhard 
2013); and, together with its Swedish neighbour, to play an active role in shaping the 
future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially in terms of crisis 
management (Jungar 2002; Downs and Riutta 2005; Andersson 2006). In short, the 
government’s general position on European integration remained relatively similar to the 
one adopted during the previous mandate, i.e. for Finland to be a decision-maker rather 
than being a passive implementer at the European level. Unlike in previous years, no 
major EU-related issues were discussed during plenary parliamentary sessions, and there 
was a general consensus over the government’s European policy.79 
 
3.3.3. Jäätteenmäki / Vanhanen I (17 April 2003 – 19 April 2007) 
Figure 3.4 Composition of the Eduskunta following the 2003 election, per 
seats 
Source: Sundberg (2004). 
Unlike 1999, the 2003 general election was, in the words of Sundberg (2004: 1000), “the 
most dramatic in years in Finland”. Indeed, after 8 years as main party in the opposition 
in the shadow of two ‘Rainbow Coalition’ governments, the Centre Party became once 
again the largest party represented in the Eduskunta (55 seats, +7 compared to 1999) 
                                                          
79 This consensus does not only concern EU-related issues: indeed, following the relative success of the 
first Rainbow Government and after the 1999 election, Arter (2000b: 184) stated that there was “a case to 
be made for a Finnish model of government” and highlighted, e.g., the broad consensus amongst political 

















following a campaign that was mostly driven by speculations over the coming cabinet 
formation, the unemployment rate and the war in Iraq (Arter 2003). The National 
Coalition Party did not perform in this election, losing a total of six seats compared to 
1999. The Christian Democrats as well as the Swedish People’s Party lost three seats each, 
while the Left Alliance lost only one and the Finns Party gained two. Meanwhile, the 
Social Democrats gained two additional seats, enabling them to become a potential major 
coalition partner for the winning Centre Party.  
Following the election, KESK party leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki was given the role to form 
a cabinet, and unsurprisingly chose the SDP as main coalition partner, together with RKP 
to form a new centrist surplus majority government accounting for 58.5 per cent of MPs 
in parliament and nicknamed ‘Red Earth coalition’ (Arter 2003). Jäätteenmäki became the 
first female Prime Minister in the history of Finland. However, on 24 June (only two 
months after the general election), she had to resign following revelations on the use of 
classified documents during the election campaign. These allegations were referred to as 
‘Iraqgate’ in the media (Downs and Riutta 2005). She got replaced by the new Centre 
Party leader Matti Vanhanen, and this change did not have any impact on the composition 
and nature of the cabinet.  
The position taken by the Vanhanen I cabinet on European integration rather diverged 
from the one adopted by both Lipponen governments, and mostly reflected the position 
of the Centre Party: “[o]bservers correctly anticipated that [Vanhanen] would jealously 
guard Finland’s neutrality and military independence in the face of EU attempts to 
construct a common foreign and security policy” (Downs and Riutta 2005: 440). In other 
words, the Red Earth coalition was more reluctant to support and promote the process 
of deepening European integration during Intergovernmental Conferences. This is 
illustrated, e.g., by the unenthusiastic position taken by the government on the draft 
constitution for the European Union as well as on the future of the CFSP. In early 2004, 
political figures from the most pro-integrationist parties, including Stubb (KOK) and 
former Prime Minister Lipponen (despite being a coalition member and Chair of the 
Eduskunta), expressed their concerns regarding this switch in the government’s European 
policy (Helsingin Sanomat 2004). Nevertheless, in terms of horizontal integration (which 
constitutes the main focus of this thesis), the Vanhanen I cabinet’s position remained 
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similar to the one adopted by its predecessor, that is for Finland to stay in the ‘inner core’ 
of the Union. 
Few discussions on European issues took place during parliamentary plenary sessions for 
this term.80 On 8 December 2006, the Eduskunta pronounced itself on the government’s 
proposal to participate in the EU Battle Group 107 from January to June 2007, jointly 
with troops from Germany and the Netherlands. Even though this vote was purely 
consultative as mentioned in the Military Crisis Management Act,81 it was rather symbolic 
as the parliament rarely had the opportunity of pronouncing itself on CFSP-related issues, 
especially since the constitutional reforms introduced in 2000 which empowered the 
government in the field of foreign policy (see section 3.1). 
Table 3.8 Eduskunta’s  vote  on  participation  in  the  European Union Battle 
Group 107, per party82 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions
/absents 
KOK 42 41 0 1 
SDP 52 41 1 10 
KESK  54 48 0 6 
KD 6 2 4 0 
VAS 19 0 17 2 
VIHR 14 12 0 2 
PS 3 0 2 1 
RKP 9 8 0 1 
TOTAL 199 152 24 23 
Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
The vote, as outlined in Table 3.8, did not follow the logic of majority versus opposition. 
In addition to a majority of MPs from KESK, RKP and SDP who voted in favour of 
Finland’s participation in this Battle Group, representatives from KOK and VIHR joined 
the parliamentary majority, leaving KD, PS and VAS in the No-side. In other words, this 
vote reflected the parties’ ideology towards this particular aspect of European co-
operation. As mentioned by Kerttunen (2005: 74), “[p]articipation in international crisis 
management is an essential part of the Finnish foreign and security policy. It aims to 
                                                          
80 Only four EU-related issues were raised in the parliament during this parliamentary term: the EU 
Constitutional Treaty; the EEA tax legislation, a European Central Bank legislation amendment and 
participation in the European Battle Group. 
81 Sotilaallisesta Kriisinhallinnasta Annetun Lain (211/2006), para. 3. 
82 The number of MPs per party slightly differs from Figure 3.4 due to defectors and splinter groups. The 
Speaker of the parliament was Paavo Lipponen (SDP). 
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improve both international security and security of Finland”. This concept has been 
broadly accepted by the majority of Finnish political parties, including the reluctant ruling 
Centre Party as the Battle Group concept has not threatened Finland’s principle of 
military non-alignment. The parties opposing such concept are VAS, which strongly 
opposed developments that do not go in the direction of a social Europe (see section 
3.2.6.1), as well as the anti-CFSP KD and PS.  
 
3.3.4. Vanhanen II / Kiviniemi (19 April 2007 – 22 June 2011) 
Figure 3.5 Composition of the Eduskunta following the 2007 election, per 
seats 
 
Source: Sundberg (2008). 
The 2007 general election held on 18 March marked a major switch to the right, with both 
left-wing parties being defeated (SDP lost eight seats compared to 2003 and VAS lost 
two). KOK, on the other hand, was considered as the winner of this election, gaining a 
total of 50 seats (+10) and becoming the second largest party represented in parliament. 
PS (+2), RKP (+1) and VIHR (+1) also made substantial gains in this election. Vanhanen, 
as leader of the largest political party (KESK, who nevertheless lost four seats compared 
to 2003), was again put in charge of cabinet formation and chose to create a non-socialist 
surplus majority coalition with KOK, VIHR and RKP, leaving the Social Democratic 
Party in the opposition for the first time since 1995. Interestingly enough, the government 

















government partisanship (-25.3). As such, this government stands out as the only non-
centrist cabinet in Finland throughout the period analysed in this study. On 22 June 2010, 
Vanhanen stepped down as KESK party leader and Prime Minister, replaced by former 
Minister for Local Government Mari Kiviniemi who took the lead until the end of the 
parliamentary term in 2011.  
In terms of European integration policy, the new government programme mostly dealt 
with the issue of foreign policy. As outlined by Sundberg (2008: 971), “the government 
committed itself to enhancing Finnish readiness to participate in international crisis 
management by intensifying co-operation in the use of military and civil resources, and 
full participation in a joint EU security and crisis management co-operation”. 
Accordingly, the Vanhanen II/Kiviniemi government agreed to continue participation in 
the EU Battle Groups scheme and to participate in the Nordic Battle Group for two 
periods: the first semester of 2008 and, later on, the first semester of 2011 (Kerttunen 
2005). Whereas no parliamentary vote was held for participation in the NBG in 2008, a 
consultative vote took place on 10 December 2010 for Finland’s second participation in 
2011. This vote is developed in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 Eduskunta’s  vote  on  participation  in  the  Nordic Battle Group 
during the first semester of 2011, per party83 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Absentions
/absents 
KOK 50 44 0 6 
SDP 45 35 1 9 
KESK  50 35 0 15 
KD 7 6 0 1 
VAS 17 0 14 3 
VIHR 14 11 0 3 
PS 6 5 0 1 
RKP 10 6 0 4 
TOTAL 199 142 15 42 
  Source: Eduskunta’s archives. 
This vote was relatively similar to the previous one that took place in 2006 (see Table 3.8) 
and did not reflect divisions between the government and the opposition. An 
overwhelming majority of the MPs voted in favour of Finland’s participation in the NBG, 
                                                          
83 The number of MPs per party slightly differs from Figure 3.5 due to one defection (Markku 




with VAS being the only party opposed to this policy, jointly with one SDP representative. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in contrast to the 2006 vote and despite being anti-CFSP parties, 
the Christian Democrats and the Finns Party also supported such participation. This 
could be explained by the fact that Nordic co-operation is considered as one of the main 
priorities of both parties in terms of foreign and security policy: as such, the fact that the 
NBG takes place within the framework of the European Union did not seem to influence 
the attitudes of both parties on such policy.  
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This empirical chapter has focused on Finland’s relationship with the European Union 
and how it evolved through time. Its first section has demonstrated that Finland is the 
most integrated Nordic state, belonging to the ‘inner core’ of the EU and generally being 
a proactive rather a passive member state. In the second section, the well-established 
political parties’ preferences on European integration were presented in detail. It has been 
demonstrated that a majority of these parties are rather in favour of European integration 
as a whole while there are no parties fully opposed to ‘Europe’, as they all agree that 
Finland should remain in the Union. The third section has analysed the various 
governments’ composition as well as their positions on European integration, and 
provided an extensive analysis of parliamentary votes over major European policies (i.e. 
Finland’s participation in the EEA, application for an EU membership, participation in 
the Schengen agreement, participation in the third stage of the EMU and participation in 
two EU Battle Groups). In order to answer the main research question of this thesis (have 
Nordic government preferences on European integration been influenced by domestic political factors?), 
and with regard to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, four main sets of conclusions 
can be drawn from Finland’s European experience. 
Each parliamentary vote analysed in this chapter showed a comfortable lead for 
governments’ proposals for three main reasons. First, the absence of fully anti-
integrationist parties in Finland favoured such positive attitudes towards European 
integration (Raunio 2005). Second, the parties that were broadly in favour of integration 
(i.e. KOK, SDP and RKP) were able to secure more than 50 per cent of the seats in 
parliament for each term showing that, in addition to the divided Centre Party, the 
majority of the Finnish parliament was generally composed of pro-European MPs. Third, 
84 
 
in all parliamentary terms analysed, the governments’ share of MPs in parliament was 
superior to 50 per cent, de facto enabling the executive power to secure a positive 
outcome in the Eduskunta. For these motives, the case of Finland validates the first 
hypothesis explored within the framework of this study (i.e. if there is a majority of pro-
European integration parties in parliament, then the government will be in favour of deepening the 
country’s relationship with the European Union).  
Furthermore, it appears that governments that were not composed of a majority of fully 
pro-integrationist parties could still be in favour of deepening Finland’s relationship with 
the European Union. This is illustrated by the fact that the Aho I cabinet, which was 
strongly divided on the issue, submitted an application for an EU membership before the 
Eduskunta (see section 3.3.1). Similarly, if a government was composed of a majority of pro-
European integration parties, it would be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with the EU, 
which would thus confirm the second hypothesis. Nevertheless, it should be borne in 
mind that all Finnish governments analysed in this study showed their willingness to be 
part of the ‘inner core’ of the European Union: the Finnish case does not offer any 
counter-example.  
Unlike its Nordic neighbours, Finland has a strong tradition of majority governments. 
Between 1991 and 2010, governments consisted of surplus majority coalitions, i.e. 
coalitions from which a party can be removed without threatening its majority status. Due 
to the absence of minority cabinets, it is not possible to offer a detailed comparative 
analysis between different types of governments while only focusing on the case of 
Finland; however, it can be supposed that this tradition of majority government enabled 
the executive power to have more influence in terms European integration policy, as it 
was the case with the issue of participation in the EMU (see section 3.3.2.1). This would 
thus confirm hypothesis 4 stating that a majority government will adopt a stronger position on 
European integration.  
Finally, in the case of Finland, it seems rather difficult to determine whether government 
ideology influenced its position on European integration. This is explained by the fact 
that there is a general consensus over European policies amongst Finnish political parties, 
enabling them to build broad coalitions and to avoid divisions on this issue (hence the 
‘Finnish model of government’ suggested by Arter 1999). Furthermore, in a country with 
a strong tradition of surplus majority coalitions often cutting across the left-right political 
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spectrum, the governments’ ideologies have tended to be more centre-oriented than in 
countries with minority or one-party coalitions, as demonstrated by their values on Kim 
and Fording’s index of government partisanship (see Table 3.3). It thus appears that in 
the Finnish case, centre-oriented surplus majority governments strongly advocated 
European integration. The only non-centrist cabinets, Vanhanen II / Kiviniemi (-25.3 on 
Kim and Fording’s index), still supported European integration, as illustrated through 
participation in the Nordic Battle Group. This would contradict the fifth hypothesis (i.e. 
Government’s support for European integration will decline as it moves further to either the left or the 
right).  






Chapter 4. Sweden 
 
4.1. Relations between Sweden and the European Union: 
a ‘Euro-outsider’84 on the edge? 
Like Finland, Sweden applied for an EU membership in the early 1990s and joined the 
Union on 1 January 1995. This accession was approved by the population in a narrow 
referendum held in November 1994, which saw 52.3 per cent of Swedes voting in favour 
of membership and with 46.8 per cent voting against (turnout of 83.3 per cent). However, 
since joining the European Union, the country has not followed the same path as its 
Eastern Nordic neighbour, remaining in the ‘outer core’ of the European Union and by 
de facto85 opting out of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. This decision, 
first taken by the Persson government in 1997, was then submitted to the population in 
September 2003 through a referendum: 42 per cent of whom voted in favour of EMU 
membership, while 55.9 per cent voted against (with a turnout of 82.6 per cent).  
This section briefly outlines the evolution of Sweden’s path to European integration, from 
its early days to the de facto opt-out of the EMU. The existing literature on the 
relationship between Sweden and the European Union is also discussed. 
                                                          
84 A ‘Euro-outsider’ has been defined by Miles (2005a: 4) as “a country that is a full member of the EU, yet 
remains outside the euro-area and this has not adopted the euro”. This notion is preferred to ‘EMU-
outsider’, as “those countries outside the euro do participate in the more general preparatory First and 
Second Stages of the EMU programme” (ibid.).  
85 In contrast to Denmark and the United Kingdom, Sweden has a legal obligation to join the Eurozone. 
Hence, this constitutes a de facto (and not de jure) opt-out (see e.g. Adler-Nissen 2009). From a legal 
perspective, the Swedish case for differentiated integration is thus rather difficult to defend.  
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Box 4.1 Timeline: Sweden’s  major  steps  towards  integration 
Date Agreement 
1949 Membership, Council of Europe 
1960 Membership, European Free Trade Association 
1973 Free trade agreement with the European Economic Community 
1991 Application for European Union Membership 
1994 Membership, European Economic Area 
1995 Membership, European Union 
1996 Membership, Schengen Area (implemented in 2001, jointly with the other 
Nordic states) 
1997 Government’s decision not to join the third stage of the EMU;; 
membership subject to popular referendum at a later stage 
2003 Referendum on participation to the third stage of the EMU, rejected by 
the population 
2008 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
2011 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
 
As illustrated in Box 4.1, Sweden played a proactive role in European co-operation from 
its early days, being one of the founding members of the Council of Europe and the 
European Free Trade Association. Between 1961 and 1971, the positions taken by the 
Swedish government are particularly interesting.86 Indeed, while being critical of full 
membership which was perceived as a threat to the policy of neutrality and the Swedish 
welfare state, the government actively tried to promote an early form of differentiated 
integration through associate membership of the (then) European Community. However, 
such possibilities never led to negotiations between the EC and Sweden, first as a 
consequence of de Gaulle’s position on the issue of enlargement, and then due to 
divisions within the Commission and the Council. It should also be noted that between 
1967 and 1970, Sweden considered joining the EC, “provided that there could be a 
solution to the neutrality problem” (Gustavsson 1998: 47-48). However, by 1971, the 
Social Democratic government no longer saw membership as a solution, mostly due to 
the EC’s ambition to move further in a federalist direction following the Council’s 
decision to accept the content of the Werner and Davignon reports (Gustavsson 1998; 
Lindahl and Naurin 2005). Consequently, rather than joining the EC or finding an 
agreement on some form of associate membership, Sweden signed a free trade agreement 
                                                          
86 For more detailed discussions on the Swedish governments’ positions on European co-operation between 
1961 and 1971, see Miljan (1977); Karlsson (1995); Miles (1997); Gustavsson (1998); Gstöhl (2002). 
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with the EC in 1972, which was mostly seen as beneficial by both parties. In sum, Sweden 
remained in the inner periphery of the EU until 1995 for three main reasons: concerns 
over the principle of neutrality, and over the future of the welfare state; opposing the 
federalist direction taken by the Council, which can be referred to as ‘federo-scepticism’ 
(Miles 2001); and a reluctance from the EC to grant a status of associate member, which 
would have led to a very first case of formal differentiated integration.   
 
Following the ratification of the free trade agreement, the question of European 
integration remained off the political agenda until the mid-1980s, with the ratification of 
the Single European Act in 1986 and plans to implement a Single Market by the end of 
1992. In 1988, all parties represented in the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, reached a 
consensus on a declaration that paved the way for negotiations on what would become 
the European Economic Area (as discussed in section 2.2). Sweden thus played a 
proactive role in starting negotiations over the future EEA agreement.  
In 1990, a severe economic crisis hit Sweden,87 which led the government to adopt an 
unpopular package of austerity measures (Aylott 1997). As a result, the government 
released a press statement at the end of October 1990, calling for “a new decision by the 
Riksdag which more distinctly and in more positive wordings clarifies Sweden’s ambition 
to become a member of the European Community” (Gustavsson 1998: 66). The Social 
Democrat (single party) minority government, through Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, 
eventually decided to formally apply for EC membership on 1 July 1991. Formal 
negotiations with Brussels started in February 1993 and were facilitated by the EEA 
agreement signed in 1992, similarly to the Finnish and Norwegian cases. It was also 
decided that a referendum on the issue of membership would take place once the 
accession treaty has been negotiated. Even though referendums in Sweden are technically 
only advisory, all political parties represented in the Riksdag agreed in advance to respect 
the outcome of the popular vote, regardless of their own views on this issue (ibid.). The 
referendum was eventually held on Sunday 13 November 1994, four weeks after the 
Finns’ decision to join the Union. 
The main reason that led the government to apply for an EU membership was thus the 
deep economic recession that had hit the country (Johansson 2003), even though Prime 
                                                          
87 For an analysis on the causes and consequences of the crisis, see Englund (1999). 
89 
 
Minister Carlsson never publicly admitted this to be the case (Arter 2008). However, the 
literature acknowledges three other contextual factors that were likely to play a role in 
shaping this position. The first one is related to the strongly held principle of neutrality,88 
which lost its main raison d’être following the end of the Cold War (Jerneck 1993;; 
Mouritzen 1993; Sundelius 1994; Widfeldt 1996; Gustavsson 1998; Gstöhl 2002; Arter 
2008). While this policy served national interests until the late 1980s by enabling the 
country to gain international prestige, the end of a two-block division implied an 
emergence of ‘multipolarity’, with the EU becoming an increasingly influential actor at 
the international stage. In the words of Gustavsson (1998: 96), “in the new situation, being 
neutral was no longer ‘something to be’, and this policy could no longer serve as a base 
for upholding Sweden’s international position”. By becoming a member of the European 
Union, Sweden could thus play a role in shaping common positions with other states 
sharing similar views in terms of foreign policy, and adapting itself to a new international 
environment by avoiding the risk of becoming a peripheral actor. The second contextual 
factor is linked to the poor prospects in the EEA negotiations: Sweden hoped that the 
negotiated agreement would give the possibility for EEA member states to shape 
decisions related to the Single European Market. However, it quickly appeared that the 
EFTA countries would suffer a lack of influence in the EEA. As a result, applying for full 
EU membership was seen as a ‘better’ solution in order to avoid being left in the periphery 
of the new Europe (Gustavsson 1998; Miles 2005b). The third factor which helps to 
explain the government’s decision to apply for EU membership (and more especially the 
timing) is related to the electoral schedule. With the next general election looming on the 
horizon, “there was concern to avoid the potentially calamitous electoral costs of an 
enforced devaluation of the Swedish krona” (Arter 2008: 322). As a result, applying for 
EU membership shortly before the general election in September 1991 can also be 
understood as a strategic move to avoid a potential electoral disaster.  
While looking at the Europeanisation of the nation-state, Miles (2001; 2005b) offers a 
very useful classification of the Swedish governments’ positions on European integration 
following EU accession, both in terms of vertical (i.e. influencing developments at the 
                                                          
88 It should be noted that unlike Finland (see previous chapter), the Swedish principle of neutrality was not 
a consequence of a special relationship with a particular state or block (i.e. the former USSR). As mentioned 
by Gustavsson (1998: 73), “Sweden’s neutrality was never codified in any binding way or guaranteed by the 
great powers. Swedish policy-makers have instead emphasized flexibility arguing that ‘we determine the 
policy of neutrality ourselves’”.  
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supranational level), and horizontal (i.e. adopting EU policies at the domestic level) 
integration. In his views, the Swedish adaptation to full EU membership can be divided 
into four periods: 
x Period A (1995-1997) which constitutes a ‘reactive shock’ during which Swedish 
governments “were largely concerned with securing EU acceptance of those 
policy issues raised by Sweden, but not subsequently accepted by the Union, 
during the 1993-1994 accession negotiations”;; 
x Period B (1997-1999) referred to as ‘breakthrough’, “represents the time when the 
vast majority of the Swedish political elite or state abandoned any pretensions 
towards EU-scepticism (on full membership status) and became further 
Europeanised”;; 
x Period C (1999-2000) of ‘positive adjustment’ is characterised by “movement on 
the part of the leading political actors – most notably the Social Democratic 
government” towards a more proactive European policy”;; 
x And Period D (2001) coinciding with the Swedish EU Council Presidency, which 
enabled the government to successfully “add a ‘Swedish accent’ to the Union’s 
agenda for six months” (Miles 2001: 316-326, 2005b: 189-208). 
During these four periods as well as from 2002 onwards, two major areas constituted 
‘policy dilemmas’89 for the Swedish government: defence and participation in the third 
stage of the EMU. Participation in Schengen did also constitute a dilemma during period 
A, before the government (and parliament) effectively opted into this policy together with 
all other Nordic countries. In addition, “Sweden’s approaches to EU affairs during the 
first years of membership can be characterised as largely reactive rather than pro-active 
and anticipatory” (Johansson 2003: 382). This constitutes a strong contrast to Finland’s 
attitudes towards integration.90 Such signs of reluctance have mostly been explained by 
the discrepancy between public opinion and that of the political elites, which also 
                                                          
89 In the words of Miles (2001: 311; 2005b: 180), a ‘policy dilemma’ occurs where “the priority of Swedish 
government in these policy areas is to overtly ‘defend’ and usually ‘protect’ national interests, even if this 
requires Sweden to be placed on the periphery of EU development” (see also Johansson 2003). 
90 Sweden’s attitude towards European integration (and more especially the EMU) has also been analysed 
by Miles (2004: 156) using the metaphor of a ‘hitchhiker’ which is, in his words, “a Sweden (or perhaps 
more accurately Sweden’s governing political elite) that wishes to respond positively to the establishment 
of the European single currency >…@ yet for largely domestic political reasons >…@ is unready to commit 
fully to participation in the evolving euro area at the time”. 
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constitutes a particular characteristic in Swedish domestic politics. Indeed, while there are 
clear indications of a consensus over deepening European integration, especially amongst 
the elected representatives, the views of the general population have consistently showed 
signs of reluctance (see e.g. Lindahl 2000; Miles 2001; Johansson 2003; Aylott 2005; 
Lindahl and Naurin 2005). Such division between the population and the political elites 
has given the country a ‘twin face’, with governments employing what has been named as 
the ‘politics of low visibility’: “[a] quiet networking and a ‘best in class’ behaviour in 
Brussels has been combined with a low degree of Europeanisation of the domestic 
political debate” (Lindahl and Naurin 2005: 67). In short, the Swedes’ strong mass-level 
Euroscepticism should not be ignored when looking at government positions on 
European integration, especially in the years immediately following membership 
acquisition. This gap is best exemplified by the national debate on EMU membership, 
which will be outlined in section 4.3.4.  
While the existing literature has mostly focused on these contextual elements in order to 
explain Sweden’s reluctance, few studies discuss some of the common domestic political 
variables which are the centre of attention for this thesis (Aylott 2005; Lindahl and Naurin 
2005). The next section analyses the Swedish party system and outlines the positions of 
each party on (differentiated) European integration. 
 
4.2. The Swedish party system and European integration 
As Norway, Sweden is a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary democracy, and a 
unitary state. Since 1971, 349 representatives are elected in the unicameral Riksdag.91 MPs 
are elected for a period of four years.92 Until the late 1980s, the Swedish multi-party system 
had a series of distinctive characteristics, outlined by Bergström (1991: 8). First, it has 
been “the simplest in any of the democracies”, due to the importance of the basic left-
right scale to account for party structure and electoral behaviour (see e.g. Aylott 2002). 
Second, it has been “one of the most ‘frozen’” systems, with five party families 
constituting its core (namely the Communists, the Social Democrats, the Liberals, the 
Conservatives and the Agrarians), which reflects Berglund and Lindström’s (1978) five-
                                                          
91 The Swedish upper chamber (första kammaren) has been abolished in 1971 (Aylott et al. 2013). 
92 Between 1970 and 1994, however, representatives were elected for a period of three years.  
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party Scandinavian system (see section 1.2). Third, the Social Democratic Party (Sveriges 
socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) has historically been the dominant party, and much 
more so than in compared Sweden’s neighbours. While the latter characteristic managed 
to remain salient until recent years, the 1988 and 1991 general elections witnessed a 
substantial change to the traditional structure of the party system, which moved it from a 
five- to a seven-to-eight-party set with the introduction of the Green, Christian 
Democratic and (most recently) Right-Wing Populist party families all gaining seats in the 
Riksdag. It should also be noted that since the mid-1960s, the party system has 
traditionally been divided into two main blocs, a socialist (or red-greens) versus a non-
socialist (nicknamed ‘the Alliance’, Alliansen; see further section 4.3.5), and which have 
more recently constituted more or less formal pre-election coalitions (Allern and Aylott 
2009; Bergman and Bolin 2011; Aylott et al. 2013). While a similar two-bloc structure also 
exists in Norway, it is not present in Finland, where instead the three ‘big’ parties (i.e. the 
National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party) have 
governed together despite their ideological divergences. 
As with the previous chapter on Finland, the aim of this section is to analyse the position 
of the well-established Swedish parties towards European integration. In the Swedish 
case, the period analysed starts in 1990, when the EU issue became a much more salient 
question under the Carlsson II cabinet, and finishes at the end of 2010, when the 
parliament voted in favour of participating for the second time in the Nordic Battle 
Group. Since 1990, seven parties have consistently managed to secure seats in the 
Riksdag: the conservative Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet, M); the Social 
Democratic Party; the agrarian Centre Party (Centerpartiet, C);; the Liberal People’s Party 
(Folkpartiet Liberalerna, FP); the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna, KDS);93 and two 
‘new politics’ parties: the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, Vp), belonging to the socialist left party 
family; and the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, MdG).94 In addition, two populist right 
parties have been represented in the Riksdag: the short-lived New Democracy (Ny 
Demokrati, NyD), which secured 25 seats in 1991 before disappearing from the political 
                                                          
93 The Christian Democratic Party of Sweden is ususally shortened as ‘KD’;; however, as such acronym has 
already been used for the Finnish Christian Democratic Party and in order to avoid confusion, the initials 
‘KDS’ are used in this analysis. 
94 The Green Party is commonly named Miljöpartiet and shortened as ‘MP’;; however, as such acronym has 
already been used for the term ‘member of parliament’, the initials ‘MdG’ are used in this analysis. 
93 
 
scene three years later,95 and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD), which 
gained 20 seats in 2010. Even though, at the time of writing, the latter is represented in 
the Riksdag and might become a well-established party in the future, it has not been 
included in for this study due to its young history in parliament and the minor role it has 
so far played in Swedish politics.  
Table 4.1 Percentage vote for Swedish political parties in parliamentary 
elections, from 1988 to 2010 
 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 
Moderate Party (M) 18.3 21.9 22.4 22.9 15.3 26.2 30.1 
Social Democratic Party (SAP) 43.2 37.7 45.3 36.4 39.8 35.0 30.7 
Centre Party (C) 11.3 8.5 7.7 5.1 6.2 7.9 6.6 
Liberal People’s Party (Fp) 12.2 9.1 7.2 4.7 13.4 7.5 7.1 
Christian Democrats (KDS) 2.0 7.1 4.1 11.8 9.1 6.6 5.6 
Left Party (Vp) (5.8)1 4.5 6.2 12.0 8.4 5.8 5.6 
Green Party (MdG) 5.5 3.4 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.2 7.3 
Others 0.7 7.8 2.2 2.6 3.1 5.7 7.0 
Turnout 86 86.7 86.8 81.4 80.1 82.0 84.6 
Source: Sainsbury (1989); Pierre and Widfeldt (1992; 1999); Widfeldt and Pierre (1995); Widfeldt (2003a; 
2007; 2011). 
1 Running under the name of Left Communists (Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna, VPK) – see section 4.2.6.1. 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the electoral score for the seven well-established parties in 
the general elections held between 1988 and 2010. This confirms the trends outlined 
above. Throughout the period in question, SAP has been the largest party, with a 
comfortable lead on the second largest party, the Moderate Party, even though the 
strength of the Social Democrats has started to decline progressively from 2006 onwards.  
 
4.2.1. Conservative Party 
The centre-right Moderate Party (sometimes referred to as ‘Conservative Party’; see for 
instance Gustavsson 1998; Arter 2008; Bergman and Bolin 2011) was founded in 1904 
                                                          
95 New Democracy was formally dissolved in 2000, following three unsuccessful elections in 1994, 1995 
(European parliamentary elections) and 1998. 
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under the name of General Electoral League (Allmänna valmansförbundet) as a response to 
the rise of the Social Democrats and the Liberals. The Conservatives have historically 
competed against the ideologically close Liberals and Agrarians to become the largest 
non-socialist party in Sweden. This position has been secured since 1979, making M the 
second largest party in the Riksdag. It closely co-operates with Swedish non-socialist 
parties, i.e. the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the Christian Democrats, 
through the ‘Alliance’ as introduced in the previous section. Between 1988 and 2010, the 
party secured between 15.3 per cent (in 2002) and 30.1 per cent (in 2010) of the votes, 
and participated in all three non-socialist coalition governments. At the European level, 
M is part of the European People’s Party. 
As its Finnish and Norwegian sister parties, M is broadly and almost unanimously 
supportive of European integration, even though the party does not support a federalist 
vision of Europe (Johansson and Raunio 2001; Miles 2005b). Even before the European 
issue became salient in the late 1980s, the party has consistently and almost unanimously 
been in favour of participating in the process of European integration, jointly with the 
Liberals (see section 4.2.4). In 1988, the party manifesto mentioned that “Sweden must 
be part of building the new Europe”96 and “should not be an isolated corner of Europe”97 
(Moderata samlingspartiet 1988) without explicitly calling for membership as such due to 
the (rather fragile) consensus that prevailed amongst the parties represented in parliament 
over the EEA negotiations. However, during the summer of 1990, the party expressively 
urged the government to apply for an EU membership and thereby put pressure on the 
ruling Social Democratic Party, which did not consider this option as viable until October 
1990 (Gustavsson 1998). Following Sweden’s accession to the EU, the party supported 
developments at the European level, including the strengthening of the CFSP as well as 
full Swedish participation in all EU policies, including Schengen and the EMU (Moderata 
samlingspartiet 1998).98 In other words, the Moderate Party wanted to see Sweden belong 
to the ‘inner core’ of the European Union, jointly with Finland, until the population 
rejected participation in the Eurozone in 2003. Since then, even though its leadership is 
still pro-EMU, the party has become more passive on this issue. The 2010 Alliance 
                                                          
96 Author’s translation: “Sverige måste vara med och bygga det nya Europa”. 
97 Author’s translation: “Vårt land får inte bli ett isolerat hörn av Europa”. 
98 It should be noted that there were some minor intra-party divisions on participation in the third stage of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, with some Conservatives campaigning for the No-side in the 2003 
referendum campaign (Arter 2008; Aylott et al. 2013). 
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manifesto, common to the Moderate, Centre, Liberal People’s and Christian Democratic 
parties, stated that “a potential future Swedish EMU membership must be preceded by a 
referendum. The timing of such must be decided by the Parliament. A referendum should 
only take place after broad discussions in which the pros and cons are tested in the light 
of, amongst others, experiences and developments in countries inside and outside the 
Eurozone” (Alliansen 2010).99  
In sum, the Moderate Party is a strongly pro-integrationist party in Sweden, and has always 
campaigned for Sweden to be part of the ‘inner core’ of the Union. As such, M does not 
want to promote horizontal differentiated integration, and ultimately wants Sweden to 
participate in the third stage of the EMU. 
 
4.2.2. Social Democratic Party 
Founded in 1889, the Swedish Social Democratic Party is the oldest and largest political 
party in the country. However, it appears that the Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden 
has eroded in recent years, as demonstrated by the evolution of the party’s electoral score 
throughout the period analysed, falling from 45.3 per cent in 1994 to 30.7 per cent in 
2010.100 Despite being ideologically close to the Left Party and, more recently, the Greens, 
SAP generally governed alone when it was not in the opposition, forming single party 
minority governments usually with the support of other left-oriented parties in parliament 
(see section 4.3). The party is furthermore represented in the European Parliament in the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
As a consequence of being a relatively large and heterogeneous party, SAP has faced major 
difficulties to manage the European issue since the late 1980s. Broadly speaking, the left-
wing of the party has been more opposed to European integration than the right-wing 
has, and its leadership is known to be more pro-European than the average party member 
is (Johansson and Raunio 2001). In the 1988 general election, for example, the party’s 
slogan was ‘Sweden is unique’  (Sverige är unikt), aiming to emphasise the divergences 
                                                          
99 Author’s translation: “Ett eventuellt framtida svenskt inträde i valutaunionen måste föregås av en 
folkomröstning.Tidpunkten för en sådan måste beslutas av riksdagen. En folkomröstning bör genomföras 
först efter en bred diskussion där för- och nackdelar på nytt prövas i ljuset av bland annat erfarenheter och 
utveckling i länderna i och utanför eurosamarbetet”. 
100 On the reasons of the Social Democratic decline, see Arter (2008; 2012). 
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between the Swedish welfare system and those of the EC countries (Sveriges 
socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 1988; Sainsbury 1993; Aylott 1997). The party 
nevertheless favoured negotiations on the future EEA agreement. The economic crisis of 
the early 1990s, however, ‘forced’ the Social Democratic leadership to consider applying 
for an EU membership and thus to activate an internal debate over this issue, which had 
not been discussed throughout the year. In order to avoid a split as has occurred within 
its Norwegian counterpart, the SAP leadership successfully adopted a strategy of 
compartmentalisation, which consisted of four steps: first, while being in power, the 
Social Democrats took the decision to let the population decide on the issue through a 
referendum, leading the party to avoid taking a collective decision; second, it did not 
sanction the EU opponents within its organization, thus breaking with the usual norms 
of party discipline; third, in addition to tolerating divergences over this issue, the party 
also appointed senior anti-membership figures to its leadership; and finally, SAP lobbied 
to organise the referendum directly after the 1994 general election, with the aim of keeping 
this issue out of the traditional election campaigns (Aylott 1997; 2002; Miles 2005b; Aylott 
et al. 2013; see also section 4.3.2). The leadership eventually adopted a positive attitude 
towards an EU membership following a vote at the party congress (Pierre and Widfeldt 
1995), but let its anti-EU faction campaign against membership in compliance with the 
compartmentalisation strategy (Aylott 2008). Following the referendum result, the party’s 
unity was preserved and in subsequent manifestos, it reiterated its federo-sceptic stance 
by stating, e.g., that supranational decision-making “must be limited to what strictly 
requires supranationalism. Otherwise, the distance becomes too big between the 
population and their elected representatives” (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 
1998).101 
Due to the policy of neutrality, SAP was initially reluctant to support developments in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, during the period of positive adjustment 
(1999-2000, see section 4.1), the party had also started to raise this issue and support such 
developments, especially in terms of crisis management and the defence of human rights 
(Miles 2005b). Accordingly, from 2002 onwards, the manifestos began to emphasise the 
party’s positive attitude towards developments in the CFSP.  
                                                          
101 Author’s translation: “Det överstatliga beslutsfattandet i EU behövs. Men det måste begränsas till det 
som oundgängligen kräver överstatlighet. I annat fall blir avståndet för stort mellan folk och folkvalda.” 
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While the party had unanimously supported participation in Schengen, the issue of EMU 
membership was even more controversial than that of the EU membership itself. SAP 
was strongly divided and constrained by contextual factors related to domestic politics. 
As a consequence, the party announced in 1997 (while in office) its opposition to Sweden 
being part of the first wave entrants, before switching its position at the 2000 party 
Congress, where a majority of party representatives voted in favour of joining the EMU 
third stage. When the issue became politically salient again in 2002 (due to a rather positive 
political context, further explored in section 4.3.4), the party did once again adopt a 
strategy of compartmentalisation which, this time, was unsuccessful. Even though the 
party leadership (through Prime Minister and Party Leader Göran Persson) had once 
again called for a ‘Yes’ vote, more than half of its electorate voted against. The decision 
of SAP to raise the EMU membership issue in 2002 is considered as a contextual 
miscalculation on behalf of the leadership (Aylott 2005).  
In a nutshell, while SAP’s official party line, since the early 1990s, supports the European 
Union, it has been rather divided over participation in certain policy areas, as illustrated 
by the EMU example. This can be mostly explained by the size of the party, which often 
formed single party minority governments throughout the 20th century.  
 
4.2.3. Agrarian Party 
The agrarian Centre Party was founded in 1913 as the Farmers’ League (Bondeförbundet), 
before changing its name in 1957. Located very much at the centre-right of the traditional 
left-right scale, C has participated in the most recent non-socialist governments, being 
ideologically close to the Liberals; however, the party also has historic ties with SAP (Elder 
and Gooderham 1978) and has occasionally supported single party minority governments 
led by the Social Democrats.102 During the period analysed, the party’s electoral results 
fluctuated between 5.1 per cent (in 1998) and 11.3 per cent (in 1988). In the European 
Parliament, the party is affiliated to ALDE.  
                                                          
102 As mentioned by an interviewee, the Centre Party is “a neo-liberal green party” and the Social 
Democratic Party is a “Red Socialist party. So we do not find much to agree on anymore” (Interview with 
a spokesperson from the Centre Party, 7 April 2014). 
98 
 
While the other Swedish centre-right parties did not encounter any major difficulties in 
managing the European issue, the Centre Party’s experience rather diverges. Indeed, the 
party has been divided on this issue, both within the leadership and within the electorate, 
and a small organised anti-EU faction has operated within the party from 1992 onwards 
(Aylott 2008). Similarly to its Finnish and Norwegian sister parties, the party has strongly 
defended national neutrality in its broadest sense due to its agrarian base (Aylott et al. 
2013). Nevertheless, the party leadership supported the EEA agreement, the 
government’s decision to apply for an EU membership in 1990 as well as the accession 
treaty in 1994. The party was somewhat critical of the latter agreement, especially in terms 
of respect of the principle of neutrality and agricultural policies. Like most other parties 
in Sweden, C has advocated for intergovernmentalism rather than for supranationalism 
(Johansson and Raunio 2001). Furthermore, the 1994 manifesto stipulated that should 
Sweden join the EU, the Centre Party would ensure that the country “[…] is not part of 
a common defence and that Sweden can stand outside the common currency” 
(Centerpartiet 1994).103 In other words, the party wanted to promote differentiated 
integration by opting out of the CFSP and the EMU. This support for differentiation is 
still present nowadays, as stated by an interviewee: “we would like to see different types 
of integration within Europe. We could have a multi-core Union so to speak. So more 
integration on some issues but less integration on some others”.104 
Although the Centre Party has progressively started to support a Swedish participation in 
the CFSP (especially regarding peacekeeping operations led by the European Union) from 
1998 onwards, it did not change its stance towards participation in the third stage of the 
EMU. Indeed, C argued, e.g., that Eurozone membership would lead to increased 
supranationalism, which would go against the party’s ideology (Centerpartiet 1998). The 
party also campaigned for the No-side in 2003, being the only centre-right party to oppose 
an EMU membership. Even though the party has remained opposed participation to the 
Monetary Union, its position on Europe has evolved into one that is increasingly pro-
integrationist: “[i]n the 2004 European election, it went so far as to advocate ‘federalism’ 
in Europe, albeit a version that would involve a ‘leaner but sharper’ Union” (Aylott et al. 
                                                          
103 Author’s translation: “Om svenska folket beslutar om medlemskap skall vi säkerställa att Sverige kan 
behålla sin alliansfrihet i fred syftande till neutralitet i krig, att Sverige inte ingår i ett gemensamt försvar 
samt att Sverige kan stå utanför en gemensam valuta.” 
104 Interview with a spokesperson from the Centre Party, 7 April 2014. 
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2013: 161). As mentioned by an interviewee, “we have a different view on what federalism 
is compared to some other parties, especially Folkpartiet. For us, a federal union would 
mean that there is less power on the EU level and more power at the state level and for 
local governments. That is really important to us”.105  
In sum, within the context of European integration, “the vacillating position of the party 
reflects a cost-benefit analysis for the agricultural sector as a whole, with many small-scale 
farmers suffering from increased competition in the EU” (Johansson and Raunio 2001: 
243).  
 
4.2.4. Liberal Party  
The Liberal People’s Party of Sweden was created in 1934 and is currently one of the four 
well-established centre-right parties represented in the Riksdag. Ideologically close to the 
Centre Party,106 Fp also co-operates with other Swedish centre-right parties through the 
Alliance and participated in the three non-socialist governments throughout the period 
analysed. Between 1988 and 2010, its electoral performance fluctuated between 4.7 per 
cent in 1998 and 13.4 per cent in 2002. The party is represented in the European 
Parliament under ALDE. 
The Liberal People’s Party’s position towards European co-operation has been even more 
positive than the one adopted by the Moderate Party. Indeed, while the Conservatives 
show some (minor) signs of division over participation in the Eurozone, the Liberals are 
united in their pro-integrationist approach to the Union. Furthermore, Fp advocates a 
federal Europe, while M has come to defend the intergovernmentalist vision. However, 
as noted by Johansson and Raunio (2001: 243), the party adapted itself to the Eurosceptic 
public opinion and “the most federalist notions were dropped”. Nevertheless, party 
manifestos adopted from 1991 onwards are broadly pro-integrationist: the party wants 
Sweden to belong to the ‘inner core’ of the European Union, with full participation in all 
policy areas, including the CFSP, the AFSJ and the EMU. The party has also called for a 
liberalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy but without rejecting it. While the 2006 
                                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 “We are a party that is part of the Alliance, and historically we have had an especially close relationship 




manifesto avoided mentioning participation in the Eurozone (following the referendum 
result of 2003),107 the issue reappeared in 2010 with the manifesto mentioning that 
“Sweden should introduce the euro as currency. Another referendum should be held in 
the next term” (Folkpartiet liberalerna 2010).108 In sum, Fp can be considered as the most 
pro-integrationist party in Sweden, and does not consider differentiated integration as a 
viable option for the country.  
 
4.2.5. Christian Democratic Party 
Founded in 1964, the Christian Democrats is the youngest party of its kind in the Nordic 
region. While the party remained marginal in its early years, it managed to gain its first 
parliamentary seat in the 1985 election by joining forces with the Centre Party, before 
losing it three years later (Karvonen 1993). However, since 1991, KDS has been 
represented in the Riksdag, with an electoral score fluctuating between 4.1 per cent (in 
1994) and 11.8 per cent (in 1998). The party is thus well-established on the Swedish 
political scene and has actively participated in the European debate from the early 1990s 
onwards. As a centre-right party, the Christian Democrats participated in all non-socialist 
coalition governments since 1991. Similarly to its Finnish sister party, KDS is member of 
the European People’s Party in the European Parliament.  
Even though the party leadership came to be in favour of European integration when the 
issue arose in the early 1990s,109 its voters have generally been more sceptical (Johansson 
and Raunio 2001). As early as 1991, the party manifesto stressed that EU membership is 
the expression “of an ideological connection to the ideas of peace and solidarity in 
Europe” (Kristdemokraterna 1991).110 The party subsequently campaigned in favour of 
the Yes-side in the 1994 referendum, despite some signs of internal divisions. Such 
                                                          
107 This has been explained by an interviewee as such: “It was an issue of respecting the referendum of 
course. What we said is that we respect this referendum, but we will call for a referendum again sometime 
in the future. […] It is not a question of immediate policy. If it was not part of the manifesto, then my guess 
is that the manifesto probably touched upon more immediate issues when it comes to European policies” 
(ibid.).  
108 Author’s translation: “Sverige ska info ̈ra euron som valuta. En ny folkomro ̈stning bo ̈r därfo ̈r ha ̊llas under 
na ̈sta mandatperiod”. 
109 It should be noted that the party’s position on European integration has been strongly influenced by Alf 
Svensson, who was the leader of the Christian Democrats between 1973 and 2004 and a renowned pro-
European figure in Sweden (Miles 2005b). 
110 Author’s translation: “betona EG-medlemskapet som uttryck för en ideologisk anslutning till tanken på 
fred och samhörighet i Europa”. 
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divisions eventually led to the creation of an organised anti-EU faction within the party, 
named ‘Christian Democrats for an Alternative EU Policy’ (Kristdemokrater för en Alternativ 
Europapolitik; Aylott 2008). 
The party’s position regarding participation in the third stage of the EMU has evolved 
over time. In 1997 and 1998, the party congress initially argued that Sweden was not ready 
to be amongst the first wave entrants in the Eurozone (Widfeldt 2000b); but, by 
December 1999, the party had changed its position and decided to support EMU 
participation after all. This position was then retained by the party leadership during the 
2003 referendum campaign, despite some minor internal divisions (Miles 2005b). 
Following the outcome of this referendum, participation in the Eurozone was left off the 
party manifestos. 
Besides this switch regarding participation in the Eurozone, the party has consistently 
been in favour of deepening Sweden’s relationship with the European Union and has not 
seen differentiated integration to be an option for the country. Participation in the CFSP 
was perceived to be positive by KDS, which further wants to make the European Union 
a strong peace-making and peacekeeping force (Kristdemokraterna 2002; 2006).  
In conclusion, and unlike its Finnish sister party who is one of the most reluctant parties 
of the country (see previous chapter), KDS can be considered as a pro-integrationist party, 
even though less pro-European its centre-right partners in the Alliance, namely the 
Moderate Party and the Liberal People’s Party.  
 
4.2.6. ‘New Politics’ Parties 
As in Finland and Norway, two ‘new’ parties emerged in the late 1980s, and became well 
established in the Swedish party system from the early 1990s onwards: the Left Party, and 
the Greens. However, these two parties do not share the same history, nor positions, on 




4.2.6.1. Socialist Left Party 
While the Finnish Socialist Left party (the Left Alliance) was founded in the early 1990s 
as an answer to foreign policy issues, the Left Party is the direct continuation of the former 
Swedish Social Democratic Left Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska vänsterparti), founded in 
1917, which became the Swedish Communist Party (Sveriges kommunistiska parti) in 1921 
and was renamed the Left-Communists (Vänsterpartiet kommunisterna, VPK) in 1967 
(Christensen 1998; Arter 2008). Following the Revolutions of 1989, the party has formally 
adopted the more moderate name of the “Left Party” in 1990, breaking away from its 
communist past; yet it remains the most left-oriented party represented in the Riksdag 
(Arter 2002). Despite the fact that Vp was never represented at the executive level, it has 
historically been linked to SAP and has largely supported most of the latter’s single party 
minority governments. Throughout the period analysed, the Left Party’s electoral 
performance oscillated between 4.5 per cent (in 1991) and 12 per cent (in 1998). At the 
European level, the party is represented in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
parliamentary group. 
Throughout its existence, the Left Party stated its (almost) unanimous opposition to 
European co-operation. Already in 1972, the party rejected the Free Trade Agreement 
with the European Economic Community which was seen as benefiting big capital against 
the people (Christensen 1998). Already in 1988, and before the issue of EU membership 
became salient, the party manifesto stated that Sweden should not join the Union for two 
main reasons: first, the European Community “has been established to strengthen the 
position of capitalism in Western Europe”111; and second, Vp advocates “a policy towards 
Europe from a pan-European perspective, tending to dissolve the military, political and 
economic blocs”112 (Vänsterpartiet 1988). The party also stated its opposition to the EEA 
agreement in their 1991 manifesto which implied, according to the party, the erosion of 
Swedish legislation and welfare policy (Vänsterpartiet 1991). Despite the electorate’s 
decision to join the European Union via referendum, and a statement according to which 
the party respected the verdict in 1994 (Christensen 1998), it has remained anti-Europe 
and wants Sweden to leave the European Union as soon as possible (see e.g. 
                                                          
111 Author’s translation:  “EG har tillkommit för att stärka kapitalismens position i Västeuropa.” 
112 Author’s translation: “Vi bör föra en politik gentemot Europa utifrån ett alleuropeiskt perspektiv, som 
strävar mot att lösa upp militära politiska och ekonomiska blockbildningar.” 
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Vänsterpartiet 1998; 2002).113 It is thus fair to consider the Left Party as an anti-
integrationist, as it opposes any kind of institutionalised European co-operation. 
Why has the Left Party been so opposed to European co-operation? The answer, 
according to Johansson and Raunio (2001: 242), lies in the domestic political context and 
in their electoral strategies: “the leftists have skillfully exploited the reservoir provided by 
Eurosceptical public opinion. Having never been in government, the party has a freer 
position than a governing party”. In other words, it could be assumed that the Left Party 
uses the European issue as ‘the politics of opposition’ (Sitter 2001) in order to catch as 
many votes as possible in a country where mass-level Euroscepticism is relatively strong. 
 
4.2.6.2. Green Party 
The Swedish Green Party was formally founded in 1981, following a national referendum 
on nuclear power held in 1980 (Bennulf and Holmberg 1990). However, its roots can be 
traced back to the late 1960s, when new social movements dedicated to the protection of 
the environment were founded. While environmental issues constitute the main raison 
d’être of the party, MdG also emphasises issues such as cutting defence costs, equal 
income distribution and, more importantly within the framework of this thesis, 
opposition to European integration (Bennulf 1995). MdG is considered to be a largely 
centre-left party, ideologically closer to the Social Democratic Party, especially since 1998 
when the party agreed to support the Persson government (Elander 2000; see further 
section 4.3.4.2). Like the Left Party, they have never been represented at the executive 
level but have supported SAP’s single party minority governments on several occasions. 
Between 1988 and 2010, MP received between 3.4 per cent (in 1991) and 7.3 per cent (in 
2010) of votes. In the European Parliament, the party is part of the Greens-European 
Free Alliance group.  
Together with the Left Party, MdG shares the ‘anti-Europe’ platform in Swedish politics. 
The party heavily campaigned against the EEA agreement and EU membership in the 
early 1990s. Using the motto “Yes to Europe – No to the EC” (Ja till Europa – Nej till EG) 
in 1991, the Greens considered that market liberalisation, the use of supranationalism and 
                                                          
113 Aylott et al. (2013), however, emphasises that even though such policy remains in the party programme, 
it does not constitute a key priority of the Left Party. 
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military co-operation were the main reasons for why an EU membership should be 
rejected. In contrast to Vp, however, the party supported a form of European co-
operation on environmental issues as well as on the freedom to travel, study, and work 
(Miljöpartiet de Gröna 1991; 1994). The party has then gradually moved away from being 
in full opposition to an institutionalised European co-operation to taking up a softer 
stance and opposing participation in specific policy areas. In 2008, while still opposing 
EMU membership, developments in the CFSP114 and deepening European integration, 
the party removed the ‘withdrawal clause’ from its programme following an internal vote. 
Three reasons have been outlined to explain this switch in the party’s position on Europe. 
First, while opposition to the EU was initially perceived as an opportunity to increase 
electoral support (Miles 2005b), the Left Party has been more effective in gaining votes 
from the most Eurosceptic segment of the Swedish population, making such a platform 
less profitable for the Greens (Johansson and Raunio 2001). Second, the party has moved 
closer to the Social Democratic Party, being part of the so-called red-green parliamentary 
majority with the Left Party in 1998 and seeking to join the cabinet in subsequent 
elections: this encouraged the party leadership to take change its stance on European co-
operation (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013). Third, the party leadership (and especially Maria 
Wetterstrand and Peter Eriksson) was successful in convincing their voters to adopt a 
softer stance, with the aim of entering office in co-operation with the Social Democrats 
(Aylott et al. 2013). In sum, the party now supports EU membership as well as the current 
situation, with Sweden belonging to the ‘outer core’ or the European Union. According 
to MdG, differentiated integration is thus a viable option for Sweden. 
                                                          
114 A nuanced answer on the Green Party’s position on participation in the CFSP has been provided by an 
interviewee: “we are all in favour of EU states talking about foreign policy, co-ordinating foreign policy, 
trying to do things together, […] we are very much in favour of keeping the veto for military actions, and 
we are very much in favour of the Swedish policy of military non-alignment. […] We are in favour of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy but we are very sceptical about the EU trying to force member states 
to have majority rules in decision-making when it comes to a common foreign policy, because […] we are 
sceptical about whether there really is a common interest for all EU member states. Sometimes, it seems 
that there is no real Common Foreign and Security Policy, because the big states always act the way they 
want anyway. […] The way the [CFSP] is designed today is a bit fuzzy, and it is not an optimal solution 
(Interview with a MP from the Green Party, 25 March 2014).  
105 
 
4.2.7. Party positions – summary 
Table 4.2 Swedish parties’   positions   on participation in European 
integration (1991 – 2010), by selected policy area 
 EU EEA  CFSP AFSJ EMU 
M ++ ++ ++ ++ +  
SAP + ++ 
- (before 2002) 
+ (after 2002) + 
- (before 2002) 
+ (2002-2003) 
0 (after 2003) 
C + + 
- (before 1998) 
+ (after 1998) + -- 
Fp ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
KDS + ++ ++ ++ 
- (before 1999) 
+ (1999-2003) 
0 (after 2003) 
Vp --  -- -- -- -- 
MdG 
-- (before 2008)  
+ (after 2008) + 
-- (before 2008) 
+ (after 2008) 
-- (before 2008) 
+ (after 2008) -- 
++ = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 + = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
0 = neutral or no official position on participation in this area 
 - = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
 -- = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 
In a similarly vein to the preceding chapter on Finland, Table 4.2 offers a summary of 
Swedish parties’ positions regarding European co-operation per policy area. There is a 
majority of pro-European integration parties, with the right-wing ones (the Liberal 
People’s Party, the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and, to a lesser extent due 
to some internal divisions, the Centre Party as well) being the most supportive. However, 
the political weight of the Social Democratic Party, as historically the largest party 
represented in the Riksdag, cannot be underestimated and they have played an important 
role in shaping government positions on European integration. As demonstrated in 
section 4.2.2, SAP is, and has been, strongly divided on this issue, both within its 
leadership and within its membership base. As a consequence, the party has tried to avoid 
further irreversible divisions by adopting a strategy of compartmentalisation, which 
proved successful in 1994 but which somewhat failed in 2003. It should also be borne in 
mind that some parties have changed their official stance on some of the policy areas, as 
illustrated by KDS and SAP’s preferences on participation in the third stage of the EMU. 
Furthermore, this section has demonstrated that the two most reluctant political parties, 
the Left and the Greens, do not necessarily share the same platform as their respective 
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sister parties in Finland. Furthermore, their main ‘coalition’ partner, SAP, has prevented 
both parties from joining the government. As a consequence and in an attempt to enter 
government in recent years, the Green Party has decided to soften its position on 
Sweden’s participation in European integration. In contrast, the Left Party has retained 
its strong anti-EU stance and is currently the only party in parliament that is opposed to 
institutionalised European co-operation. 
The following section focuses on government positions on European integration for the 
past two decades, from the Carlsson II government (early 1990) to the second mandate 
of the Reinfeldt government.  
 
4.3. Swedish governments and their positions on 
European integration  
As outlined in the first section of this chapter, the analysis of the Swedish case starts in 
1990, when the issue of EU membership became salient, especially under the Carlsson II 
cabinet. Throughout the period in question, a total of six general elections were held and 
five coalition governments were formed.  
Table 4.3 gives an overview of the composition of these cabinets. As mentioned above, 
the Swedish party system has been divided into two blocs, socialist versus non-socialist, 
which constitute the two main competing government’s political orientations. While 
socialist (or centre-left) governments have tended to consist of single party cabinets led 
by successive Social Democratic Party leaders supported by other centre-left parties in the 
Riksdag, non-socialist (or centre-right) governments are coalitions consisting of the four 
main centre-right parties represented in parliament under the leadership of a Prime 
Minister coming from the largest political party in this block, the Moderate Party. 
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Table 4.3 List and characteristics of Swedish cabinets, 1990 – 2013  
Dates Cabinet Party/parties included Government 
position on a left-
right scale (Kim 
and Fording index) 
Percentage of 
government’s share of 
MPs 
27 February 1990 – 4 October 1991 Carlsson II  Social Democratic Party -23.9 44.7 
4 October 1991 – 7 October 1994 Bildt Moderate Party 
Centre Party 
Liberal People’s Party 
Christian Democrats 
19.9 48.7 
7 October 1994 – 22 March 1996 Carlsson III Social Democratic Party 
 
23.8 46.1 
22 March 1996 – 6 October 1998 Persson, first 
mandate 
Social Democratic Party 
 
23.8 46.1 
6 October 1998 – 30 September 2002 Persson, second 
mandate 
Social Democratic Party 
 
-3.5 37.5 
30 September 2002 – 6 October 2006 Persson, third 
mandate 
Social Democratic Party -18.3  41.3 




Liberal People’s Party 
Christian Democrats 
3.95 51 










4.3.1. Carlsson II (27 February 1990 – 4 October 1991) 
Figure 4.1 Composition of the Riksdag following the 1988 election, per 
seats115 
Source: Sainsbury (1989). 
While a general election was held in Sweden in 1988 and led to the victory of the Social 
Democratic Party forming a single party left-wing minority government, the European 
membership issue only became salient in 1990 under the Carlsson II cabinet116 and did 
not constitute a ‘hot topic’ during the election campaign, despite being raised by the 
Moderate and Liberal People’s parties. Instead, the Carlsson I government reelected in 
1988 committed itself to conduct negotiations over the future EEA agreement. However, 
the economic events of 1990 changed this situation, and the left-wing Social Democratic 
government decided to change its position on EU membership. On 12 December 1990, 
the Riksdag approved the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee’s report, according 
                                                          
115 As the European issue was not salient in 1988, this general election and the context surrounding it are 
not fully investigated. For an in-depth analysis, see e.g. Sainsbury (1989). 
116 The Carlsson I cabinet, formed following the assassination of Social Democrat Prime Minister Olof 
Palme in March 1986, was renewed following the 1988 general election. It resigned on 9 February 1990 
after the Swedish parliament voted down an emergency package to fight against the severe economic crisis 
that hit the country (see section 4.1). The Carlsson II cabinet was then formed on 27 February, with the 
support of the (then) Left Communists in the parliament. A new emergency package was then approved by 















to which an application for EU membership could be submitted by the government in 
1991. Based on a broad party consensus, this parliamentary decision stated: 
Sweden should strive to become a member of the European Community, 
while maintaining its neutrality policy. Only as an EC member can our 
country fully participate in, and influence, European Community co-
operation. After an overall assessment of foreign and security policy aspects, 
and after consultation in the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, the 
government should be in a position to submit a Swedish application for 
membership. In the judgment of the Committee, this can occur during 1991 
(quoted in Lindmarker 1991: 5; Bieler 1998: 204-205).  
 
Table 4.4 Riksdag’s   vote   on   submitting   an   application   for   European 
Union membership, per party 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 66 63 0 3 
SAP 156 145 0 11 
C 42 38 0 4 
Fp 44 42 0 2 
VPK 21 0 21 0 
MdG 20 0 0 20 
TOTAL 349 288 21 40 
   Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
As Table 4.4 shows, a large majority of the MPs voted in favour of an EU membership, 
thus paving the way for the government to submit its application. The vote mostly 
followed each party’s official position, with M, SAP, C and Fp voting in favour and the 
Left party being opposed. All the Green MPs, despite being strongly opposed to such 
membership, abstained from voting.  As both the Moderate Party and the Liberal People’s 
Party pleaded for full membership during the summer of 1990, the ruling Social 
Democratic Party could rely on a comfortable parliamentary majority to support its 
position. Following this vote and subsequent discussions during the first semester of 1991 
(especially with regards to holding a referendum on this issue), the Carlsson II 
government formally submitted its application for EU membership on 1 July 1991.  
As discussed in section 4.1, this switch in the government’s position has been mostly 
explained by four contextual factors: the economic crisis; the end of the Cold War; the 
poor prospects in the EEA negotiations; and the domestic political situation ahead of the 
following general election. Following this switch in SAP’s official position, the Riksdag 
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was composed of a majority of pro-EU parties, with M, Fp and the divided but still pro-
EU C supporting this decision. The composition of parliament could thus have played a 
role in shaping the government’s decision to apply for EU membership. In this case, the 
fact that Carlsson II was a minority government did not prevent it from putting the issue 
on top of its agenda: it is thus reasonable to assume that the aforementioned contextual 
factors were sufficiently important to take up such position.  
Despite the application, however, negotiations on the future EEA agreement were still 
considered to be the main priority for the government, and the final agreement was to be 
discussed during the following parliamentary term. 
 
4.3.2. Bildt (4 October 1991 – 7 October 1994) 
The government’s decision to formally apply for an EU membership on 1 July 1991 
shaped the content of the 1991 general election campaign, which was held on 15 
September. Together with the ongoing economic crisis and the reform of the taxation 
system, membership constituted a hot topic to present to the population (Pierre and 
Widfeldt 1992). 
Figure 4.2 Composition of the Riksdag following the 1991 election, per 
seats 

















The results of the general election were considered as historic by observers for many 
reasons. First, the election was disastrous for the ruling SAP government, which lost 5.7 
per cent of votes and 18 seats compared to the 1988 general election. Nevertheless, the 
party remained the largest one in the Riksdag. Second, two political parties, KDS and the 
short-lived populist-right NyD, entered parliament for the first time, leading Wörlund 
(1992: 142) to rightly claim that “the durable Swedish five-party system is now definitely 
dead and gone”. Third, the 1991 election saw a fragmentation of the electorate, with all 
traditional parties (besides the Moderate Party) losing seats. As a result, a broad non-
socialist right-wing government led by Moderate Party leader Carl Bildt succeeded to the 
Carlsson II government. This minority coalition117 included the three well-established 
centre-right parties as well as the newly elected Christian Democrats. While traditional 
‘bourgeois coalitions’ were prone to internal conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, there were 
some concerns about the stability of the Bildt government at the time of its creation (see 
for instance Sainsbury 1992; Wörlund 1992). 
As far as European matters are concerned, the Bildt government’s programme was in the 
continuity of its predecessor. Amongst its main priorities presented before the Riksdag, 
the first one was to conduct successful negotiations for EU membership: “the 
government will do all it can to ensure that Sweden becomes a full member of the 
European Community as soon as possible” (Government of Sweden 1991).118 Even 
though negotiations over full EU membership constituted a top priority for the 
government, a vote over the new EEA agreement was to be held in the Riksdag. This 
agreement was of significant importance, as it covered about 75 per cent of the acquis 
communautaire, which was then to be discussed within the framework of Sweden’s 
application for full EU membership.  
                                                          
117 While the government accounted for 48.7 per cent of MPs, it could be relevant to talk of a quasi-majority 
coalition government. Indeed, the only non-socialist party that remained in the opposition was the newly 
elected New Democracy, which is strongly opposed to both SAP and Vp. As noted by Wörlund (1992: 
143), “a strongly anti-socialist party like New Democracy is not likely to help the socialists overthrow a 
bourgeois government”.  
118 Author’s translation: “Regeringen kommer med all kraft att verka för att Sverige snarast möjligt blir 
fullvärdig medlem av den europeiska gemenskapen”. 
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Table 4.5 Riksdag’s  vote  on  the  European Economic Area agreement, per 
party119 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 80 75 0 5 
SAP 138 127 2 9 
C 31 27 1 3 
Fp 33 32 0 1 
Vp 15 0 9 6 
KDS 26 23 0 3 
Other 26 24 1 1 
TOTAL 349 308 13 28 
       Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, and as demonstrated in Table 4.5, a broad majority of MPs 
supported the EEA agreement on 18 November 1992. All pro-European parties voted in 
favour, leaving the anti-integrationist Left Party with 9 MPs against and with 6 
abstentions. The populist-right NyD, who came up in favour of joining the European 
Union, also voted in favour of EEA membership. With a majority of pro-EEA parties in 
the Riksdag and all coalition parties supporting the agreement, the issue did not appear as 
a political challenge for the government. In sum, this result also reflects the parties’ 
preferences on European integration. This vote thus paved the way for successful 
negotiations with the European Union, which formally started in February 1993. 
Following an intense year of consultations, an agreement between Stockholm and 
Brussels was finally reached on 1 March 1994 (Widfeldt and Pierre 1995). 
As agreed under the Carlsson II government, a referendum was to be held on the issue 
of EU membership. On 18 March 1994, it was decided that the referendum would be 
held on 13 November 1994, following the general election scheduled for 18 September. 
The (somewhat controversial) decision to hold the referendum two months later was 
taken in order to disassociate the European issue from the general election.120 
 
                                                          
119 The number of MPs per party slightly differs from Figure 4.2 due to defectors and splinter groups. 
Independent MPs include one former Left Party MP (Annika Ahnberg) and two former New Democrats 
(Lars Andersson and Sten Söderberg), who left their respective parties following internal divergences.  
120 On the reasons explaining the controversial timing of the referendum, see Widfeldt (1996); Aylott (1997). 
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4.3.3. Carlsson III (7 October 1994 – 22 March 1996) 
The 1994 general election campaign was dominated by domestic economic issues, and 
not by the forthcoming referendum on EU membership (Widfeldt 1996). Accordingly, it 
seems that all political parties agreed to avoid mixing both matters with the exception of 
the anti-EU Left Party and the Greens which, on the other hand, campaigned heavily on 
that theme from April 1994 onwards. Between 1991 and 1994, opinion polls suggested 
that SAP would recover from the disastrous preceding election: “>t@he election of 1991 
had recorded the party’s worst result since 1928;; that of 1994 was to prove the second 
best since 1970” (Widfeldt and Pierre 1995: 481). 
Figure 4.3 Composition of the Riksdag following the 1994 election, per 
seats 
Source: Widfeldt and Pierre (1995). 
SAP received 45.2 per cent of votes (+7.5 per cent compared to 1991) and gained a total 
of 161 parliamentary seats (+23), while the Moderate Party remained stable (22.4 per cent, 
+0.5 per cent since 1991) with the 80 seats obtained four years earlier. However, the other 
non-socialist parties faced severe losses: while the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party 
and the Christian Democrats together lost a total of 22 seats, and New Democracy lost 
all representation in the Riksdag. In contrast, the Left Party gained 6 seats, and the Green 
Party made its comeback in parliament with 18 seats. All in all, it was a clear victory of 
the socialist bloc, and a single party minority government led by SAP leader Carlsson was 

















parties represented in parliament did mostly abstained from voting on the Prime 
Minister’s appointment, apart from all 26 MPs from the Liberal People’s Party who voted 
against. Nevertheless, the Carlsson III government subsequently co-operated with various 
parties throughout its mandate and particularly with the Centre Party from 1995 onwards 
(Pierre and Widfeldt 1996). This co-operation lasted until the 1998 general election (Pierre 
and Widfeldt 1998).  
Interestingly enough, the Carlsson III government’s ideology was more right-oriented 
than usual, with a value of 23.8 on Kim and Fording’s index of government partisanship, 
while other social democratic minority governments were centre-to-left-oriented 
throughout the analysed period (see Table 4.3). This can be explained by the fact that 
SAP’s manifesto mostly covered right-wing issues such as ‘economic orthodoxy’ or 
‘political authority’ (see Table 2.3) in order to adapt to the specific domestic political 
context (i.e. the national economic situation). As a consequence, Carlsson III can be 
considered as an unusual example of social democratic right-wing government. 
In his speech to the Riksdag introducing the government’s general policy, Prime Minister 
Carlsson stated his support for Sweden’s application for EU membership. He also offered 
two scenarios relating to the outcome of the referendum. On the one hand, in case of a 
victory for the No-side, “the EEA agreement will then be the basis for Sweden’s 
relationship with the EU” (Government of Sweden 1994).121 On the other, should the 
electorate vote in favour of an EU membership, then the government would work for 
“an ever closer union amongst the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as 
closely as possible” (ibid.).122 Sweden’s principle of neutrality was however emphasised in 
this declaration, and no mention of a potential participation in the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union was made. This issue was thus temporarily off the 
political agenda.  
Shortly after the general election, the referendum campaign started. As discussed 
throughout section 4.2, some parties suffered from strong internal divisions. This was 
particularly the case for the ruling Social Democratic Party, which adopted a strategy of 
compartmentalisation123 in order to avoid potential ruptures which would hit the party’s 
                                                          
121 Author’s translation: “EES-avtalet kommer därvid att utgöra grunden för Sveriges relationer med EU”. 
122 Author’s translation: “Det behövs en allt fastare sammanslutning mellan de europeiska folken, där 
besluten fattas så nära medborgarna som möjligt.” 
123 This strategy of compartmentalisation and its consequences have been discussed in section 4.2.2. 
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unity in the long run. Accordingly, even though the government officially supported EU 
membership, two newly appointed ministers were openly opposed to this project (Aylott 
1997). The Centre Party was also divided on the European issue, but the party leadership 
eventually secured a majority in favour of accession in the 1994 Congress (Widfeldt and 
Pierre 1995). Three parties were almost unanimously in favour of EU membership: the 
Moderate Party, the Liberal People’s Party and (to a lesser extent) the Christian 
Democrats. Conversely, the Green and Left parties were strongly opposed to accession. 
The Yes-side eventually won the referendum with 52.3 per cent. On 15 December 1994, 
the Riksdag confirmed this decision with 296 votes in favour and 18 against (i.e. 17 Green 
and 1 Left MPs). Sweden subsequently became a formal member of the European Union 
on 1 January 1995, together with Austria and Finland.  
 
4.3.4. Persson (22 March 1996 – 6 October 2006) 
4.3.4.1. First mandate (1996-1998) 
In December 1995, Ingvar Carlsson announced his intention to resign from both his 
positions as party leader and as prime minister. While the Social Democrats faced 
difficulties in finding his successor, the then minister of finance, Göran Persson, was 
eventually appointed prime minister on 22 March 1996. While this change implied a 
reshuffle within the cabinet, the government’s type and ideology remained similar to its 
predecessor (Pierre and Widfeldt 1997).  
The first European issue that the Persson government had to face was Sweden’s 
participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union. Indeed, the 
government had to decide whether Sweden would join the Eurozone’s first wave of 
entrants in 1999. This issue was controversial for both political and economic reasons. 
On the one hand, political parties were strongly divided and, as mentioned in section 
4.2.2, the ruling SAP was even more divided than they were on the issue of EU 
membership in the early 1990s. Indeed, the party leadership had to face strong opposition 
to the EMU project amongst its MPs and ministers as well as from its rank-and-file 
members. On the other hand, there were doubts over the impact of such membership on 
the national economy and over the government’s ability to control financial flows, as in 
other EU member states. However, the Swedish case rather diverges: “the complexity of 
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these assessments were exacerbated by a policy making style which drew heavily on 
extensive consultation with, and involvement of, organized interests throughout the 
policy process” (Pierre and Widfeldt 1997: 497). This draws on Ingebritsen’s (1998) 
sectoral approach, which has been discussed in section 2.1. Even though Sweden had to 
accept the EMU programme agreed by the member states in 1992 as part of the acquis 
communautaire, this issue constituted a ‘policy dilemma’ at the domestic level (Miles 
2005b). 
In October 1995, a group of economic experts were commissioned by the Carlsson III 
government in order to determine whether Sweden should join the EMU’s third stage in 
1999, and thus be amongst the first wave of entrants in the Eurozone.124 On 4 November 
1996, the so-called Calmfors commission presented its conclusions and recommended 
that Sweden should not join (Pierre and Widfeldt 1997). While the commission report 
was purely advisory, it nevertheless played an important role in shaping the government’s 
position submitted on 10 October 1997, stating: 
Sweden should not introduce the European Union’s single currency, the 
Euro, when the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union starts on 
January 1, 1999. Sweden should keep the door open for a later Swedish 
participation in the monetary union. The greatest possible freedom of action 
should be preserved. If the Government later finds that Sweden should 
participate, it will submit the question to the Swedish people for 
consideration (quoted in Miles 2005b: 230). 
In other words, the government decided to support a temporary form of differentiated 
integration, leaving the final decision in the hands of the Swedish population. Besides the 
influence of the Calmfors report, this ‘wait and see’ decision has been explained by a 
variety of factors in the literature. First, the ruling Social Democratic Party was strongly 
divided on this issue. Consequently, the party’s National Board decided to follow the 
Calmfors commission’s recommendation, which then inspired the government’s official 
position on the issue. Second, because of these strong internal divisions, the government 
also decided to adopt a strategy of compartmentalisation, similarly to 1994. As such, “to 
avoid taking a painful decision, which, because of these internal divisions, might have 
jeopardized its objectives in the arenas of ‘normal’ politics, the party decided to delegate 
that decision to someone else – namely, the electorate” (Aylott 2005: 543). However, as 
discussed in section 4.1, the population seemed to be strongly opposed to the single 
                                                          
124 For the full commission report, see Calmfors et al. (1997).  
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currency. In March 1997, Eurobarometer polls showed that only 28 per cent of the 
Swedish population was positive to EU membership, making Sweden the member state 
with the most negative public views on the European Union (Pierre and Widfeldt 1998). 
Furthermore, in November 1997, national opinion polls showed that less than 25 per cent 
of the Swedes were in favour of EMU participation, while 48 per cent were against (Aylott 
2005; Lindahl and Naurin 2005). It thus seemed that a referendum could not be won at 
that time, justifying the ‘wait and see’ position the Persson cabinet adopted. Third, the 
government was significantly constrained by the domestic political situation in parliament. 
Indeed, as a single party minority cabinet, it had to rely on the support of some of the 
other parties in the Riksdag. Since 1995, the Centre Party was the government’s main 
supporter and was strongly opposed to this policy (see section 4.2.3). As C was, at that 
time, underwriting a parliamentary majority for the Persson cabinet, adopting a position 
that was in favour of joining the EMU’s third stage could potentially have compromised 
such a partnership. In other words, the government’s decision to not be part of the 
Eurozone’s first wave of entrants can also be explained by how it did not want to placate 
its main supporter in parliament (Aylott 2005; Miles 2005b). As a single-party minority 
government relying on such external parliamentary support, the Persson cabinet would 
have risked to harm its legitimacy by putting the EMU issue on top of its agenda, since 
the Centre Party was strongly opposed to this policy.  
Furthermore, the composition of the Riksdag did not favour participation in the 
Eurozone in the late 1990s. According to opinion polls released in mid-1997, 40 per cent 
of the Social Democratic MPs were opposed to participation in the third stage of the 
EMU, while only 20 per cent were in favour (Pierre and Widfeldt 1998). Besides divisions 
within the ruling SAP, there was also the absence of a clear parliamentary majority which 
was in favour of participation. Indeed, only the Moderate and the Liberal People’s parties 
were (mostly) in favour of such participation, accounting for 30.4 per cent of the 
composition of the Riksdag. Other parties that were (mostly) united against the EMU (i.e. 
the Centre Party, the Left Party, the Green Party and, at that time, the Christian 
Democrats) accounted for 23.5 per cent of MPs. Taking into account SAP’s internal 
divisions, this meant that there was not a clear majority that were in favour of joining the 
monetary union. Therefore, and in contrast to the 1990 application for EU membership, 




Table 4.6 Riksdag’s  vote  on  postponing participation in the third stage of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, per party 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 80 1 65 14 
SAP 161 144 0 17 
C 27 23 0 4 
Fp 26 0 0 26 
Vp 22 0 0 18 
KDS 15 0 0 12 
MdG 18 0 0 18 
TOTAL 349 168 65 116  
  Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
Table 4.6 summarises the voting outcome on the government’s proposal, which took 
place on 4 December 1997. Even though this proposal left the door open to a potential 
EMU membership in the future, the Centre Party nevertheless supported this position, as 
the decision to put this matter to a referendum was seen as acceptable by the party 
leadership. The largest opposition party, the (mostly pro-EMU) Moderate Party, voted 
against, while all other parties (including the pro-EMU Liberal People’s Party) abstained. 
The decision to put such matter to a popular, non-binding referendum was made 
following the general election in 2002, when there were clear indications that such vote 
could be won. This will be further discussed in sub-section 4.3.4.3.  
Another less controversial and also less politicised issue was raised during the 1997-1998 
parliamentary session, that is, participation in the Schengen area. A Schengen membership 
was seen as a mean to preserve Nordic co-operation in the field, initiated by the 
implementation of the Nordic Passport Union in 1958. As a result, there was a broad 
party consensus over this issue, with the sole opposition being the two anti-AFSJ parties, 
the Left and Green parties.  
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Table 4.7 Riksdag’s  vote  on  participation in the Schengen area, per party  
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 80 66 0 14 
SAP 161 124 2 35 
C 27 15 2 10 
Fp 26 16 1 9 
Vp 22 0 18 4 
KDS 15 10 0 5 
MdG 18 0 16 2 
TOTAL 349 231 39 75 
  Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
This cross-party consensus is reflected in the parliamentary vote outlined in Table 4.7, 
which took place on 18 April 1998. Besides MdG and Vp, a comfortable majority of all 
other MPs voted in favour of the government’s proposition to join Schengen.  
 
4.3.4.2. Second mandate (1998-2002) 
The 1998 general election was held on 20 September. The campaign was centred on fairly 
typical Swedish election topics, namely taxes, public expenditures and unemployment, 
while any European-related matters (including the future of Sweden’s participation in the 
EMU) were mostly left off the agenda. 
Figure 4.4 Composition of the Riksdag following the 1998 election, per 
seats 

















The ruling Social Democratic Party lost 8.9 per cent and 30 parliamentary seats compared 
to the 1994 election. A significant amount of SAP votes were transferred to the Left Party, 
which received 12 per cent of votes (+5.8 per cent compared to 1994) and 43 seats (+21) 
and became the third largest party represented in the Riksdag. The Christian Democrats 
scored their best electoral result since its creation, with 11.8 per cent (+7.8 per cent) and 
42 seats (+27). The Centre Party and the Liberal People’s Party lost 9 seats each, while 
the Moderate and Green parties remained quite stable with respectively 82 (+2) and 16 (-
2) seats (Möller 1999; Pierre and Widfeldt 1999).  
Following the election, SAP Leader Persson announced his intention to form a single 
party minority government with the parliamentary support of the Left Party and, for the 
first time since its creation, the Green Party as well (Pierre and Widfeldt 1999). Support 
from the Greens constituted a political surprise for many observers, as the party had 
previously avoided positioning itself in either side of the two traditional blocks (Elander 
2000). The Persson government, which was strongly reshuffled, took office on 6 October 
1998. This time, its value on Kim and Fording’s index of government partisanship (-3.5) 
suggests that it returned to a centrist ideology. Its stance on any further European co-
operation remained mostly unchanged. In the presentation of the government 
programme to the Riksdag, Persson reiterated SAP’s position on participation in the 
EMU’s third stage adopted one year earlier:  
The single currency will be implemented during this term. The decision on 
Swedish participation in the EMU third stage shall be submitted to the 
Swedish population by election or referendum. In order to increase awareness 
and stimulate a broad debate, a comprehensive informative and educational 
task will be launched (Government of Sweden 1998).125 
Interestingly enough, however, the aforementioned statement did not include any 
references that Sweden’s participation in the Eurozone was to be raised during this 
parliamentary term. Even though, technically, the issue became salient once the EMU’s 
third stage became effective in 1999 and subsequently led to intense discussions within 
several parties, the Riksdag and the government, the organisation of a referendum on 
Sweden’s potential participation did not take place during this term. Three reasons have 
                                                          
125 Author’s translation: “Den gemensamma valutan kommer att förverkligas under denna mandatperiod. 
Beslut om svenskt deltagande i EMU:s tredje fas skall underställas det svenska folket i val eller i 
folkomröstning. För att öka kunskapen och stimulera en bred debatt påbörjas ett omfattande informations- 
och folkbildningsarbete om EMU”. 
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been put forward to explain this. First, the fact that the government’s partners in 
parliament were strongly opposed to such participation. Second, internal divisions within 
SAP remained topical, and the moment did not seem appropriate for the government to 
raise this issue. Third, Denmark had held a referendum on this issue on 28 September 
2000, which saw the population rejecting participation in the EMU’s third stage by a small 
majority (53.2 per cent), which thus gave a boost to the anti-EMU factions in Sweden 
(Downs 2001; Miles 2005b). However, from 1999 onwards, it appeared that the 
government had started to prepare the ground for a referendum. Indeed, “Persson began 
an elaborate political game during this period, aimed at bringing important political and 
interest group actors on side so that the holding of a referendum on the Euro could be 
viable politically after the September 2002 General Election” (Miles 2005b: 236). This 
‘political game’ consisted of extensive consultations with interest groups, international 
actors (especially the United Kingdom) and party factions (Miles 2004). In 2000, then, the 
SAP congress voted in favour of participation in the third stage of the EMU, thus 
changing its previous ‘wait and see’ stance despite the strong internal divisions that 
prevailed. The Christian Democrats, which were strongly opposed to EMU until then, 
similarly changed their position and decided to support such participation (Widfeldt 
2000b). Opinion polls had also started to show that the Swedish population was becoming 
more positive towards the EMU (Aylott 2005; Lindahl and Naurin 2005). The general 
election of 15 September 2002 was therefore to be crucial.  
 
4.3.4.3. Third mandate (2002-2006) 
Interestingly enough, and as in the 1994 general election, European issues (and particularly 
the EMU) did not constitute a central feature in the 2002 election campaign, as parties 
implicitly agreed that participation in the EMU’s third stage should be separated from the 
general election where daily domestic politics prevailed (Miles 2005b). Instead, parties 
focused on ‘unusual’ issues such as immigration and integration,126 as well as on more 
traditional issues such as education, health care and the economy (Widfeldt 2003a). 
                                                          
126 On the salience of immigration and integration in the 2002 general election, see Ljunggren (2003); 
Widfeldt (2003b); Green-Pedersen and Odmalm (2008).  
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Figure 4.5 Composition of the Riksdag following the 2002 election, per 
seats 
Source: Widfeldt (2003a). 
When looking at the balance of power between the parties, some major changes had 
occurred. The Moderate Party, in particular, performed poorly and lost 27 seats, most of 
which that went to the Liberal People’s Party, which conversely gained a total of 48 seats 
(+31 compared to 1998). The Centre Party’s share of vote went up marginally and gained 
them a total of 22 seats (+4), whereas and the Christian Democrats was not as successful 
as they had been previously (33 seats, -9) Within the socialist bloc, SAP gained a total of 
144 seats (+13), while the Left Party made a corresponding loss (30 seats, -13).  
From a broader perspective, the outcome did not bring any major changes in the balance 
of power between the two blocs, the centre-left made a net gain of one seat whereas the 
centre-right lost one. As a consequence, Persson began consultations with both the Green 
and the Left parties in order to renew the existing parliamentary partnership and to be 
able to continue as a single party minority government.  
While SAP, MdG and Vp preserved the required parliamentary majority, the Green Party 
put pressure on Persson by demanding seats in the cabinet in exchange for their support 
(Widfeldt 2003a). However, such a scenario was quickly ruled out by the SAP leader, who 
claimed that the new government’s policy was going to be to call a referendum on 
participating in the EMU’s third stage. As outlined by Miles (2005b: 240), “the Prime 
Minister argued that [the participation of the Green Party in the government] was not 

















in a future referendum could not also include Green ministers who opposed the country’s 
membership of the Union”.127 In other words, a government composed of (mostly) pro- 
and anti-EMU parties would have been problematic. As a result, the Green Party started 
talks to form a minority centre-green government (consisting of a coalition between C, 
Fp, KDS and MdG), which would be tolerated by the Moderate Party (Widfeldt 2003a). 
These negotiations were however short-lived, as the Centre Party left the table a few days 
later. As a consequence, negotiations between the existing red-green partners were 
resumed, and the Persson government was eventually renewed, yet reshuffled, on 30 
September, with the parliamentary support secured four years earlier. According to its 
value on Kim and Fording’s index (-18.3), the government’s ideology switched to a leftist 
one. 
The government’s policy towards European co-operation was quite positive, especially 
regarding the upcoming enlargement and the idea of introducing a common asylum 
policy. However, the government had also called for a reform of the Common 
Agricultural and Fisheries policies, and further suggested how the role of national 
parliaments should be strengthened within the EU’s decision-making process. In terms 
of participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union, the 
government’s programme stated that “talks will be initiated between the parties 
represented in the Riksdag concerning a date for a referendum on full Swedish 
participation in the EMU, the aim being to achieve as broad a consensus is possible” 
(Government of Sweden 2002: 12). This statement thus made it clear that organising a 
referendum on participation in the EMU’s third stage was to be a top priority issue on 
the government’s agenda. Hoping to reiterate the 1994 scenario which had proved to be 
in SAP’s favour, the Persson government adopted a similar strategy, that is, to hold a 
referendum shortly after winning a general election; not to sanction any anti-EMU 
members; and to appoint key anti-EMU figures within its leadership (as well as within the 
government). Furthermore, following changes to several parties’ positions on EMU 
membership in 2000, the new parliamentary situation seemed to evolve in favour of an 
EMU membership. Indeed, as SAP and KDS had changed their stances on the issue, four 
                                                          
127 In accordance with SAP’s strategy of compartmentalisation, however, this rationale did not extend to 




out of the seven parties represented in the Riksdag were now officially in favour of this 
policy.  
In sum, the composition of parliament and the composition of government came to play 
an important role in shaping Persson’s decision to hold a referendum. Furthermore, due 
to SAP’s strategy of compartmentalisation which partly consisted in dissociating the EMU 
issue from the more day-to-day politics, the fact that the government was in minority did 
not threaten its existence, despite both of its parliamentary partners (MdG and Vp) being 
opposed to such policy. On 29 November, all parliamentary party leaders agreed that a 
referendum would be held on 14 September 2003. This decision was voted in the Riksdag 
on 12 March 2003. 
Table 4.8 Riksdag’s  vote  on  holding  a  referendum  on  the  introduction  of  
the Euro, per party 
 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 55 48 0 7 
SAP 144 132 0 12 
C 22 18 0 4 
Fp 48 43 0 5 
Vp 30 0 25 5 
KDS 33 29 0 4 
MdG 17 0 15 2 
TOTAL 349 270 40 39 
  Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
As Table 4.8 shows, there was a broad consensus on organizing a referendum. This did 
not constitute a surprise, as the government had already reached a compromise on this 
matter with other parties. Although the Centre Party remained opposed to this policy, it 
still voted in favour of the government’s proposal, as its leadership believed that the issue 
should be in the hands of the electorate. Only the two anti-EMU parties voted against, 
and mostly expressed concerns on the formulation of the question (Widfeldt 2004). In 
compliance with the general strategy of compartementatisation, Persson declared that the 
formal parliamentary co-operation with both anti-EMU parties would continue 
independently from the referendum campaign (Aylott 2005). 
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Before the referendum campaign had officially started, all political parties held congresses 
with the intention of coming up with an official position.128 While a small majority of the 
parties were mostly united in favour of this issue (with the Centre, the Green and the Left 
parties being mostly against),129 the Social Democratic Party remained divided and had 
members campaigning on both fronts, despite the official party line being in favour of an 
EMU membership (Aylott 2005). While a majority of the MPs, together with a majority 
of the ministers,130 were hoping for a victory of the ‘Yes’-camp, a gap of 13.9 per cent 
between both sides showed that this decision had been a miscalculation from the Social 
Democratic leadership (see Aylott 2005; Aylott et al. 2013). 
 
4.3.5. Reinfeldt (6 October 2006 - ) 
4.3.5.1. First mandate (2006-2010) 
The 2006 election marked the end of a decade ruled by the Social Democratic Party in 
single party minority governments and, in a broader sense, hinted at the end of the Social 
Democratic hegemony in Sweden. The election campaign was unique. For the first time 
in Sweden’s political history, the four centre-right parties formally campaigned together 
under “the Alliance” and presented a joint manifesto based on eight key areas: growth, 
education, foreign policy, the welfare state, the labour market, justice, taxation and social 
security (Aylott and Bolin 2007). On the other side of the political spectrum, and even 
though the informal red-green parliamentary majority did not campaign on a common 
platform, it seemed clear that SAP, MP and Vp would continue to co-operate. Their 
campaign was also tarnished by several political affairs which mostly hit the ruling 
administration (see Widfeldt 2007). It is also believed that the outcome of the EMU 
referendum negatively affected the government’s popularity. 
                                                          
128 For a full analysis of the referendum campaign and its outcome, see Widfeldt (2004); Aylott (2005); 
Lindahl and Naurin (2005); Miles (2005b). 
129 It should be noted that small grass-root factions of the Green and Left parties campaigned in favour of 
the Euro. These groups were respectively named ‘Green Euro’ and ‘Left for EMU’; see Aylott (2005). 
130 Lindahl and Naurin (2005) as well as Aylott and Bolin (2007) noted that a significant amount of ministers 
and politically appointed members of the administration actively campaigned for the ‘No’-side. 
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Figure 4.6 Composition of the Riksdag following the 2006 election, per 
seats 
Source: Widfeldt (2007). 
As a consequence, SAP suffered its worst election results since 1920 (35 per cent of the 
votes, -4.9 per cent compared to 2002; and 130 seats, -14). The Left Party (-8 seats), the 
Christian Democrats (-9) and the Liberal People’s Party (-20) also suffered major losses. 
The unquestionable winner was the Moderate Party, achieving its highest electoral result 
since 1928 (26.2 per cent, +10.9 per cent; and 97 seats, +42). The Centre Party also made 
substantial gains, while the Green Party was the only ‘left bloc’ party to not suffer any 
dramatic loss in support. With these results, the Alliance accounted for 178 seats, while 
the red-greens totalled 171 seats. As a consequence, Persson resigned as prime minister 
as well as party leader, and a majority non-socialist centrist government was created by 
Moderate Party leader Reinfeldt, who became the youngest Prime Minister in Sweden’s 
history.  
On 6 October 2006, Reinfeldt presented the new government’s policy. In terms of 
European policy, the programme stated that “Sweden is clearly at the heart of European 
co-operation. The Government wishes to work for an open, effective and dynamic 
European Union” (Government of Sweden 2006).131 This is hardly surprising, as the 
majority of in the ‘Alliance’ were mostly pro-integrationists (with the Centre Party being 
slightly more reluctant). Furthermore, the statement was mentioned in the Alliance’s 
                                                          

















common electoral platform (Allians för Sverige 2006). While the agreement avoided 
raising the issue of EMU membership which, since the 2003 referendum, mostly became 
non-salient, the new government was clearly more pro-EU than its predecessor had been, 
with a total of 16 pro-European policies mentioned compared to 5 in Persson’s third 
mandate’s government programme. More importantly, the Reinfeldt government was 
committed to participate in the CFSP, as the below quote suggests:  
The development and design of our security policy must continue to be made 
in broad national consensus. Sweden is military non-aligned. Our country’s 
future security is based on community and co-operation with other countries. 
The government attaches importance to the EU’s common security strategy. 
Demands from the UN, the EU and NATO for Sweden’s participation in 
international operations have never been greater. Sweden should have 
increased opportunities to participate in international peace operations 
(Government of Sweden 2006).132 
On 19 December 2007, the Riksdag voted in favour of a Swedish participation in the 
Nordic Battle Group for the first semester of 2008. As mentioned in section 2.2, this vote 
was followed by further discussions that had been initiated in 2004 between Sweden, 
Estonia, Finland, Norway and Ireland. Within this Battle Group, it was decided that 
Sweden would be the Framework Nation, meaning that it had a special responsibility in 
coordinating the battle group’s actions and, if necessary, the implementation of a military 
crisis management (Government of Sweden 2007).  
Participation in such an EU policy was hardly seen as controversial even within the 
context of the well-grounded policy of non-alignment. Indeed, “Sweden has gradually 
redefined its traditional policy of neutrality, and though it remains (military) alliance-free, 
it sees an important difference between NATO and the EU when it comes to the nature, 
functions and ends of security. In this context, the [EUBG concept] makes a particularly 
good fit with the current trajectory of Swedish defense reforms” (Jacoby and Jones 2008: 
316). In other words, participation in the NBG was seen by the government as beneficial 
with regards to its foreign policy.  
                                                          
132 Author’s translation: “Utvecklingen och utformningen av vår säkerhetspolitik måste fortsatt ske i brett 
nationellt samförstånd. Sverige är militärt alliansfritt. Vårt lands framtida säkerhet bygger på gemenskap och 
samverkan med andra länder. Regeringen fäster vikt vid EU:s gemensamma säkerhetsstrategi. Efterfrågan 
från FN, EU och Nato på Sveriges medverkan i internationella insatser har aldrig varit större. Sverige bör 
ha ökade möjligheter att delta i olika internationella fredsinsatser. “ 
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Following government negotiations with other participating countries, the Swedish 
parliamentary committee on foreign affairs and defence prepared a report (2007/08: 
UFöU3) on participation in the NBG, which was backed by six out of the seven parties. 
The anti-CFSP Left Party unsurprisingly rejected this policy, whereas the Green Party 
supported such participation, despite expressing some material concerns during the 
parliamentary session. The Greens’ position, which historically opposed any 
institutionalised co-operation within the EU framework, has been explained by an 
interviewee as such:  
I think we had an agreement with other parties that we should be part of the 
Nordic Battle Group at that time. […] Since the European Battle Groups are 
on standby and can be used only for operations that have been agreed upon, 
we do not think it is a problem to agree on this and we are prepared to 
participate and to use it. It was a very pragmatic vote.133  
Furthermore, as mentioned in section 4.2.6.2, the party had progressively moved away 
from an explicit anti-EU stance, a position which was not only less profitable in terms of 
gaining votes but also a strategy that had prevented the possibility of entering into any 
form of government coalition. Table 4.9 outlines the parliamentary vote on participation 
in the NBG which took place on 19 December 2007 and which received an overwhelming 
majority – 292 votes in favour, and 20 against.  
Table 4.9 Riksdag’s   vote   on   participation   in   the   Nordic   Battle   Group  
during the first semester of 2008, per party  
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 97 90 0 7 
SAP 130 115 1 14 
C 29 26 0 3 
Fp 28 22 0 6 
Vp 22 0 19 3 
KDS 24 22 0 2 
MdG 19 17 0 2 
TOTAL 349 292 20 37 
  Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
It seems clear that the government’s positive attitude towards participation in the NBG 
was facilitated by the composition of parliament (as most parties were largely in favour of 
this policy) and the composition of the government (as all centre-right parties were in 
                                                          
133 Interview with a MP from the Green Party, 25 March 2014. 
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favour of full participation in the CFSP). As a majority government, the Reinfeldt cabinet 
did furthermore not have to count on support from the opposition and, as such a decision 
also had an impact on Nordic co-operation, it could have been expected that the cabinet 
would have adopted a similar position if it was in minority. 
In terms of European policies, the rest of Reinfeldt’s first mandate as Prime Minister was 
mostly marked by Sweden’s presidency of the EU, from July to December 2009 (see Miles 
2010; Widfeldt 2010).  
 
4.3.5.2. Second mandate (2010-2014) 
The general election that took place on 19 September 2010 was somewhat historic, at 
least in the Swedish context. In an attempt to compete against the ruling Alliance, the 
three opposition parties decided to form their ‘own’ alliance and campaigned together as 
the ‘Red-Greens’ (De Rödgröna). 
Figure 4.7 Composition of the Riksdag following the 2010 election, per 
seats 
Source: Widfeldt (2011). 
Following a campaign that was marked by the absence of EU issues and one that instead 
focused on the future of the Swedish welfare state, the Social Democratic Party received 
30.7 per cent of votes (-4.3 per cent compared with 2006), and 112 parliamentary seats (-


















Party (-6), the Liberal People’s Party (-4) and the Christian Democrats (-5) also suffered 
losses, while the Green Party (+6), and more importantly the Moderate Party (+10) 
achieved their best election results ever. Above all, the biggest post-electoral change 
following the 2010 general election was the fact that a populist radical right party, the 
Sweden Democrats, entered parliament for the first time with 20 seats. Despite the 
Moderate Party’s result, the ruling government lost its parliamentary majority, getting a 
total of 173 seats (-5). In the opposition, the Red-Greens were granted a total of 156 seats 
(-15; Widfeldt 2011).  
Following the election and negotiations between parties belonging to the Alliance, the 
Reinfeldt government was renewed for a second term. Due to its high electoral result, the 
Moderate Party extended its influence within the coalition, gaining two additional 
ministerial positions that were created in consultation with the ‘Alliance’ parties. While its 
ideology remained centrist (+1.2 on Kim and Fording’s index of government 
partisanship), the main difference in 2010 was that the government had just lost its 
parliamentary majority. As the cabinet now only required two additional MPs from the 
other parties to secure a majority and knowing that a coalition between the red-green 
parties and the Swedish Democrats would be ideologically improbable (Widfeldt 2011), it 
could be more relevant to talk of it as a ‘quasi-majority coalition’ rather than as a ‘minority 
coalition’. The government’s programme presented to the Riksdag on 5 October did not 
bring major changes, especially in terms of European co-operation. It emphasized 
Sweden’s participation in various peacekeeping operations, both within the framework of 
the EU and beyond. More importantly for the framework of this thesis, the government 
reiterated its commitment to the Nordic Battle Group: 
Through our participation in the Nordic Battle Group, one of two EU rapid 
reaction forces, Sweden is taking responsibility for peace and security within 
and outside our region. Sweden will command the Nordic Battle Group in 
2011. We should also have the ambition of undertaking its command in 2014 
(Government of Sweden 2010).  
Unsurprisingly, then, the Riksdag voted in favour of a second participation in the NBG 
on 14 December 2010 (see Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10 Riksdag’s   vote   on   participation   in   the  Nordic  Battle  Group  
during the first semester of 2011, per party 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
/ absents 
M 107 103 0 4 
SAP 112 105 0 7 
C 23 22 0 1 
Fp 24 22 0 2 
Vp 19 0 17 2 
KDS 19 17 0 2 
MdG 25 24 0 1 
Other  20 0 0 20 
TOTAL 349 293 17 39 
  Source: Riksdag’s archives. 
 
In comparison with the first vote (outlined in Table 4.9), the voting pattern remained 
largely intact: six parties were in favour (i.e. M, Fp, C, KDS, SAP and MdG), and one was 
against (Vp). MPs from the Sweden Democrats, however, decided to abstain.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed how the relationship between Sweden and the European Union 
has evolved in the past decades. It has been demonstrated that this relationship has been 
affected by what is referred to as ‘federo-scepticism’ (i.e. opposition to a federalist vision 
of Europe) at all levels. The position of each well-established party towards European co-
operation has been analysed, as well as the evolution of government positions on the 
selected policy areas from 1990 onwards. As stated in the introduction, Sweden belongs 
to the ‘outer core’ of the Union, enjoying a de facto opt-out of participation in the third 
stage of the EMU. Accordingly, and in order to understand the various government 
positions on this form of differentiation and what the implications have been, the 
emphasis has mostly been placed on this policy area, but without undervaluing the other 
policies analysed within the framework of this comparative study. As a case study 
exemplifying horizontal differentiated integration (and, more especially, internal 
differentiation), several conclusions can be drawn from the Swedish experience with 
regard to the hypotheses explored in this study.  
First, the composition of parliament played a significant role in shaping the government 
positions on European integration. This is best exemplified by Persson’s decision not to 
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join the third stage of the EMU in 1997. Indeed, while other factors (i.e. divisions within 
the ruling party, public opinion and the influence of the Calmfors report) should not be 
ignored, the absence of a clear parliamentary majority in favour of this policy prevented 
the Social Democratic government from adopting its strategy of compartmentalisation, 
which was successfully used in the context of EU membership in 1994. By 2003 however, 
and following the switches in SAP and KDS positions, the new composition of the 
Riksdag was seen as favourable to such policy and led the government to call for a 
referendum. In all other policy cases that have been analysed herein, it also appears that 
the composition of the Riksdag provided a favourable environment for supporting 
government positions on European issues. The Swedish case would thus confirm the first 
hypothesis, according to which if there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in 
parliament, then the government will be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with the European 
Union. 
Second, with regard to the composition of government, the Swedish case shows that all 
cabinets included parties that shared similar positions on European co-operation. On the 
one hand, as demonstrated in section 4.2, all centre-right parties belonging to the 
‘Alliance’ (from 2006 onwards) shared the same platform regarding foreign policy. On the 
other, it appears that the Greens and the Left Party’s critical positions on Europe by and 
large prevented them from joining the Social Democratic Party in a centre-left (or red-
green) cabinet. The ruling SAP preferred to form single party minority governments and 
rely on parliamentary support from these parties (especially from 1998 onwards), as 
discussed in sections 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3. This would confirm the second hypothesis, 
suggesting that if there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in the government, then the 
government will be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with the European Union. 
Third, throughout the period analysed, the Swedish cabinets consisted of three different 
types of governments: single party minority, majority and finally minority ones (even 
though it could be argued that the Bildt and second Reinfeldt governments were quasi-
majority coalitions). However, the Swedish case does not appear to support the third 
hypothesis explored in this study, according to which a minority government will avoid putting 
the issue of European integration on top of its agenda. The issues of EEA and Schengen 
memberships as well as participating in the EMU’s third stage were all raised under a 
social democratic single party minority government, and could as such not necessarily 
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count on a broad parliamentary support for these policies. The same goes for both the 
minority and majority non-socialist governments. There was a significant cross-party 
consensus over the issues raised under their leadership (i.e. EU membership and 
participation in the NBG). As a result, hypotheses related to the type of government seem 
to be dismissed by the Swedish example.  
Fourth, according to Kim and Fording’s index, it appears that government ideology varied 
much more than in Finland between 1991 and 2010. While Carlsson III/Persson (first 
mandate) and Bildt were right-oriented, the Carlsson II and Persson (third mandate) 
governments were leftists. In contrast, Persson (second mandate) and both Reinfeldt 
cabinets were considered as centrists. In 1998, the right-wing Persson government 
decided not to join the third stage of the EMU, which would confirm hypothesis 5 
according to which government’s support for European integration will decline as it moves further to 
either the left or the right. Such finding should nonetheless be tempered by a series of domestic 
political constraints which have been discussed in section 4.3.4.1 (including strong internal 
divisions on this issue within SAP). Conversely, other non-centrist governments 
supported developments at the European level. This is best exemplified by Persson’s 
support for participation in the Eurozone in 2002. As a result, the Swedish case does not 
seem to confirm hypothesis 5, and Persson’s position on participation in the EMU in 
1997 should be considered as an exception.  
The following chapter will focus on Norway, which is located at the ‘inner periphery’ of 





Chapter 5. Norway 
 
5.1. Relations between Norway and the European Union: 
between Euroscepticism and Europhilia 
 
Box 5.1 Timeline:  Norway’s  major  steps  towards  integration 
Date Agreement 
1949 Membership, Council of Europe 
1949 Membership, NATO 
1960 Membership, European Free Trade Association 
1962 Application for European Economic Community membership, 
withdrawn following France’s veto on the United Kingdom application 
1967 Application for European Economic Community membership, 
suspended following France’s second veto (reactivated in 1969 following 
De Gaulle’s resignation) 
1972 Application for European Economic Community membership rejected 
by the population  
1973 Free trade agreement with the European Economic Community 
1992 Application for European Union Membership 
1992 Associate membership, Western European Union [WEU] 
1994 Membership, European Economic Area 
European Union Membership rejected by the population 
1996 Membership, Schengen Area (implemented in 2001, jointly with the other 
Nordic states) 
2000 Agreement on participation in the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction 
2001 Agreement on co-operation in the European Police Office [EUROPOL] 
2001 Agreement on participation in the European Union Satellite Centre  
2003 Ratification of the Dublin Regulation (on asylum applications)  
2003 Agreement on mutual assistance in criminal matters 
2005 Agreement on co-operation in the EU’s Judicial Co-operation Unit 
[EUROJUST] 
2006 Associate membership, European Police College  
2006 Agreement on the recognition of the European Arrest Warrant  
2007 Ratification of the Lugano Convention on mutual recognition of courts 
and judgements in civil and commercial matters 
2008 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
2011 Participation in the Nordic Battle Group (ready for operations between 
January and June) 
Source: based on Norges offentlige utredinger (2012). For the full list of agreements between Norway and 
the European Union, see European Union External Action Service (2010). 
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As demonstrated in Box 5.1, the relationship between Norway and the European Union 
is more complex than in the cases of Finland and Sweden. On the one hand, the European 
issue was activated three decades earlier, and Norway applied for EC/EU membership 
on three occasions. On the other hand, the population rejected such membership twice: 
in 1972 (with 53.5 per cent against and a turnout of 79 per cent) and in 1994 (52.2 per 
cent, turnout of 89 per cent). Since the outcome of the last referendum, co-operation 
between Oslo and Brussels mostly takes place through the European Economic Area 
agreement, which covers about 75 percent of the European legislation and grants Norway 
access to the European Single Market. The EEA thus constitutes a ‘meta-agreement’ 
which enables Norway to belong to the ‘inner periphery’ of the European Union. Egeberg 
and Trondal (1999: 134) even argue that “the non-member EEA countries are integrated 
to the same extent as full members are as far as policy harmonization is concerned”. 
However, Norway further co-operates with the European Union in many areas that are 
not covered by the EEA agreement.  
Figure 5.1 Map of the agreements between Norway and the European 
Union, as of 2013 
 
Figure 5.1 attempts to demonstrate the complexity of the relationship Norway has with 
the EU outside the EEA, by mapping agreements per main policy areas. While the EMU 
does not fall within the scope of any agreements due to Norway’s status as non-member 
of the EU, the Norwegian authorities decided to take part to other policies not covered 
within the scope of the EEA. As summarised by Sitter (2012: 276) “Norway has […] 
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secured access to a number of other EU-related activities, from ad hoc participation in 
education policy, military and police initiatives to almost full membership of Schengen, in 
a system sometimes described as ‘buy-ins’ because it mirrors EU states’ opt-outs but 
comes with a price tag”. 
What contextual factors contribute to explain this particularly complex relationship 
between Norway and the European Union, contrasting with the Finnish and Swedish 
cases? The aim of this section is to highlight these factors and to offer a brief historic 
overview of the evolution of such relationship. 
Unlike Finland and Sweden, Norway was an occupied territory during the Second World 
War following the German invasion of 9 April 1940. Norway subsequently ratified the 
North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 and effectively became a founding member of 
NATO. As explained by Gstöhl (2002: 51), “[t]he bad experience with neutrality in World 
War II and the Cold War climate made Norway turn to the Atlantic alliance in spite of its 
historical aversion to integration”. NATO membership was perceived as beneficial by the 
majority of Norwegian political elites, despite having a common border with the USSR. 
According to Tunsjø (2011: 73), “Norway aligned with NATO to deter the Soviet Union, 
while simultaneously screening its role in the alliance through self-imposed restrictions 
and engaging with the Soviet Union diplomatically, thereby aiming to reassure Moscow”. 
By joining NATO, the country strengthened its security ties with the United States and, 
more importantly, with the United Kingdom, which has been Norway’s main trading 
partner since its independence in 1905 (ibid.). In short, the country did not follow the 
same path as its Eastern Nordic neighbours in terms of foreign and security policy, mostly 
due to its experience of the Second World War. As a consequence, the European issue 
became politically salient much earlier than in Finland and Sweden, where the principles 
of neutrality and military non-alignment prevailed. 
Throughout the 1950s and until the early 1970s, Norway’s position on European 
integration was mostly influenced by the United Kingdom’s preferences. The Stockholm 
Convention establishing EFTA was signed in 1960 by seven countries, including 
Norway.134 As early as 1961, shortly after the ratification of the Stockholm Convention, 
the UK, with Denmark and Ireland, contemplated the idea of joining the European 
                                                          
134 The seven founding countries were: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, 
Switzerland and Portugal. 
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Community and eventually applied for membership. As a response to this application and 
despite strong internal divisions within the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) and also 
within political parties, Norway decided to submit a first application for EC membership 
on 30 April 1962. However, following French President Charles de Gaulle’s veto on UK’s 
entry into the Community, Norway’s application was withdrawn. A similar situation 
occurred in 1967, but the membership issue was reactivated following de Gaulle’s 
resignation in 1969 (Archer 2005). Negotiations between the EC and Norway took place 
between 1970 and early 1972.  The accession treaty was then submitted for approval by 
the electorate on 25 September 1972. Following the negative outcome of this referendum 
and while the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Community, this issue lost 
its political saliency at the domestic level until the early 1990s.  
Whereas the then ongoing negotiations on the future EEA agreement were welcomed by 
the Norwegian authorities, Sweden and Finland’s decisions to apply for an EU 
membership modified the political context surrounding the EEA. Indeed, with these 
applications, Norway was facing the risk of being isolated from the rest of the European 
continent as only three countries would remain part of the EEA: Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway. As a consequence of both Finland and Sweden’s decisions and even though 
the Norwegian government, led by Labour Party Leader Gro Harlem Brundtland, tried 
to avoid such an issue, it had no choice but to put the application on the agenda during 
its national convention in April 1992 (Kux and Sverdrup 2000; see further section 5.3.2). 
In fact, “[i]t seems that the Labour leadership had originally hoped that the EEA would 
be brought in from 1 January 1993 and, after a few years of ‘socialization’ in the single 
market the public would come more easily to accept full membership of [...] the EU” 
(Archer 2005: 57). Norway eventually reapplied for an EU membership on 25 November 
1992. Negotiations started in May 1993 and were concluded in March 1994 (Sæter 1996). 
On 27 and 28 November 1994, 52.2 per cent of the electorate then rejected such 
membership via referendum (with a turnout of 88.6 per cent). The outcome of both 
referendums (in 1972 and 1994) has been explained by the fact that the centre-periphery 
cleavage prevails in Norway (see e.g. Bjørklund 1996). 
Despite the electorate’s second rejection of EU membership and besides participation in 
the EEA, the Norwegian authorities enhanced co-operation with the European Union 
through the ratification of 97 agreements in various policy areas between 1995 and 2011 
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while remaining in the ‘inner periphery’ of the Union (European External Relations 
Service 2010; see also Box 5.1 and Figure 5.1). This ‘ever closer co-operation’ is mostly 
explained by the fact that there is a strong political willingness to strengthen ties with 
Brussels. In other words, “Norway’s approach to European integration is the product of 
the somewhat paradoxical combination of marginal popular majorities against EU 
membership in 1972 and 1994 and a seemingly permanent pro-integration parliamentary 
majority” (Eliassen and Sitter 2003: 127).  
In sum, according to the existing literature, two major contextual factors contribute in 
explaining this complex relationship between Norway and the European Union. First, 
Norway’s experience of the Second World War influenced national authorities to join 
NATO as early as 1949, and thus did not consider military non-alignment as a viable 
option. As such, Norway is more internationally oriented than Finland and Sweden, and 
the European issue became politically salient much earlier than in the two aforementioned 
states. Second, there is a strong degree of mass-level Euroscepticism in Norway, which 
contrasts with more pro-integrationist elite preferences. As a consequence, while 
membership was rejected via referendum, national authorities try to enhance co-operation 
between Oslo and Brussels.  
The following section will now study the Norwegian party system and the well-established 
parties’ positions on European integration. 
 
5.2. The Norwegian Party System and European 
Integration 
The Kingdom of Norway is a parliamentary representative constitutional monarchy, like 
its Swedish neighbour. The Storting (or Stortinget) is the national unicameral parliament, 
where 169 representatives are elected for a term of four years (Matthews and Valen 1999). 
As mentioned by Heidar (2001: 62), “[s]ince the introduction of parliamentarism in 1884, 
parties have been the main actors in Norwegian politics”. Like for Finland and Sweden, 
it is thus relevant to provide an in-depth analysis of the Norwegian party system, and the 
parties’ positions regarding European integration, before focusing on the executive actor. 
In Norway, the analysis focuses on the period between 1990, when negotiations on the 
EEA agreement led to strong divisions within the government, and ends in 2010 with the 
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decision to participate in the Nordic Battle Group during the first semester of 2011. 
Throughout this period, seven parties have been able to secure regular seats in the 
Storting: the Conservative Party (Høyre, H); the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet, A), belonging 
to the social democratic party family; the agrarian Centre Party (Senterpartiet, Sp); the 
Liberal Party (Venstre, V); the Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF, 
formerly named Christian People’s Party); the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti, 
SV); and the populist right Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP).135 Much like in Sweden, 
the Norwegian party system has been traditionally divided into two main ideological blocs:  
[F]or a number of elections, dating back to 1965, the Norwegian electorate 
has been confronted with two clear-cut government alternatives, a single 
Labour Party government based on a socialist majority or a coalition 
consisting of bourgeois parties (the Centre Party, the Christian People’s Party, 
the Conservatives and in earlier period the Liberals). These alternatives, 
which fit the division on the left-right axis, have remained the same (Narud 
1995: 5).  
However, from the 1990s onwards, this bloc division became somewhat less clear. Indeed, 
since the collapse of the Syse government over the EEA issue (see further section 5.3.1), 
the traditional bourgeois bloc has not been renewed. Moreover, in recent years, the 
agrarian Centre Party joined the Labour and Socialist Left parties to form a coalition 
government (see further section 5.3.7), thus breaking with the tradition of ‘bloc politics’. 
Nevertheless, there are still signs of such political blocs, illustrated by the division between 
the Labour and Conservative parties (Narud and Strøm 2011). 
Table 5.1 summarises the evolution of the electoral score of each party between 1989 and 
2009. Until the 2013 general election (which is not analysed in this study), the Progress 
Party was the only party that had never been appointed at the executive level.  
                                                          
135 The Progress Party is ususally shortened as ‘Fp’;; however, as such acronym has already been used for 




Table 5.1 Percentage vote for Norwegian political parties in 
parliamentary elections, from 1989 to 2009 
 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 
Conservative Party (H) 22.0  17 .0 14.3  21.2  14.1  17.2  
Labour Party (A) 34.3  36.9  35  24.3  32.7  35.4  
Centre Party (Sp) 6.5  16.7  7.9  5.6  6.5  6.2  
Liberal Party (V) 3.2  3.6  4.5  3.9  5.9  3.9  
Christian Democratic Party (KrF) 8.5  7.9  13.7  12.4  6.8  5.5  
Socialist Left Party (SV) 1.1  7.9  6 .0 12.5  8.8  6.2  
Progress Party (FrP) 13  6.3  15.3  14.6  22.1  22.9  
Other 2.1  3.6  3.4  5.5  2.9  2.5  
Turnout 83.2  75.8  78.3  75.5  77.4  76.4  
  Source: Aardal (1990); Heidar (1994); Narud (1998); Aalberg (2002; 2010); Aalberg and Brekken (2006). 
This section analyses the evolution of the party system in Norway, and how parties 
positioned themselves regarding European co-operation since the early 1990s. Similarly 
to the two previous empirical chapters, it is divided into one sub-section per well-
established party family. The final sub-section will then offer a summary of party positions 
on European integration. 
 
5.2.1. Conservative Party 
Founded in 1884, the Conservative Party (or Høyre) is a centre-right party belonging to 
the same party family as the Finnish National Coalition Party and the Swedish Moderate 
Party. At the domestic level, the party is historically close to the Liberal Party,136 and has 
co-operated with other bourgeois parties (i.e. the Christian Democratic Party and, until 
1990, the Centre Party). However, since 2005, the party has started to co-operate with the 
Progress Party.137 Between the 1989 and 2009 general elections, the party’s election results 
fluctuated between 14.1 per cent (in 2005) and 22.2 per cent (in 1989), being either the 
second or the third largest party represented in the Storting.  
                                                          
136 Originally, this white-collar party was created “to uphold the rule of law and to fight the political 
populist democracy of the Liberal Party” (Heidar 2001: 66). 
137 On 16 October 2013, the Solberg government was appointed and consists of a minority coalition 
between the Conservative Party and the Progress Party.  
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Throughout the years, the Conservative Party has been the most pro-EU party in Norway, 
campaigning in favour of membership as early as 1972 (together with the Labour Party). 
Since 1989, its position on the European Union has remained stable, and the party still 
advocates full membership as well as participation in all European policy areas. The 1997 
party manifesto constitutes the only notable exception. Following the outcome of the 
1994 referendum, the Conservative Party decided to emphasise the need to maintain and 
deepen the EEA agreement. As mentioned in this manifesto:  
The decision to say no to EU membership was not a decision to refuse to co-
operate with the EU. Developments in the EU are increasingly important for 
Norway. Norwegian interests are best secured through the broadest possible 
co-operation with the EU and its member states. The EU currently accounts 
for about 80 per cent of our exports. The EEA is, therefore, absolutely 
essential as most of our companies have the same regulations as their 
competitors (Høyre 1997).138  
Despite reluctance from a minority of party members,139 there is a broad consensus within 
the Conservatives on the issue of European integration. The Storting vote on the 
application for EU membership that took place in 1992 illustrates this: all thirty-seven 
Conservative MPs voted in favour of the application (Archer 2005; see section 5.3.2). 
Furthermore, the party sees the EEA agreement “not as a good alternative, but a good 
tool, as a necessary step for us towards membership”.140 Despite this strong and stable 
position on European integration as well as on EU membership, Heidar (2001: 67) argued 
that this issue “gave the Conservatives few opportunities to present a distinct political 
profile to the electorate. If the party wanted Norway to join […] it had to play second 
fiddle to the Labor Party”. This view might be contested, as the Labour Party was strongly 
divided on the membership issue in the early 1990s (as discussed below). In sum, the 
Conservative Party can be considered as Norway’s most pro-integrationist party and 
would like Norway to belong to the ‘inner core’ of the European Union. As such, it does 
not see differentiated integration as a viable option for the country. 
                                                          
138 Author’s translation: “Beslutningen om å si nei til medlemskap i EU var ikke noen beslutning om å si 
nei til samarbeid med EU. Utviklingen i EU er stadig viktigere for Norge. Norske interesser sikres best 
gjennom et bredest mulig samarbeid med EU og EU-landene. EU mottar i dag ca. 80 prosent av vår eksport. 
EØS-avtalen er derfor helt avgjørende for at mest mulig av næringslivet skal ha de samme vilkår som sine 
konkurrenter”. 
139 “Within the Party today, there are smaller groups who are not too enthusiastic for membership. But at 
every convention every 4 years when the Party programme is decided, there is about 100% of votes 
supporting EU membership” (Interview with a MP from the Conservative Party, 12 October 2012). 




5.2.2. Social Democratic Party 
Founded in 1887 by trade union activists, the Labour Party has been Norway’s largest 
political party since 1927 (Strøm and Leipart 1989; Heidar 2001). Originally composed of 
three main tendencies (Communists, Labour and Social Democrats), the party split when 
it briefly became member of the Komintern between 1919 and 1923, before being 
reunited with its Social Democratic faction. Despite its different background, the Labour 
Party is ideologically close to other European social democratic parties, including its 
Finnish and Swedish counterparts.141 Throughout the period analysed, the party’s electoral 
performance at the national level fluctuated between 24.3 per cent (in 2001) and 36.9 per 
cent (in 1993). 
The party’s position on European integration has been mostly positive, despite strong 
internal divisions on the issue of membership. However, these preferences have evolved 
over time. In 1989, whereas the party congress voted a resolution stating that “it is neither 
necessary nor desirable that Norway take a position on membership now” (quoted and 
translated in Saglie 2000: 98), the party manifesto emphasised the necessity to join the 
internal market through the future EEA agreement (Arbeiderpartiet 1989). Following 
Norway’s application for an EU membership in 1992, the 1993 Labour manifesto was 
mostly focused on the issue of European integration in its broad meaning. First, it 
emphasised the importance of the EEA for Norway (and, more generally, small 
countries). Second, it supported the application for an EU membership “[…] because [the 
Labour Party] believe[s] that Norway naturally fits in a committed relationship with 
democratic countries in our own continent” (Arbeiderpartiet 1993),142 but also highlighted 
the conditions to join the European Union: “it is essential that Norway retains control of 
Norwegian natural resources, and that we can find a good agreement for primary 
industries and regional policy” (ibid.).143 Third, the manifesto emphasised the benefits of 
EU membership for Norway with regard to the party’s key objectives: securing 
                                                          
141 “The history is slightly different from other European Labour Parties or Social Democratic Parties, but 
now, they look alike to a bigger extent” (Interview with a former MP from the Labour Party, 7 November 
2012). 
142 Author’s translation: “Arbeiderpartiet vil at Norge skal søke om medlemskap i EF, fordi vi mener at 
Norge hører naturlig hjemme i et forpliktende samarbeid med de demokratiske land i vår egen verdensdel”.  
143 Author’s translation: “I forhandlingene vil vi legge avgjørende vekt på at Norge får beholde kontrollen 
over norske naturressurser og at vi finner gode løsninger for primærnæringene og distriktspolitikken”.  
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employment, welfare, security and peace; enhancing co-operation with other social 
democratic parties in Europe; the opportunity for Norway to shape the future of 
European integration, especially in terms of labour, social and environmental policies. 
Finally, it discussed the importance of NATO in terms of foreign policy, and opposed 
the creation of a common foreign and security policy. Despite the relatively positive 
attitude towards membership as stated in this manifesto, there were strong divisions 
within the party. In October 1993, a fraction of the Labour Party created an organised 
group named ‘Social Democrats against EU’ (Sosialdemokrater mot EU) which heavily 
campaigned against membership throughout 1994 until the date of the referendum. This 
weakened the pro-EU campaign as well as the Labour government (see further section 
5.3.2). 
In 1997, and following these strong internal divisions, the Labour position on European 
integration was tempered. The party leadership accepted the electorate’s decision to reject 
membership in 1994, and this decision subsequently constituted the basis of the Labour’s 
European policy for the 1997-2001 parliamentary term. However, the manifesto stated 
the party’s willingness to co-operate with the European Union as closely as possible in 
policy areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. The prominence of NATO as the basis of the Norwegian foreign 
policy was also highlighted. Finally, the party did not rule out a future application for 
membership, “[…] if there are any major changes in terms of European co-operation” 
(Arbeiderpartiet 1997).144 
In 2001, the Labour Party adapted its programme according to the international context, 
taking account of the upcoming ‘big bang enlargement’ and the launch of the third stage 
of the Economic and Monetary Union. Whereas it outlined the benefits of existing 
agreements with the EU and the importance of NATO, the Labour manifesto seemed to 
promote differentiated integration:  
                                                          
144 Author’s translation: “En ny vurdering av spørsmålet om EU-medlemskap vil bare være naturlig dersom 
det skjer vesentlige endringer i det europeiske samarbeidet.” 
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[The Labour Party] believe[s] that Norway must take advantage of the 
opportunities our current form of association provides, both for close 
coordination with the EU where it is desirable and to have a separate policy 
where appropriate. In this way, we can reduce the risk of foreign political 
marginalisation of Norway in the light of developments within the EU. We 
must always have an open debate in which the benefits of being outside [of 
the EU] must prevail over the disadvantages (Arbeiderpartiet 2001).145  
2005 marked a series of major changes in the Labour Party’s position on European co-
operation. Indeed, internal divisions on the membership issue were mentioned and it was 
stated if the question of membership was raised in parliament, this would require a new 
Labour congress to decide on the party’s stance. Nevertheless, the manifesto mentioned 
the need to strengthen co-operation with the European Union. These positions were 
reiterated in the 2009 manifesto (Arbeiderpartiet 2005; 2009). 
In sum, the Labour party has been divided on the issue of European integration and has 
had moderate views on the membership issue due to these strong internal divisions. As 
summarised by an interviewee: 
In our programme, we say that the best would have been for Norway to be 
member of the European Union, because that would have made us also a 
part of the political project and give us influence over decisions which 
concern us, but we are also a party where there are different views on this 
issue. […] After the 1994 referendum, […] every time the EU has expended 
its co-operation, we wanted to participate, and we would want to go for 
further integration.146   
In other words, the party adapted its position on EU membership following the outcome 
of the 1994 referendum. While remaining outside of the Union, the party has advocated 
differentiated integration through close co-operation in policy areas which would be 
beneficial to Norway. The party has also acknowledged the importance of existing 
agreements with the EU and the relevance of NATO as a cornerstone of Norway’s 
foreign and defence policy.  
                                                          
145 Author’s translation: “Arbeiderpartiet mener at Norge må utnytte de muligheter vår nåværende 
tilknytningsform gir, både til nær koordinering med EU der det er ønskelig og til å føre en egen politikk der 
det er formålstjenlig. Bare slik kan vi dempe faren for utenrikspolitisk marginalisering av Norge i lys av 
utviklingen innad i EU. Vi må derfor hele tiden føre en åpen debatt hvor fordelene ved å stå utenfor avveies 
mot ulempene”. 
146 Interview with a MP from the Labour Party, 23 October 2012. 
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5.2.3. Agrarian Party 
The Centre Party (formerly named Farmers’ Party, Bondepartiet) is an agrarian party who 
was founded in 1920. Initially a party “of farmers for farmers and their families” (Heidar 
2001: 68), the industrialisation of Norway led to a change in the party line, in order to 
attract new voters especially in urban areas (Elder and Gooderham 1978). On a left-right 
scale, the Centre Party has traditionally been located between the Liberals and the 
Conservatives and favoured co-operation with both of these parties as well as with the 
Christian Democrats (Arntzen and Knudsen 1980). However, after Sp’s decision to join 
a left-wing coalition government with the Labour and the Socialist Left parties in 2005, 
this ideological position has been more difficult to draw. Since the collapse of the Syse 
coalition (see section 5.3.1), the party has considered that “the old left-right divide […] 
had become obsolete” (Heidar 2001: 68). Except following the 1993 general election 
when it became the second largest party of Norway with 16.7 per cent, the Centre Party’s 
electoral score remained stable and fluctuated between 5.6 per cent (in 2001) and 7.9 per 
cent (in 1997). 
One of the key political aspects defended by the Centre Party is the decentralisation of 
power. In the views of the party, bureaucracy should be avoided and “uniformity hinders 
development” (Senterpartiet 1993).147 Throughout the period analysed, the party has 
opposed any forms of institutionalised European integration, as the party sees the EU as 
a bureaucratic tool to transfer national powers to a supranational institution damaging 
democracy and economic growth. As an alternative to European integration, the Centre 
Party wants to promote “an all-European co-operation between independent nations” 
(ibid.).148 In other words, the party does not advocate European integration or 
differentiated integration, but co-operation based on the principles of international law 
(Senterpartiet 1993; 1997; 2001; 2005). 
In 1989, while the membership issue was not salient and in response to the future creation 
of the internal market, the Centre Party advocated bilateral contacts between Norway and 
the (then) EC in order to avoid trade obstacles between the two actors. In 1993, the party 
successfully became the main actor of the campaign against EU membership, and the 
                                                          
147 Author’s translation: “Ensretting hemmer utvikling”. 




European debate was the central theme of their manifesto: while opposing both EU and 
EEA memberships, the party defended the free trade agreement as the basis for European 
co-operation (Senterpartiet 1993). This stance was renewed in the 1997 manifesto, and 
extended to the Schengen agreement: in the party’s views, Norway should be free to 
pursue an independent asylum and visa policy (Senterpartiet 1997). 
In 2001, the party took a milder stance on the EEA agreement, while remaining firmly 
opposed to EU membership and participation in the AFSJ, mostly through Schengen. 
Indeed, instead of fully opposing EEA membership as it did in the previous years, the 
party called for a re-evaluation of this agreement which could give birth to a Swiss-type of 
bilateral co-operation. Nevertheless, the party reiterated its willingness to terminate 
Norwegian participation to the EEA scheme in the 2005 and 2009 manifestos, thus calling 
for a form of differentiated disintegration (Senterpartiet 2005; 2009). The party has also 
consistently rejected participation in the CFSP and has considered the future creation of 
a European army of 100,000 men as an “aggressive fighting force”,149 stating that NATO 
should remain the main actor in terms of foreign and security policy (Senterpartiet 2001). 
Furthermore, following the creation of EU Battle Group concept in 2004, the party has 
consistently opposed Norway’s involvement in such policy (Senterpartiet 2005;; 2009).  
In sum, the Centre Party has the most radical views towards European integration 
amongst parties represented in the Storting. Furthermore, party members have not been 
divided on the question and are strongly opposed to institutionalised co-operation with 
Brussels as well. While European integration has been considered as one of the key issues 
on the party’s political agenda, Sp is also considered as the main responsible for the 
collapse of the Syse coalition government in 1990 (see further section 5.3.1). Throughout 
the period analysed, the Centre Party’s position thus remained relatively stable and could 
be summarised as follows: no to EU membership, no to the EEA, no to Schengen or to 
any institutionalised agreement with the European Union, but yes to EFTA and to co-
operation on the principles of international law. 
 
                                                          
149 Author’s translation ”Styrken vil være bygd opp som en slagkraftig og offensiv kampstyrke”. 
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5.2.4. Liberal Party 
Founded in 1884, the Liberal Party (whose Norwegian name, Venstre, is literally translated 
as ‘the Left’) is together with Høyre the oldest political party in Norway. Originally, the 
party was created in order to defend the interests of the Norwegian nation in the Union 
between Sweden and Norway (Arter 2008). While Venstre was one of the largest parties 
represented in the Storting until 1945, its electoral score has drastically declined since 
then. The party suffered from an identity crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s which 
led the party to lose all parliamentary representation (Heidar 2001). Following the 1993 
election and throughout the rest of the period analysed, Venstre re-established itself in 
the Storting but remained as a small party, gaining between 3.6 per cent (in 1993) and 5.9 
per cent (in 2005) in national elections.  
The Liberal Party’s support for European integration has varied per policy area. In 1989, 
while the party suggested that it was not the right time to apply for an EU membership, 
it was open to the debate and considered that a thorough discussion on Norway’s 
relationship with the European institutions should take place during the 1989-1993 
parliamentary term (Venstre 1989). However, it should be borne in mind that following 
the 1989 general election, Venstre was not successful in securing representation in the 
Storting. In 1993, the party decided to stand against membership, advocating the EEA 
agreement as the basis for Norway’s co-operation with the EU. In the party’s views, the 
newly negotiated EEA agreement enabled Norway to be more flexible in key areas such 
as foreign policy and international trade, and was perceived as beneficial as it did not as it 
did not include agricultural and fisheries policies (Venstre 1993). The 1997 manifesto 
contained a section entitled “yes to Europe – no to EU membership” (Venstre 1997),150 
in which the party remained in favour of European co-operation within the framework 
of existing agreements (mostly through the EEA). The party went even further by 
mentioning its willingness to promote the EEA as an alternative membership for new 
applicant states, thus advocating more horizontal differentiation across Europe. Similarly, 
the 2001, 2005 and 2009 manifestos mentioned the fact that this agreement has worked 
well for Norwegian economic interests and should be further developed (Venstre 2001; 
2005; 2009). In 2005, the party seemed more flexible on the EU membership issue and 
mentioned in its manifesto that even though the party leadership did not want to join the 
                                                          
150 Author’s translation: “Ja til Europa, nei til EU-medlemskap”. 
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EU, it acknowledged that some of its members and supporters were in favour of a 
membership (Venstre 2005; 2009).   
Interestingly enough, none of the Liberal Party manifestos avoided discussing the 
Schengen agreement or AFSJ-related policies. This can be explained by the fact that the 
party has been strongly divided on this issue.151 However, Venstre has consistently 
supported developments of the CFSP and believed that Norway should fully contribute 
to such policy without undermining the importance of NATO (Venstre 2001; 2005; 2009).  
Venstre is thus a political party advocating current forms of horizontal differentiated 
integration: while European co-operation should be based on the EEA agreement, the 
Party has also advocated participation in other policy areas such as the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.  
 
5.2.5. Christian Democratic Party 
Founded in 1933 in Western counties before becoming a national party in 1945, the 
Christian Democratic Party was originally created following the lay Church movement’s 
dissatisfaction on the lack of Christian influence within the Liberal Party (Arter 2008; on 
events regarding the creation of the party, see Karvonen 1993). KrF was the first party of 
its type to be created in the Nordic states, and served as a model to the creation of its 
Danish, Finnish and Swedish counterparts. Between 1989 and 2009, its electoral score 
fluctuated between 5.5 per cent (in 2009) and 13.7 per cent (in 1997). It was also 
represented in three government coalitions, notably under the influence of their former 
leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik, who served as Prime Minister during nearly seven years 
(1997-2000 and 2001-2005).  
The Christian Democratic Party’s attitude towards European integration has been 
relatively stable and is quite similar to the one adopted by the Liberal Party. Throughout 
the period analysed, whereas the party was formally opposed to an EU membership and 
considered that NATO should remain the main actor in terms of Norway’s foreign and 
security policy, it advocated a close co-operation with the European institutions in various 
areas. In 1989, the party wanted Norway to join the future Single Market in co-operation 
                                                          
151 These internal divisions within the Liberal party will be illustrated in section 5.3.4. 
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and consultation with other EFTA countries and thus supported the future EEA 
agreement (Kristelig Folkeparti 1989). In 1993, while opposing membership, the party 
stated its willingness to increase Norwegian participation in European co-operation “in 
areas such as the environment, education, the fight against racism and against terrorism”152 
as well as issues related to health, safety and security (Kristelig Folkeparti 1993). This 
stance was renewed in the 1997 and 2001 manifestos, which also mentioned the economic 
benefits on EEA membership for Norway (especially in terms of exports). It is important 
to note that much like the Liberal Party, there has been no mention of the Schengen 
agreement in those manifestos, at times when Norway’s participation in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice was a hot topic. An interviewee justified this absence of 
statement as such:  
I think the honest answer would be that we knew we needed to do that [i.e. 
participate in the Schengen agreement, author’s note], but a bit half-
hearted… to ‘accept’ rather than to ‘fight for’ it. We need co-operation on 
security and justice and fighting crime, and so on, and that is what Schengen 
is all about. So I think our party has considered it as a tool to achieve those 
needs of co-operation but we also see some challenges, such as the lack of 
control of our own borders.153 
Furthermore, due to European developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
in the late 1990s, the 2001 manifesto stated that whereas NATO should remain the 
cornerstone in terms of Norway’s foreign and security policy, the country “should actively 
engage in co-operation and ensure adequate influence on the decision-making process in 
the EU, including through participation in various working groups and by adequate 
consultation arrangements” (Kristelig Folkeparti 2001).154  Similarly, the party advocated 
close co-operation with supranational institutions in order to strengthen human rights, 
democracy, economic development, peace and stability in Europe.  
In 2005, KrF reiterated its previous positions towards European integration: “[…] the 
current forms of association with the EU still serve our country best” (Kristelig Folkeparti 
2005).155 Furthermore, the 2005 manifesto stipulated that agreements in policy areas such 
                                                          
152 Author’s translation: “[…] økt samarbeid i Europa på områder som miljø, utdanning, anti-rasistisk arbeid 
og arbeid mot terrorisme”. 
153 Interview with a policy adviser from the Christian Democratic Party, 17 July 2013. 
154 Author’s translation: “[…] Norge bør ta aktivt del i samarbeidet og sikre seg tilfredsstillende innflytelse 
på beslutningsprosessen i EU bl.a. gjennom deltakelse i ulike arbeidsgrupper og ved gode 
konsultasjonsordninger.” 
155 Author’s translation: “[…] mener KrF at de nåværende tilknytningsformer til EU fremdeles tjener landet 
vårt best“.  
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as agriculture, fisheries, management of natural resources and the monetary union would 
not be beneficial for Norway.156 The 2009 manifesto did not bring major changes to these 
positions, besides stating the fact that an EU membership would impair Norway’s 
flexibility in several key areas, e.g. peace mediation and conflict resolution (Kristelig 
Folkeparti 2009).   
KrF’s position on European integration has thus remained relatively stable throughout 
the years: no to EU membership, but yes to political and economic integration as long as 
it serves Norway’s interests best. In the party’s views, NATO should remain the key 
international actor in terms of foreign and security policy, but the party has also advocated 
co-operation with the European Union in this area. Similarly to other Norwegian parties, 
this stance follows the logic of differentiated integration.  
 
5.2.6. ‘New Politics’ Parties 
In contrast to the Finnish and Swedish party systems, there is no well-established green 
party in Norway. This is mostly explained by the fact that the Socialist Left Party has one 
important environmental dimension within its programme (see next sub-section). In fact, 
the Norwegian Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) won its first parliamentary seat 
following the 2013 general election, which is not analysed within the framework of this 
study.  
 
5.2.6.1. Socialist Left Party 
The Socialist Left Party was founded in 1975 as a merger of several left-wing groups or 
“left-of-Labour merger” (Heidar 2001: 69). These groups are: the Socialist People’s Party 
(Sosialistisk Folkeparti), one of the former opposition group within the Labour Party who 
was created in 1961; the Communist Party (Norges Kommunistiske Parti); some independent 
socialists; and the Information Committee of the Labour Movement against Norwegian 
Membership in the European Community (Arbeirderbevegelsens informasjonskomité mot norsk 
medlemskap i EF), which was a splinter group from the then pro-EC Labour Party (Arntzen 
                                                          




and Knudsen 1980). The formation of this ‘new left’ party was the first indicator of the 
end of the traditional five-party model (Christensen 1998). The main objective of SV, 
from its early years onwards, has been international non-alignment (Arter 2008). 
Throughout the 1980s, the party moved towards a ‘green’ ideology, putting the protection 
of the environment on top of its agenda. However, SV cannot be considered as a green 
party per se, due to its internal organisation and political strategy (Heidar 2001). 
Nevertheless, the party considers itself as close to other European socialist and green 
parties, as mentioned in some of its manifestos (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 1993; 1997; 
2001). Between 1989 and 2009, SV’s electoral score fluctuated between 6 per cent (in 
1997) and 12.5 per cent (in 2001). The party was also a coalition member in both terms 
of the Stoltenberg II cabinet.  
Due to its historical composition, SV’s position on European integration has been 
unsurprisingly critical. From the late 1980s onwards, the party has stood against European 
co-operation, arguing that Norway’s relationship with the EU should be based on the 
EFTA agreement and intergovernmental decision-making. Nevertheless, this position 
should be clarified, as the party has not been opposed to all aspects of European 
integration. In 1989, the party opposed the idea of an EC membership as well as 
“uncritical adaptation to the EC internal market” (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 1989).157 In 
other words, SV was initially not opposed to joining the Single Market, stating that Norway 
would benefit from European integration in policy areas such as health and safety 
regulations, consumer and environmental protection. In 1993, the Socialist Left Party 
adopted a negative stance towards EU membership and extended it to the EEA 
agreement. Furthermore, the 1993 manifesto criticised the evolution of European 
integration in terms of foreign and security policy (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 1993). In 1997, 
in addition to the positions outlined above, the party mentioned its opposition to the 
Schengen agreement, which was seen as harming the principle of national sovereignty 
(Sosialistisk Venstreparti 1997). In 2001, SV enumerated the benefits of Norway’s status 
as non-member of the EU, outlining e.g. “a far simpler agricultural and fisheries policy”,158 
a “small, transparent society” versus “the large, complex EU”159 and Norway’s freedom 
                                                          
157 Author’s translation: “SV vil bekjempe den ukritiske tilpasningen til EFs indre marked”. 
158 Author’s translation: “Vi kan også langt enklare føre ein landbruks- og fiskeripolitikk”. 
159 Author’s translation: “På det økonomiske området er det langt enklare å sikre full sysselsetting, sosial 




in terms of foreign policy (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 2001). It also rejected the creation of 
a European defence force, as co-operation in this area should, in the party’s views, take 
place within the framework of NATO. In its 2005 and 2009 manifestos, the party stance 
towards European integration remained unchanged: SV advocated close co-operation 
between Norway and other countries of Europe through intergovernmental agreements 
and not within the framework of the European Union. In addition, SV mentioned that it 
did not want Norway to contribute to the Nordic Battle Group (Sosialistisk Venstreparti 
2005; 2009).  
The Socialist Left Party thus shares the same views as the Centre Party in terms of 
European integration: no to binding memberships and to institutionalised co-operation 
with the European Union, but yes to co-operation within the framework of the Free Trade 
Agreement. This constitutes one of the founding positions of the party, and it has not 
been challenged by its members.  
 
5.2.6.2. Populist Right Party 
The Progress Party is Norway’s youngest well-established party, founded in 1973 under 
the name of “Ander Lange’s Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public 
Intervention” (Anders Langes Parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep), 
which gained four seats on the same year (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Originally built on 
anti-tax grounds and following the example of the Danish Progress Party 
(Fremskridtspartiet) created a year earlier, the party line has progressively evolved to become 
an anti-immigrant party by the late 1980s (Heidar 2001). As such, the Progress Party is 
mostly considered as a populist right party (see for instance Arter 2008; Fossum 2010). 
At a time when small new parties were not successful in establishing themselves amongst 
the traditional Norwegian parties, the Progress Party was able to gather enough votes in 
order to be permanently represented in the Storting since 1981, and to eventually become 
the second largest party of Norway in 2009. This was made possible by combining views 
against immigration with “welfare chauvinism and a demand for spending on the elderly, 
young-parent families, hospitals and so on” (Arter 2008: 118-119). The party also 
benefited from an increase in electoral volatility which occurred in the 1980s.  
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Unlike any other well-established parties in Norway, the position of the Progress Party 
on European integration is rather unclear. According to Fossum (2010: 82), the party 
“sees itself as a receiver, rather than a shaper, of popular opinion” on the issue of EU 
membership. An interviewee mentioned that the Progress Party tends to remain neutral 
on the issue of EU membership, but considers itself in favour of European integration as 
it supports agreements such as the EEA and Schengen.160  
It is interesting to outline the evolution of the party’s stance towards European integration 
per policy area, as stated in the manifestos for the period considered in this analysis. In 
1989, a few years before the submission of Norway’s application for an EU membership, 
the party mentioned its willingness to “clarify Norway’s relationship to the EC and put 
the issue of membership to a referendum” (Fremskrittspartiet 1989).161 In 1993, shortly 
before the accession treaty was negotiated, a more elaborate position on European 
integration was developed, summarised by the stance “yes to the EC – no to the Union” 
(Fremskrittspartiet 1993).162 In other words, the general line of the party opposed the 
Maastricht Treaty but supported the EEA agreement.  However, party members and MPs 
were free to support or oppose EU membership, which eventually led to strong divisions 
within the party during the 1994 national convention. As a result, four Progress MPs left 
the party to form an independent group in the Storting (Heidar 1995). Following the 
victory of the No-side, the 1997 party manifesto did not discuss issues relating to 
European integration: in fact, this document did not have a section on ‘Norway and 
Europe’ (Norge og Europa), as it was the case for all other manifestos released between 
1989 and 2009. Instead, this section was replaced by another entitled ‘Norway and the 
world’ (Norge og verden). From 2001 onwards, the Progress Party advocated closer co-
operation between Norway and the European Union in policy fields requiring 
supranational solutions, such as crime, security, the environment, free trade, economic 
competition and human rights (Fremskrittspartiet 2001; 2005; 2009). On the issue of 
security, however, the party considered that participation in NATO should remain the 
                                                          
160 “[…] We stay neutral on the issue of EU membership. We are pro-EEA, we are in favour of Norway 
being a member of Schengen. So at the moment, we are in favour of European integration. We are definitely 
in favour of having a constant look at the agreements: how they benefit Norway, how they can be improved, 
being open to renegotiations. But having a firm agreement with the EU, which commits us and makes us 
part of the internal market, is positive” (Interview with a MP from the Progress Party, 22 October 2012). 
161 Author’s translation: “Avklare Norges forhold til EF og legge spørsmålet om medlemskap frem til 
folkeavstemning”. 
162 Author’s translation: “Ja til EF – Nei til Union”.  
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cornerstone.163 As summarised by an interviewee, “[i]n Norway, you will find some parties 
which are negative, saying that the EU goes too far in liberalising some sectors, […] that 
criticism you will not find in our party. Maybe you will have some issues regarding some 
of those directives, but in general, we are in favour of as much liberalisation as we can 
find”.164 
In a nutshell, while it has not developed an official stance other than following public 
opinion on the issue of EU membership, the Progress Party has been in favour of 
European integration mostly through the EEA and other existing agreements, thus 
advocating differentiated integration. Further European integration could be conceivable 
for the party, as long as this compels with its main objectives of individual freedom and 
globalisation. 
 
5.2.7. Party positions – summary 
Table 5.2 Norwegian parties’   positions   on participation in European 
integration (1990 – 2010), by selected policy area 
 EU EEA CFSP AFSJ EMU1 
H ++ ++ ++ ++ N/A 
A 
0 (before 1992) 
+ (1992-1994) 
0 (after 1994) ++ + + N/A 
Sp -- -- -- -- N/A 
V - + + 0 N/A 
KrF -- + + 0 N/A 
SV -- -- -- -- N/A 
FrP 0 ++ + + N/A 
1 Due to Norway’s status as non-member of the EU, the EMU issue has not been politically 
salient. 
++ = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 + = official party line in favour of co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
0 = neutral or no official position on participation in this area 
 - = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, internal divisions 
 -- = official party line opposed to co-operation in this area, no internal divisions 
 
                                                          
163 “On defence, I would not say that we would change something, because it is important to continue 
having relevant co-operation where we feel that it is natural. We have to look at it in the context of NATO. 
You should not have duplication on the structures. NATO remains the cornerstone. Ideally, I would like 
to see European co-operation on security within NATO” (Interview with a MP from the Progress Party, 
22 October 2012). 
164 Interview with a MP from the Progress Party, 22 October 2012. 
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Based on interview and manifesto analyses, Table 5.2 gives a general summary of the 
parties’ positions on European integration per policy area. Whereas the Conservative 
Party and, to a lower extent, the Labour Party (who was constrained by its electorate and 
internal divisions), have been the only supporters of membership, such table again 
demonstrates the importance of taking into account the concept of differentiated 
integration when analysing party preferences. Indeed, all party preferences regarding 
European co-operation vary depending on each policy areas. This is particularly the case 
for FrP, KrF and V, who have mixed views on integration. On the other hand, both Sp 
and SV have been strongly opposed to any forms of institutionalised co-operation with 
Brussels.  
The following section will now focus on the Norwegian executive power and will analyse 
all policy challenges governments had to face on European co-operation.  
 
5.3. Norwegian governments and their positions on 
European Integration (1989-2011) 
Between 1989 and 2009, six parliamentary elections were held and seven cabinets were 
formed. Table 5.3 details the general composition of these cabinets, from Syse (1990-
1991) to Stoltenberg II (2005-2013). The aim of this section is to analyse government 
policies on European integration. As in the two previous empirical chapters, this section 
mostly focuses on major policies that were strongly politicised and discussed in the 
Storting: the EEA agreement; EU membership; Schengen; and the Nordic Battle Group. 
As mentioned in section 5.1, participation in the EMU has never been salient in Norway, 




Table 5.3 List and characteristics of Norwegian cabinets, 1989 – 2013 
 Dates Cabinet Party/parties included Government 






share of MPs 
16 October 1989 – 3 November 1990 Syse Conservative Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Centre Party 
-14.23 37.6% 
3 November 1990 – 14 September 1993 Brundtland III  Labour Party -36 38.2% 
14 September 1993 – 17 October 1997 Brundtland IV 
/ Jagland 
Labour Party -19.7 40.6% 




17 March 2000 – 19 October 2001 Stoltenberg I Labour Party -18.1 39.4% 
19 October 2001 – 17 October 2005 Bondevik II Conservative Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Liberal Party 
-3.16 37.6% 
17 October 2005 – 20 October 2009 Stoltenberg II, 
first mandate 
Labour Party 
Socialist Left Party 
Centre Party 
-31.23 52.7%  




Socialist Left Party 
Centre Party 




5.3.1. Syse (16 October 1989 – 3 November 1990) 
Figure 5.2 Composition of the Storting following the 1989 election, per 
seats 
Source: Aardal (1990). 
In the context of a severe banking crisis that hit the country, parliamentary elections took 
place on 10 and 11 September 1989.165 Following this election, the Conservative Party, 
together with the Christian Democratic and Centre parties, created a non-socialist (or 
bourgeois) minority coalition with Jan Peder Syse (Conservative) as prime minister 
(Archer 2005). According to the government’s partisanship based on Kim and Fording’s 
index (-14.23), it is nevertheless considered as a leftist government, mostly because the 
manifestos of all three parties discussed left-wing values such as education, 
internationalism and expansion of social services, as a consequence of the banking crisis.  
Within the coalition agreement, and despite divergences on the issue European 
integration (especially coming from the Centre Party), the parties agreed to support 
negotiations on the future EEA agreement. Nevertheless, the agreement stated that “the 
government must base its relationship with the EC and adjustment policies to the EC 
                                                          
165 As the thesis focuses on the 1990-2010 period and as the European issue only became salient in the mid-
1990s, the 1989 general election and the context surrounding it are not considered. For an in-depth analysis, 


















Single Market on the grounds that Norway is not a member of the EC”,166 thus ruling out 
a potential application for full membership (Government of Norway 1989).  
When negotiations over the EEA agreement started on 20 June 1990, strong divisions 
within the coalition became visible, and October 1990 turned out to be a crucial month 
for the Syse cabinet. Indeed, the Centre Party defended the right for Norway to be 
exempted from EC regulations in order to favour Norwegian investors over foreign 
businessmen. This possibility was ruled out by the European Commission on the grounds 
that it would undermine the basis of the Single Market: “[f]or the Centre Party, a foreign 
take-over of Norwegian resources was also unacceptable and a betrayal of national 
policies going back to the early days of independence. The party resigned from the centre-
right government which then fell from office” (Archer 2005: 56).  
In sum, it was the Centre Party’s opposition to EEA negotiations that precipitated the fall 
of the Syse coalition, which remained in power for only 13 months. As outlined in section 
5.2.3, national sovereignty has constituted one of the core issues defended by the Centre 
Party, which still remains strongly opposed to any kind of institutionalised European co-
operation. This position conflicted with the one advocated by the Conservative Party and 
the Christian Democratic Party, as they both strongly supported EEA negotiations. These 
differing views were hardly reconcilable: Heidar (1995) rightly predicted that as long as 
the ‘Europe’ issue remained salient, it would be unlikely to see this traditional 
Conservative-Agrarian coalition rise again.  
 
5.3.2. Brundtland III (3 November 1990 – 14 September 1993) 
Following Syse’s resignation, a single party minority left-wing government led by former 
Labour Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland took over on 3 November 1990. Its main 
priority was to continue negotiations on the EEA, which eventually led to an agreement 
submitted to the Storting in October 1992. As such, the government avoided putting 
Norway’s application for an EU membership on the agenda as the Labour Party was 
strongly divided on this issue (Svåsand 1992; see also section 5.2.2). As the EEA implied 
a delegation of sovereignty to a supranational organisation, the Storting considered this 
                                                          
166 Author’s translation: “Regjeringen må basere sitt forhold til EF og tilpasningspolitikken til EFs indre 
marked på at Norge ikke er medlem av EF”. 
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agreement under paragraph 93 of the Constitution, requiring three-quarters of the votes 
in order to be adopted (Archer 1995). While a broad majority of the ruling Labour Party 
supported this agreement, the Conservatives and Christian Democrats also decided to 
bring their support. Conversely, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party opposed 
such agreement, considering that the EEA “involved infringements on Norwegian 
sovereignty” (Svåsand 1992: 487). In total, 79 per cent of MPs voted in favour of the EEA 
agreement: this constituted more than the required three-quarters majority. Table 5.4 
outlines the distribution of votes by political parties. In sum, the EEA agreement was 
largely seen as beneficial for Norway, with the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party 
being the only parties to unanimously reject it, in compliance with their attitudes towards 
European (and international) co-operation.  
Table 5.4 Storting’s  vote  on  the  European Economic Area agreement, per 
party 
 #MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions / 
absents 
A 63 61 2 0 
H 37 37 0 0 
Sp 11 0 11 0 
KrF 14 11 3 0 
SV 17 0 17 0 
Fp  22 20 2 0 
Other1 1 1 0 0 
TOTAL 165 131 34 0 
Source: Storting’s archives. 
1The party Future for Finnmark (Framtid for Finnmark), represented by 
John Anders Aune, was a protest party that only got elected for one term, 
between 1989 and 1993. 
 
As mentioned in section 5.1, Sweden and Finland’s applications for a full EU membership 
modified the political context surrounding the EEA, and the accession issue came back 
on the government’s agenda. Despite division amongst elites, the decision to apply for 
membership was adopted at the party level and Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland 
announced the intention of the government to submit such an application. This put the 
government in a difficult position: “[t]hroughout the year, the government party has been 
struggling with its anti-EC fraction as well as with the EC opposition in parliament (the 
Centre, Christian and Socialist Left parties)” (Svåsand (1993: 517). Furthermore, even 
though the Progress Party did not have an official position on this issue, its 1989 
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manifesto stipulated the willingness to hold a referendum on membership in order to 
clarify the country’s relationship with Brussels: this meant that the government’s 
proposition to submit Norway’s application for a membership would also be supported 
by this party. As such, the Brundtland III government was able to rely on a sufficient 
parliamentary majority on this issue, despite strong divisions within the Storting and 
within the ruling party. Table 5.5 analyses the parliamentary vote on submitting the 
application for an EU membership.  
Table 5.5 Storting’s   vote   on   submitting   an application for European 
Union membership, per party 
 # MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions 
A 63 48 15 0 
H 37 37 0 0 
Fp 22 17 0 5 
SV 17 0 17 0 
KrF 14 2 12 0 
Sp 11 0 11 0 
Other 1 0 0 1 
TOTAL 165 104 55 6 
  Source: Archer (2005);; Storting’s archives. 
This vote mostly reflects party positions on European membership. While the 
Conservative Party was unanimously in favour, the Centre and Socialist Left parties were 
the most reluctant. Even though most Christian Democratic MPs voted in favour of the 
EEA agreement, they opposed such application for an EU membership. The Progress 
Party agreed to put the issue to a referendum once an accession treaty was negotiated, but 
also counted the only 5 MPs who abstained. Finally, about 24 per cent of the Labour 
representatives voted against, illustrating the existing internal divisions over the issue of 
European integration.  
In sum, besides the influence of its Swedish and Finnish peers, the government’s decision 
to apply for an EU membership was also facilitated by the composition of the Storting. 
Indeed, with the support of H and Fp, the ruling Labour Party was able to overcome 




5.3.3. Brundtland IV and Jagland (14 September 1993 – 17 October 
1997) 
On 12-13 September 1993, a general election was held in Norway. The campaign 
surrounding this election was mostly centred on the application for an EU membership.167 
As developed throughout section 5.2, while the Conservative and Labour parties 
campaigned in favour of joining the Union, the Centre, Christian Democratic, Liberal and 
Socialist Left parties were strongly against. The Progress Party, on the other hand, opted 
for a ‘yes to the EC – no to the Union’ position, which was considered as unclear due to 
the recent ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.   
Figure 5.3 Composition of the Storting following the 1993 election, per 
seats 
Source: Heidar (1994). 
The election results were particularly remarkable for the Centre Party with a gain of 21 
seats compared to 1989. As a result, Sp became the second largest party in parliament for 
the first time of its history. The Labour Party, on the other hand, comforted its status as 
the largest party by gaining 3 additional seats.168 Conversely, the Progress Party, the 
                                                          
167 Two surveys analysed by Aardal (1994) show that the European Union was considered as the most 
important issue at the 1993 elections: 65 per cent of the voters considered that this issue was their main 
concern. 
168 Despite internal divisions on the EU issue, the Labour Party’s victory in the 1993 elections can be 
explained by two main reasons: the issue of ‘governability’ of the country played in their favour, and they 
were successful in neutralising the EU debate by convincing “many anti-EU voters that the election would 

















Conservative Party and the Socialist Left Party respectively lost 12, 9 and 4 seats. The 
Christian Democratic Party remained quite stable, gaining one additional seat.  
Post-election analyses show that the ‘Europe’ issue disrupted the party system: the turnout 
was relatively low for Norwegian standards (75.8 per cent) and electoral volatility 
increased amongst voters. As such, it appears that the membership issue was perceived as 
more important than party adherence (Aardal 1994; Heidar 1994; Valen 1994). Following 
this election, a new minority leftist Labour government, Brundtland IV, was formed on 
14 September 1993. This new cabinet was not seriously challenged in the Storting, as no 
clear government alternatives were considered since the collapse of the Syse coalition 
(Heidar 1994; Valen 1994).  
While negotiations with Brussels were ongoing, domestic discussions and divisions over 
the application for EU membership arose in October 1993, with the creation of the ‘Social 
Democrats against EU’ group within the Labour Party which was tolerated by its 
leadership, much like within its Swedish counterpart in a similar context (see section 
4.3.3). In order to avoid losing voters linked to this anti-EU movement, the Brundtland 
IV administration “had to be careful about joining the front of free-marketeers at the right 
wing of Norwegian politics” (Heidar 1995: 446). This delicate political situation 
undoubtedly affected the pro-EU camp. 52.2 per cent of the Norwegian electorate 
eventually rejected membership on 27-28 November 1994. The referendum had the 
highest turnout in Norway’s history (89 per cent), illustrating that the issue was sensitive 
enough to mobilise voters.169  
In the aftermath of the referendum, the Brundtland IV government remained in power, 
as the Prime Minister previously made it clear that this issue would not constitute a vote 
of confidence (Archer 2005). Throughout the rest of the mandate, the debate on 
European integration remained salient, as the government’s strategy was to co-operate 
with the European Union as closely as possible while remaining outside the institution as 
such. This policy was criticised by the anti-EU parties and especially by the Centre Party, 
who interpreted the referendum result as a sign of a popular rejection of the European 
project (Heidar 1996).  
                                                          
169 For a full analysis of the referendum, see e.g. Bjørklund (1996); Pettersen et al. (1996). 
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On 23 October 1996, Brundtland stepped down as Prime Minister, leaving this position 
to Labour Party Leader Thorbjørn Jagland who formed a cabinet with minor changes in 
its composition (Heidar 1997). In fact, this change did not affect the nature or the political 
line followed by the government. The future of European integration in Norway remained 
on top of its agenda, as discussions over the Schengen agreement and over the future of 
the CFSP were to take place. 
The ratification of the Schengen agreement was one of the top priorities of both 
Brundtland IV and Jagland governments. One the one hand, this agreement was 
supported by a majority consisting of the Labour, the Conservative and the Progress 
parties, in the name of safeguarding Nordic collaboration and in order to enhance 
international police co-operation, “as Norway has suffered from the general increase in 
organized international crime during the 1990s” (Archer 2005: 158). On the other, the 
Centre, Socialist Left and Christian Democratic parties opposed this agreement on the 
grounds that it would entail a loss of sovereignty, and would open Norwegian borders to 
“international criminals” (ibid.). As such and in contrast to the domestic political situation 
in Finland and Sweden, there was a significant opposition to Norway’s participation in 
this policy. After the government signed an agreement with the Schengen member states 
on 19 December 1996, the ratification of the Schengen Agreement was approved by the 
Storting on 9 June 1997, with 75 votes in favour (Labour Party, Conservative Party and 
Progress Party) and 50 against (Centre Party, Christian Democratic Party, Socialist Left 
Party, Liberal Party and Red Electoral Alliance). However, the Intergovernmental 
Conference that took place in Amsterdam on 16-17 June 1997 invalidated the vote, as it 
was decided that Schengen would be incorporated into the revised EU treaty, implying a 
renegotiation of the agreement with Norway (Archer 2001). This was to take place under 
the next parliamentary term, as elections were to be held in October 1997 (see next 
section). 
The issues of security and defence were also raised under the Brundtland IV and Jagland 
governments. Following the EU referendum, the Labour government decided to 
strengthen Norway’s relationship with NATO through the Western European Union, 
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which was the government’s priority in terms of foreign and security policy.170 At the end 
of Jagland’s mandate (from mid-1997 onwards), major changes in the fields of foreign 
and security policy were expected, as it appeared clear that the WEU was about to be 
assimilated by the European Union following the Amsterdam Intergovernmental 
Conference. These international developments were seen as controversial for the Labour 
government, as there were strong internal divisions over the future of Norway’s 
relationship with the Union. Furthermore, from 1993 onwards, all Labour Party 
manifestos have showed some signs of reluctance regarding developments on the CFSP, 
as the party considers that NATO should remain the cornerstone in terms of foreign and 
security policy, through participation in an independent WEU. Already in mid-1996, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence Jørgen Kosmo stated that “[f]rom a Norwegian point of 
view it is desirable that the WEU should remain an independent organization. This means 
that the WEU would in the future continue to have more or less equal links with the EU 
and NATO. […] Norway would wish to see clarification on the status of associate 
members” (quoted in Archer 2005: 143). In sum, no major changes took place under 
Brundtland and Jagland’s administrations in the field of foreign and security policy: 
international co-operation with NATO through the WEU remained the priority, but 
discussions over a potential assimilation of the WEU into the EU was problematic for 
Norway.  
 
5.3.4. Bondevik I (17 October 1997 – 17 March 2000) 
A general election was held on 15 September 1997. The ‘Europe’ issue remained salient 
in terms of coalition building: indeed, since the collapse of the Syse government, a 
bourgeois alliance consisting of the Centre and Conservative parties was not conceivable, 
reinforcing the possibility of renewing a single party minority government led by Jagland. 
Nevertheless, and for the first time in Norway’s political history, a brand new government 
alternative was proposed during the election campaign by the Christian Democratic Party 
leader, Kjell Magne Bondevik. This alternative consisted of a coalition between three non-
                                                          
170 The Western European Union was not integrated to the European Union at that time, and operated as 
an independent international organisation. Until the Franco-British St Malo summit in 1998 and EU 
summits which took place in 1999, there was no plan to develop a Common Security and Defence Policy 
(see Rieker 2006; on the WEU, its role and its relationship with Norway throughout the 1990s, see e.g. 
Eliassen 1998; Archer 2005). 
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socialist parties: KrF, Sp and V. All three parties shared the same negative views on the 
issue of EU membership, but are split on participation in the European integration 
process, depending on the policy area (see Table 5.2). While observers did not consider 
such alternative as viable because of their divergences on integration (see e.g. Valen 1998), 
opinion polls progressively suggested that the Labour Party would lose seats, thus 
threatening the renewal of Jagland’s cabinet.  
Figure 8.4 Composition of the Storting following the 1997 election, per 
seats 
Source: Narud (1998). 
Despite the Centre Party losing two thirds of its seats in the Storting171 (-22 compared to 
1993) and the Conservatives (-5) failing to compete against the Progress Party (+15), the 
Labour Party (-2) is considered as the symbolic loser of the 1997 election. Indeed, during 
the election campaign, Prime Minister Jagland declared that his government would resign 
should his party receive fewer votes than in the 1993 elections (Narud 1998). This paved 
the way for Bondevik’s “centrist mini-coalition” (Narud 1999: 485), despite its small 
amount of parliamentary seats (42 out of 165, or 25.5 per cent of MPs). The Bondevik I 
cabinet was formed on 17 October 1997, one month after the elections. The government 
subsequently sought parliamentary co-operation with the Conservative and Progress 
parties, which gave their support on most domestic issues (ibid.).  
                                                          
171 According to Valen (1998), this major defeat is due to the fact that the 1993 elections were centred on 



















As stated above, despite all being opposed to an EU membership, the parties composing 
this government coalition had different views on European integration, from the ‘pro-
EEA’ Christian Democratic Party to the ‘anti-EU’ Centre Party. Nevertheless, the 
coalition agreement seemed to tend towards KrF’s preferences on integration: the 
government adopted a pro-EEA vision, with an “independent, national assessment of the 
legislation that derives from the EEA Agreement” (Government of Norway 1997), and 
NATO was reaffirmed as the cornerstone in terms of foreign and security policy. On 
participation in the AFSJ, the cabinet took account of the previous vote on Schengen and 
mentioned its willingness to evaluate the constitutional aspects of Norway’s co-operation 
in this agreement, despite the government’s reluctance:  
The Government notes that there is a majority in the Storting in favour of 
negotiations concerning Norway's continued association with the Schengen 
co-operation. The Government will work to safeguard Norwegian interests, 
for example, by retaining the Nordic Passport Union, an issue in which 
Denmark's response will also be significant. An evaluation is now being made 
of the constitutional questions connected with a new Schengen agreement 
(ibid.). 
With the help of the Nordic EU member states, an agreement on ‘Schengen II’ was 
reached in 1998 (Kux and Sverdrup 2000) and submitted to the Storting on 26 April 1999 
(see Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6 Storting’s  vote  on participation in the Schengen area, per party 
 # MPs #Yes #No #Abstentions / 
Absents 
A 65 39 0 26 
H 23 12 0 11 
Fp 25 16 0 9 
SV 9 0 7 2 
KrF 25 14 2 9 
Sp 11 0 9 2 
V 6 4 0 2 
Other 1 0 1 0 
TOTAL 165 85 19 61 
  Source: Storting’s archives. 
Interestingly enough, two governing parties who voted against ‘Schengen I’ in 1997 (i.e. 
the Christian Democrats and the Liberals) joined the Labour, the Conservatives and the 
Progress Party to vote in favour of the new agreement. Those two parties are also the 
ones who did not have an official stance on the Schengen agreement in their manifestos 
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(see Table 5.2). Two main reasons can explain this. First, this is due to the fact that the 
new agreement did not imply a loss of national sovereignty and that Norway could only 
be bound by laws accepted by national authorities (Archer 2005). As a result, both KrF 
and V decided to support ‘Schengen II’. Conversely, the Centre Party remained firm on 
the agreement and considered it as unacceptable, together with the Socialist Left Party. 
Second and more importantly within the framework of this analysis, a majority of MPs in 
the opposition were in favour of participating in the Schengen area, including parties 
which supported the sitting government (i.e. the Conservative and Progress parties). As 
mentioned by an interviewee from the Christian Democratic Party, “we needed co-
operation on security and justice and fighting crime, and that is what Schengen is all about. 
[…] Because of the political situation, we did not see many alternatives but to accept it” 
(see also section 5.2.5).172 ‘Accepting’ participation in the Schengen area is thus also 
explained by the fact that the minority government was constrained by its pro-Schengen 
parliamentary partners. In contrast to the Syse cabinet experience, the Centre Party’s 
opposition to this policy did not threaten the existence of Bondevik I, as it was tolerated 
by its coalition partners as well as other parties of the opposition.  
At times when the CFSP was under construction, the Norwegian government also had to 
face major changes and shape the evolution of its relationship with the European Union 
in this policy area. Until 1999, Norway’s relationship with the EU foreign and security 
policy was rather loose, as NATO and the independent WEU were seen as the country’s 
priorities (Sjursen 1999). At the dawning of the new century, Foreign Minister Knut 
Vollebæk suggested that Norway should keep on working in close co-operation with the 
EU by becoming an associate member of the new Common Security and Defence Policy 
(Græger 2005; Rieker 2006). This request was nevertheless rejected by the European 
Union, which did not want to undermine its decision-making system. Negotiations on 
Norway’s potential participation in the CFSP went on until the resignation of Bondevik I 
on 17 March 2000, following debates over the construction of gas-fired power plants and 
a vote of confidence (Aalberg 2001). 
 
                                                          
172 Interview with a policy adviser from the Christian Democratic Party, 17 July 2013. 
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5.3.5. Stoltenberg I (17 March 2000 – 19 October 2001) 
Following the resignation of the Bondevik I cabinet, a new single party minority leftist 
government led by Labour Party Leader Jens Stoltenberg took over. In his inaugural 
address to the Storting, the new Prime Minister stated that while European integration 
was on the threshold of major changes, the government would base Norway’s co-
operation with the European Union on existing agreements (Government of Norway 
2000). As such, Stoltenberg I did not bring major changes to the previous government’s 
policy on European integration. Negotiations on foreign and security issues were on-
going, and close co-operation through NATO was still privileged. As mentioned by 
Defence Minister Bjørn Tore Godal, “independent of the question of Norwegian EU 
membership, it is nevertheless in Norway’s interest that NATO still appears as the primary 
forum for Western security and defence policy co-operation” (quoted in Græger 2005: 
86). Attempts were made to revitalise the EU membership issue by some ministers and/or 
members of the Labour Party, especially through Foreign Minister (and former Prime 
Minister) Thorbjørn Jagland, who stated that as an EU-outsider, Norway could not 
influence institutional developments e.g. in terms of foreign and security policy. 
Nevertheless, these attempts were vain as a majority of political parties represented in the 
Storting, including the Progress Party, were opposed to reopening this debate (Aalberg 
2001). 
 
5.3.6. Bondevik II (19 October 2001 – 17 October 2005) 
Unlike in 1989, 1993 and (to a lesser extent) 1997, European co-operation was not 
considered as a ‘hot topic’ during the 2001 national election campaign: instead, domestic 




Figure 5.5 Composition of the Storting following the 2001 election, per 
seats 
Source: Aalberg (2002). 
The election results led to an unprecedented situation in Norway’s political landscape: the 
Labour Party suffered major losses, getting its lowest electoral score since 1924 (43 seats, 
-22 compared to 1997), and the former centrist coalition (KrF, Sp and V) was also 
discredited, leading former Prime Minister Bondevik to declare this alliance dead on the 
night of the election. The two winners of this election were the Conservative Party, 
gaining a total of 38 seats (+15), and the Socialist Left Party, gaining 23 seats (+14). 
Following speculations on a one-party Conservative government, this new situation led 
to the creation of a new type of minority centrist coalition government, Bondevik II and 
nicknamed ‘co-operation government’, consisting of the Christian Democrats, the 
Conservatives and the Liberals, with the support of the Progress Party in the opposition 
(Aalberg 2002). Thus, the main difference with Bondevik I was that the anti-EU Centre 
Party was replaced by the pro-EU Conservative Party. As a result, the government was 
composed of parties having different positions over the membership issue. In order to avoid 
a scenario as known in 1990 with the Syse government, the Sem Declaration setting up 
the 2001-2005 government programme stated that “Norway’s affiliation with the EU 
builds on the EEA agreement. The EEA agreement must be effectively exploited and be 
adapted in accordance with the new needs” (quoted and translated in Fossum 2010: 78). 
This effectively corresponded to a ‘suicide clause’ over the EU membership issue, as it 


















to the Conservatives. Indeed, “[f]or the Conservatives, application for EU membership is 
more important than cabinet office” (Aalberg 2002: 1049). This clause thus aimed at 
avoiding a potential government’s resignation over this issue. The Sem Declaration also 
clarified the government’s position in other EU policy areas, which did not differ from 
the former parliamentary term. Accordingly, the government advocated close co-
operation with the European institutions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
through the Schengen agreement, and close contacts on the developments of the CFSP.  
No major issues related to Norway’s relationship with the European Union were raised 
during the first years of Bondevik II. Two reasons can be invoked in order to explain this: 
the fact that the Sem Declaration was seen as a compromise to ensure the government’s 
stability, and the lack of developments at the European level to deepen Norway’s 
integration due to the introduction of the Euro and preparations for the 2004 ‘big bang 
enlargement’. Nevertheless, at the end of 2004, the agreement on the concept of EU 
Battle Groups became highly politicised at the national level and led to parliamentary 
discussions following a demand from the opposition (Sjursen 2012). On this matter, 
Norwegian Defence Minister Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative), known for her pro-
NATO policies, stated that it would be in Norway’s interest to participate in the European 
defence policy through “association to the EU Battle Group concept”, because of “a 
progression in the defence and security policy co-operation in the EU which puts all doubt 
aside with regard to the realisation of EU ambitions” (quoted in Græger 2005: 95). This 
was a turning point in the government’s attitude towards European integration (and more 
especially on participation in the CFSP), as NATO had always been considered as the 
cornerstone in terms of foreign and security policy. All parties in the ‘co-operation 
government’ shared this position. In the Storting, the two anti-integrationist parties, the 
Centre and the Socialist Left, were strongly opposed to participation in such policy. There 
were also signs of reluctance amongst members of the Labour and Progress parties. 
Following negotiations with the European institutions, the majority of the parties 
represented in the Storting decided to follow the government’s position. Unlike other 
major EU-related issues such as the EEA, the application for EU membership and 
participation in the Schengen area, no parliamentary vote was held on the ratification of 
the EUBG concept (Sjursen 2012). Most parties considered that participation in this 
policy did not constitute a challenge to the Norwegian Constitution and national 
sovereignty. Furthermore, contributing to such Battle Groups corresponded to the ruling 
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parties’ visions on co-operation in terms of foreign and security policy, despite this 
decision coming as a surprise to some observers (Græger 2005). The Memorandum […] 
concerning the principles for the establishment and operation of a multinational battle group to be made 
available to the European Union was then ratified on 17 May 2005. 
 
5.3.7. Stoltenberg II (17 October 2005 – 16 October 2013) 
5.3.7.1. First mandate (2005 – 2009) 
A new general election was held on 12 September 2005. Observers determined that an 
‘informal’ election campaign had started in the wake of the 2001 election (Aalberg and 
Brekken 2006). This is due to three main reasons. First, the Labour Party had experienced 
its worst result for almost eighty years, and was eager to come back to power. Second, the 
Centre Party was relegated to the opposition following the end of the ‘centrist coalition’ 
as claimed by Bondevik. Finally, the Socialist Left Party, who experienced its best results 
ever in 2001, wanted to improve its political influence throughout the parliamentary term. 
In addition, reports mentioned that the Labour Party was considering coming back to 
power within a majority coalition with the two aforementioned parties in a large ‘red-
green’ alliance, in order to improve government stability (ibid.). Such a coalition did not 
have any precedents in Norway, and uncertainties over its position on the issue of 
European integration could be raised, as both the Socialist Left and the Centre parties 
were strongly opposed to any forms of formal integration, unlike the Labour Party. 
The main themes raised during the ‘formal’ election campaign were similar to the ones 
raised in 2001: education, taxes and pensions. The EU issue remained non-salient, despite 
the recent implementation of the EU Battle Group. Nevertheless, the spectrum of the 
Syse coalition was still present to the extent that any coalition involving the Conservatives 




Figure 5.6 Composition of the Storting following the 2005 elections, per 
seats 
Source: Aalberg and Brekken (2006). 
Two parties won this general election: the Labour Party, gaining a total of 61 seats (+18 
compared to 2001), and the Progress Party with 38 seats (+12). The Liberal Party (+8) 
was the only ruling party to gain seats in this election, whereas the Conservative Party (-
15) and the Christian Democratic Party (-11) made significant losses. Finally, the Socialist 
Left Party lost 8 seats. As leader of the largest party represented in the Storting, Jens 
Stoltenberg took the initiative to create a majority left-wing coalition government with Sp 
and SV, contrasting with the former single party minority Labour governments which 
predominated throughout the period analysed.  
As previously mentioned, the parties’ positions on European integration diverged. In 
order to bring stability as it was the case for the Bondevik II coalition, the Soria Moria 
Declaration, constituting the basis for the Stoltenberg II government, stated that the 
coalition would not apply for a Norwegian EU membership, while previous post-1994 
government programmes avoided mentioning this issue. Nevertheless, and despite Sp and 
SV’s stance on European co-operation, the Declaration also mentioned that Stoltenberg 
II will “pursue a more active European policy (implicitly criticizing its predecessor for 
passivity). The Declaration likewise noted that the government should ensure open debate 
on EEA and EU issues, including greater parliamentary […] involvement” (Fossum 2010: 


















membership issue, the Declaration stated the importance for Norway to play a dynamic 
role in European co-operation, mostly through the EEA and other existing agreements. 
As such, the Labour Party’s position mostly shaped the content of the government 
programme in terms of European integration, while the anti-integration preferences of 
the Centre and Socialist Left parties did not prevail, most likely because of their weak 
amount of parliamentary seats. It can thus be interpreted that the composition of the 
government mostly affected the government’s position on European integration, due to 
the strong political weight of the Labour Party (61 seats) compared to its coalition partners 
(26 seats). 
During this mandate, few issues related to European co-operation were raised in the 
Storting. However, Norway’s participation in the Nordic Battle Group for the first 
semester of 2008 led to parliamentary debates but also to internal divisions within the 
government. Indeed, while such policy was not mentioned in the government 
programme, it was planned that the NBG would be ready to be deployed for this period. 
Within the government, the Labour Party strongly supported participation in such policy, 
as stated by Labour Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen: “[t]hese forces have 
also become a central part of Nordic security and defence co-operation, and are thus well-
suited for further developing this collaboration and adapting it to new needs. In this 
connection, our contribution is important because it means involving Norwegian defence 
in practical co-operation with our Nordic neighbours” (quoted and translated in Sjursen 
2012: 11). In other words, Norwegian participation in the NBG was seen by the Labour 
Party as a mean to strengthen Nordic co-operation. Somewhat surprisingly, the anti-
integrationist Centre Party shared this opinion:  
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We [the Centre Party, author’s note] consider that the operational unit to 
which we now agree is based on international law. It should be based on a 
clear UN mandate. The Parliament must be consulted, and the Government 
should make the decision. In other words: an adequate process. I believe that 
this [participation in the Nordic Battle Group, author’s note] follows the 
Nordic track, an active European policy, the NATO track and the UN-track 
and goes in the right direction (Samuelsen 2007).173  
As such, this switch in the Centre Party’s position on participation in the NBG can be 
explained by its interpretation of this policy: it is based on international law. As such, this 
policy does not contradict the main party stance on European co-operation. Nevertheless, 
Sp’s 2005 manifesto opposed participation in the NBG, which thus contradicted its stance 
as coalition member. As far as the Socialist Left Party is concerned, its representatives 
showed signs of reluctance towards Norway’s participation in this policy: “[…] the last 
time we debated on this issue in the previous parliamentary term, SV expressed scepticism 
to join the Nordic Battle Group under the EU. We are not part of the EU, so why did 
sneak in and get a foot in the door?” (Jacobsen 2007).174 Nevertheless, the party welcomed 
positive developments regarding Norway’s participation in peacekeeping operations, and 
did not openly oppose the country’s contribution in the NBG. Unlike in Finland and 
Sweden, participation in the NBG was not subject to a parliamentary vote.  
 
5.3.7.2. Second mandate (2009 – 2013) 
Following a campaign in which the global financial crisis and government alternatives 
constituted key issues, a new general election was held on 14 September 2009. This 
election was considered as an extremely close race where two blocs campaigned against 
each other: on the one hand, the existing red-green coalition was renewed and the three 
parties decided to campaign on a broad common platform; on the other, the four centre-
right opposition parties, through the impulsion of Conservative Party Leader Erna 
Solberg, wanted to promote a government alternative, but the reluctance of both Christian 
                                                          
173 Author’s translation: “Den operative enheten som vi nå er enige om, oppfatter jeg dit hen at dens aktivitet 
er basert på folkeretten. Den skal være basert på et klart FN-mandat. Stortinget skal konsulteres, og 
Regjeringen skal ta en beslutning. Med andre ord: en betryggende prosess. Jeg føler at dette er å følge det 
nordiske sporet, en aktiv europapolitikk, NATO-sporet og FN-sporet videre i en positiv retning”. 
174 Author’s translation: “Viss representantane hugsar sist vi hadde debatt om dette i førre stortingsperiode, 
blei det uttrykt skepsis frå oss i SV om å delta i Nordic Battle Group under EU. Vi er jo ikkje med i EU, så 
korfor skal vi snike oss med og få ein fot innanfor?”. 
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Democratic and Liberal parties to include the populist right Progress Party affected the 
credibility of such alternative (Aalberg 2010; Allern 2010). 
 
Figure 5.7 Composition of the Storting following the 2009 election, per 
seats 
 
Source: Aalberg (2010). 
Broadly speaking, the 2009 election results led to a situation similar to the Swedish 2006 
general election (discussed in section 4.3.5.1). The Stoltenberg II coalition eventually kept 
a slight majority of parliamentary seats with 86 seats out of 165 (-1 compared to 2005), 
despite substantial gains made by the Conservative Party (30 seats, +7) and the Progress 
Party (+3). The Liberal Party suffered major losses (2 seats, -8), while the Christian 
Democratic Party remained quite stable, losing one seat (10).  
As a result, the Stoltenberg II government was renewed and formally appointed on 20 
October 2009. As mentioned by Aalberg (2010: 1115), “[n]ot since the election in 1969 
has a Norwegian majority cabinet been re-elected”. Ministerial posts were reallocated 
according to the election results: the Labour Party got 12 ministries (+2 compared to the 
previous mandate), the Socialist Left Party 4 (-1) and the Centre Party retained its 4 
ministries. Overall, these changes did not affect the government’s ideology, which 
remained leftist (-29.98 on Kim and Fording’s index of government partisanship). The 


















one adopted four years earlier. On the issue of European integration, the Declaration 
stated, e.g., that the government would not apply for an EU membership, but would 
conduct an active European policy; appoint a public research-based committee to evaluate 
the EEA agreement and raise awareness with regards to its implications on the Norwegian 
society;175 and build further on the Schengen co-operation (Government of Norway 
2010).  
As mentioned in the two previous empirical chapters, the states participating in the 
Nordic Battle Group were expected to place their troops in high readiness during the first 
semester of 2011. Even though this policy was not implicitly mentioned in the Soria Moria 
II Declaration, it stated that the Stoltenberg II government would “strengthen […] 
Nordic co-operation where foreign policy and security policy are concerned” (ibid.) as 
well as continue collaboration with the European Union in the area of defence and 
security policy. Within this context, Norway’s participation in the NBG was not debated 
in the Storting as it was the case in 2007: instead, the issue was only briefly mentioned 
when MPs voted on the state’s budget for the year 2011 on 5 October 2010. As such, 
there is no data available on the parties’ positions on participation in the NBG for the 
first semester of 2011. Nevertheless, it seems conceivable to stress that the situation did 
not differ from 2007. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of Norway’s relationship with the 
European Union and once again showed the relevance of analysing parties’ and 
governments’ positions through the perspective of differentiated integration. Indeed, 
besides the traditional membership/non-membership dichotomy, the main political 
actors have had different views on European co-operation depending on policy areas. 
Accordingly, parties opposed to joining the EU can be in favour of participation in the 
EEA (e.g. the Christian Democratic Party and the Progress Party), while others can be 
opposed to such involvement (e.g. the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party). This 
                                                          
175 Such evaluation was published in 2012 and is commonly referred to as the “911 report”, as it consists of 
911 pages. See Norges offentlige utredninger (2012). 
177 
 
final section highlights the main conclusions that can be drawn from Norway’s empirical 
analysis. 
First, in a country with a strong tradition of minority governments, the composition of 
parliament affected government positions on European integration, which would confirm the first 
hypothesis explored in this study. Indeed, as demonstrated throughout section 5.3, 
governments were in favour of deepening Norway’s relationship with the European 
Union at times when the Storting was composed of a majority of pro-integrationist 
political parties. Conversely, a government that was not sure of having enough parliamentary support 
over a splitting EU-related issue would shape its position accordingly. This has been demonstrated 
on two occasions: under Bondevik I, when the coalition government was mostly opposed 
to the Schengen agreement but acknowledged that a majority of MPs voted in favour 
during the previous parliamentary term; and under Stoltenberg I, when tentative attempts 
were made by some ministers to reactivate the membership issue. Accordingly, the role 
of parliament in shaping government positions on European integration cannot be 
underestimated. 
Second, in most cases, the composition of government affected its position on European integration (as 
stated in hypothesis 2), while the type of cabinet did not seem to play a role (in contrast to 
hypotheses 3 and 4). Throughout the period analysed, Norway experienced three different 
types of government: minority one-party government; minority coalition government; and 
majority coalition government. Under the three Labour-led single party minority 
governments, the European policies mostly reflected the official party’s attitudes towards 
European integration: pro-membership (Brundtland III and IV) and, following the 
outcome of the 1994 referendum, pro-integration through existing agreements and 
negotiations over closer co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy (Jagland 
and Stoltenberg I). The three minority coalition governments (Syse, Bondevik I and II), 
as well as the only majority coalition government (Stoltenberg II), took somewhat milder 
positions towards European integration, due to strong opposing views between parties 
within the coalitions. In those cases, either the government opted for a status quo, basing 
Norway’s relationship with the EU on existing agreements (Bondevik II and Stoltenberg 
II), or the prevailing pro-integrationist position within the coalition was retained (Syse). 
The Bondevik I government constitutes a noteworthy exception: while all three parties in 
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the coalition were initially against participating in the Schengen area, the Christian 
Democrats and the Liberals switched their position and voted in favour of this agreement.  
Third, it appears that the government’s ideology in Norway did not play a role in influencing its stance 
on European co-operation. Between 1990 and 2010, it has been demonstrated that 
government ideology varied from being centrist (Bondevik I and II) to leftist, even for 
the Syse coalition which was exclusively composed of centre-right parties. In contrast to 
hypothesis 5 (i.e. government support for European integration will decline as government move further 
to either left of right), governments with a strong leftist value on Kim and Fording’s index of 
partisanship still advocated closer co-operation with the European Union. The most 
striking example is Brundtland III’s decision to apply for EU membership. As such, non-
centrist governments were still supportive of European integration, even following the 
electorate’s decision to reject membership in 1994.  
In order to determine the validity of the hypotheses explored in this study, the following 







Chapter 6. Comparative analysis 
 
Party and government support for European co-operation does indeed differ between 
the Nordic states. While a broad majority of the Finnish political elites have supported 
most developments at the European level as well as a full Finnish participation in all EU 
policies, the Swedish experience has rather diverged with its strong tradition of ‘federo-
scepticism’ and with an equally strong reluctance to participate in the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. In Norway, conversely, the electorate’s ‘No’ to EU 
membership and the absence of a broad pro-European consensus amongst elites led to 
contrasting positions taken up by governments, which have mostly defended the current 
status quo as an ‘inner outsider’.  
It should be borne in mind that certain contextual factors, which have been outlined in 
each empirical chapter, have also played important roles in shaping such. Yet, it has been 
demonstrated that the domestic political variables analysed in this study should not be 
downplayed. Indeed, the composition of parliament, the composition of government and, 
to a lesser extent, of the type of government have all played a role in explaining why 
governments have supported further integration or differentiation. Government ideology, 
however, did not seem to influence such positions. 
With regards to the aforementioned domestic variables, the main objective of this chapter 
is to offer a brief comparative analysis of the findings from the empirical chapters. In 
addition to assessing the relevance of these variables (across countries and policy areas), 
this summary will pave the way for the more general conclusions of the thesis. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first consists of an analysis of party 
positions on European integration, divided by party family. The second section highlights 
the comparative elements of government positions on European integration per policy 
area. And finally, the third section summarises these comparative findings in relation to 




6.1. Comparative analysis of party positions on Europe 
 
In Chapter 1, it was established that party systems in the Nordic states are relatively 
similar, with seven to eight well-established party families in place since the early 1990s 
(see Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1 List of well-established political parties in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway, per party family  
 
 Finland Sweden Norway 
Conservative 
National Coalition 








Party (SAP) Labour Party (A) 












Liberal People's Party 
(FpL) Liberal Party (V) 
Socialist Left Left Alliance (VAS) Left Party (Vp) 




(VIHR) Green Party (MdG) N/A 
Populist Right Finns Party (PS) N/A Progress Party (Fp) 
 
Despite these similarities, one important difference can be drawn between Finland, and 
Sweden and Norway – the relevance of bloc politics. For the latter two, political ideology 
has historically played a role in shaping government coalitions, while in Finland it has 
been marked by so-called ‘rainbow governments’ consisting of parties from the left and 
the right of the political spectrum.  
The three empirical chapters have also demonstrated that with the exception of the 
conservative party family, parties’ belonging or connection to a specific party family does 
not appear to influence their positions on Europe. As a result, it seems that parties shape 
their attitudes towards integration depending on the domestic political context, and do 
not share a common Nordic position on European co-operation as such. In other words, 
assumptions according to which Nordic co-operation between ideologically similar 
parties have come to affect their views on Europe can thus be ruled out.  
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This section will briefly compare party positions on European co-operation in Finland, 
Sweden and Norway. As such, it will be shown that even though the Nordic party systems 
are described as relatively similar in the literature, their experience in terms of party 
attitudes towards European integration has diverged. As these have then had a direct 
influence on subsequent governments’ programmes, it is thus relevant to establish parties’ 




In all three cases, conservative parties share similar positions in terms of support for 
further European integration; they strongly support full membership and believe that their 
respective country should belong to the ‘inner core’ of the European Union. As such, 
differentiated integration is not seen as an option or as viable alternative. This position is 
also shared by a majority of the party members and by the MPs. Unlike the other party 
families, the ‘EU issue’ does not lead to strong internal divisions. As a whole, the 
conservative parties can be considered as the only pro-European party family in Finland, 
Sweden and Norway.176  
 
Social Democratic parties 
 
In contrast to their conservative peers, the social democrats do not share any similar views 
on European co-operation. In Finland, e.g., membership and further integration – in all 
policy areas – have been perceived to be largely positive, amongst the party elites as well 
as amongst the grass-roots. The only signs of reluctance were related to developments of 
a strong European foreign and security policy. Yet, the Finnish SDP has not advocated 
for differentiated integration to apply to Finland. In Sweden and Norway, however, the 
situation is different. Both parties have suffered from strong internal divisions over the 
European ‘issue’, especially regarding the question of membership and Sweden’s 
participation in the third stage of the EMU. Signs of Euroscepticism are perceptible on 
several levels; amongst the members, the elites, the MPs and amongst the appointed 
ministers. As a consequence but in contrast to Finland, reaching a strong consensus on 
                                                          
176 However, these findings do not apply to all Nordic countries: in Iceland, the conservative Independence 
Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) in strongly opposed to EU membership but supports the EEA agreement.  
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Europe within these two parties is and has been challenging. Due to the political weight 
of the social democratic parties in these countries, such divisions have had an impact on 




Like the social democratic party family, the Nordic Centre parties have also been divided 
and do not share a common position on Europe. In Norway, Sp is strongly opposed to 
any kind of institutionalised relations with Brussels. However, in Finland and Sweden, 
these parties suffered from significant internal divisions on the issue. Furthermore, their 
leaderships have often promoted differentiated integration by advocating membership 
but rejecting participation in some highly politicised policy areas, especially the EMU and 
developments in the CFSP.  
 
Christian Democratic parties 
 
The three Christian Democratic parties also diverge in their views on Europe, even 
though they do not suffer from any similar types of internal tensions. In Finland, 
alongside the Finns Party, KD is considered to be the most well-established party that 
opposes participation in several policy areas, but without rejecting membership per se. 
The party is particularly critical of participation in the EMU and in the CFSP. In Sweden, 
however, KDS campaigned in favour of membership in the early 1990s and has supported 
full participation in all policy areas since 2000. Finally, the Norwegian KrF has adopted a 
much more pragmatic position. The party has always opposed membership but at the 
same time advocated for close co-operation with Brussels on several areas where 
interdependence prevails, such as justice and peacekeeping operations. As such, KrF 
wants Norway to belong to the ‘inner periphery’ of the Union, thus defending the current 







Regardless of having a historical link to pro-European, conservative parties, the Nordic 
liberal party family does not share a common position on Europe. While the Liberal 
People’s Party of Sweden, together with the Swedish People’s Party of Finland, are 
strongly pro-integrationist, this is not the case for their Norwegian counterpart, who has 
conversely advocated for a closer relationship with the Union in interdependent policy 
areas while still remaining in its ‘inner periphery’.  
 
Socialist Left parties 
 
As successors from the former communist parties, the socialist left parties of the three 
countries have generally tended to be opposed to European integration and were also 
strongly opposed to joining the European Union. However, when it comes to support 
for co-operation per policy area, their views tend to differ. The Swedish Vp and the 
Norwegian SV have generally been the most critical and almost unanimously rejected any 
kind of institutionalised co-operation, which is mostly seen as a neoliberal tool. In Finland, 
however, VAS has adopted a more nuanced attitude. In the early 1990s, e.g., the party 
failed in adopting a common position on EU membership, which demonstrates the strong 
internal divisions on this issue. Subsequently, the party came to change its stance towards 
European integration and became much more positive. It even supported EMU 
membership in order to remain in the Lipponen rainbow cabinet, despite significant 
internal oppositions. In subsequent years, VAS has remained opposed to participation in 
the CFSP. In short, while the Swedish and Norwegian socialist left parties can be 





The Green parties across the region have also been divided on this issue. In Finland, 
VIHR shared a similar position as the Socialist Left VAS until the early 2000s, and they 
presented no official stance on membership when the debate surfaced in the early 1990s. 
They were initially opposed to an EMU membership, before changing their stance in 
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order to stay in government; and they also opposed developments relating to the CFSP. 
However, from 2003 onwards, the party has started to become more pro-integrationist, 
and has supported co-operation in most policy areas. In Sweden, MdG was and to some 
extent continues to be largely opposed to European co-operation. The party opposed 
membership from the early 1990s onwards and until 2008 when it removed the 
withdrawal clause from its party manifesto. It also opposed most developments at the 
European level (including participation in the third stage of the EMU), but has 
increasingly come to accept Sweden’s EU membership. The Norwegian Green Party 
(Miljøpartiet de Grøne), founded in 1988, gained its very first parliamentary seat following 
the 2013 general election: it is thus not included in this analysis. 
 
Populist Right parties 
 
The views of the two well-established populist right parties in the region also differ. In 
Norway, the Progress Party is the only party to not have adopted an official position on 
membership, but has supported co-operation through the EEA agreement. FrP 
subsequently advocated a close co-operation with the Union in policies where 
interdependence would prevail. The Finns Party has been more critical. The party (and 
more specifically its predecessor, the Rural Party) was opposed to membership, but 
subsequently came to accept the referendum decision to join and did not call for 
withdrawing from the Union. However, PS was strongly opposed to developments in the 
CFSP, the AFSJ and participation in the EMU. As far as Sweden is concerned, the Sweden 
Democrats gained its 20 first parliamentary seats following the 2010 elections, while New 
Democracy (25 seats in 1991) was dissolved in 2000. These two parties are thus not 
included within the framework of this study. 
 
 
6.2. Comparative analysis of government positions on 
Europe 
Based on the findings outlined in the three empirical chapters (Chapters 3, 4 and 5), Table 
6.2 offers a summary of government positions regarding European integration. Instead 
of focusing on the specific AFSJ and CFSP policies outlined in the preceding chapters 
(i.e. participation in the Schengen area, and participation in the European Union Battle 
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Groups, which were only salient for a limited time), this table instead summarises 
government positions per main policy areas selected within the framework of this analysis 
(see section 2.2). Based on an in-depth analysis of government programmes, this 
comparative summary uses a scale similar to the one used when assessing party positions 
on Europe (see section 2.4). As such: 
x ++ means that the government as a whole is in favour of integration in 
this policy area; 
x + means that the government’s official position is in favour of integration 
in this policy area, but that there are some divisions amongst ministers; 
x 0 means that the government does not have an official position on this 
policy area, or remains neutral on this issue;  
x - means that the government’s official position is against integration in 
this policy area (thus promoting differentiated integration), but that there 
are some divisions amongst ministers; 
x -- means that that the government as a whole is against integration in this 
policy area (thus promoting differentiated integration); 





Table 6.2 Summary of government positions on European integration in Finland, Sweden and Norway, per policy area 
 
Composition Position on the 
left/right scale 
Type of 
government EEA EU JHA CFSP EMU 
Finland         
Aho I (1991-1994) KESK, KOK, RKP, KD -1.59 Surplus majority ++ + + + N/A 
Aho II (1994-1995) KESK, KOK, RKP -2 Majority ++ ++ ++ + N/A 
Lipponen, first mandate (1995- 1999) SDP, KOK, RKP, VAS, VIHR -3.22 Surplus majority N/A ++ ++ + + 
Lipponen, second mandate (1999-2003) SDP, KOK, RKP, VAS, VIHR 6.38 Surplus majority N/A ++ ++ + ++ 
Jäätteenmäki / Vanhanen I (2003-2007) KESK, SDP, RKP -1.23 Surplus majority N/A ++ ++ + ++ 
Vanhanen II / Kiviniemi (2007-2011) KESK, KOK, RKP, VIHR -25.3 Surplus majority N/A ++ ++ + ++ 
Sweden         
Carlsson II (1990-1991) SAP -23.9 Single minority + + N/A N/A N/A 
Bildt (1991-1994) M, C, Fp, KDS 19.9 Minority ++ ++ ++ + N/A 
Carlsson III (1994-1996) SAP 23.8 Single minority ++ + + + N/A 
Persson, first mandate (1996-1998) SAP 23.8 Single minority N/A ++ ++ ++ - 
Persson, second mandate (1998-2002) SAP -3.5 Single minority N/A ++ ++ ++ 0 
Persson, third mandate (2002-2006) SAP -18.3 Single minority N/A ++ ++ ++ + 
Reinfeldt, first mandate (2006-2010) M, C, Fp, KDS 3.95 Majority N/A ++ ++ ++ 0 
Reinfeldt, second mandate (2010-2014) M, C, Fp, KDS 1.2 Minority N/A ++ ++ ++ 0 
Norway         
Syse (1989-1990) H, KrF, Sp -14.23 Minority + 0 0 0 N/A 
Brundtland III (1990-1993) A -36 Single minority ++ + + + N/A 
Brundtland IV / Jagland (1993-1997) A -19.7 Single minority ++ + + + N/A 
Bondevik I (1997-2000) KrF, Sp, V -7.14 Minority + 0 + + N/A 
Stoltenberg I (2000-2001) A -18.1 Single minority ++ 0 + + N/A 
Bondevik II (2001-2005) H, KrF, V -3.16 Minority ++ 0 + + N/A 
Stoltenberg II, first mandate (2005-2009) A, SV, Sp -31.23 Majority + - + + N/A 
Stoltenberg II, second mandate (2009-2013) A, SV, Sp -29.98 Majority + - + + N/A 
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Three main findings can be derived from the data presented in Table 6.2. First, it appears 
that in Finland, Sweden and Norway, no government has been fully opposed to 
participation in any of the policy areas outlined above. This is mostly due to the 
participation of pro-integrationist parties in coalitions and/or due to intra-party divisions 
over the European issue. Second, throughout the period analysed, only two governments 
have officially opposed a form of European co-operation – the Persson government 
opposed a Swedish EMU membership in 1997, and the Stoltenberg II government 
officially stated that Norway would not apply for an EU membership between 2005 and 
2013. Finally, and as hinted at in each of the three empirical chapters, this table shows 
divergences between the three countries with regards to government partisanship and the 
type of government in place. Finland has a strong tradition of surplus majority 
governments, which has a direct impact on partisanship. Apart from the Vanhanen II / 
Kiviniemi government, all cabinets can be considered to be centrist-type governments. 
Sweden, however, experienced more variation. In Norway, most cabinets were left-
oriented, notwithstanding their type.  
In order to offer a detailed analysis regarding each domestic variable analysed in this study, 
this section compares governments’ positions for each selected policy area and is thus 
divided into five sub-sections.  
 
6.2.1. Participation in the European Economic Area 
As a general rule, Nordic governments have mostly been supportive of participation in the European 
Economic Area and could rely on a strong parliamentary majority in favour of such agreement. In other 
words and regarding the first hypothesis, the relative strength of pro-EEA parties in 
parliaments appeared to shape the governments’ positions on this policy. In Finland and 
Sweden, both governments warmly welcomed the EEA agreement, highlighting the 
benefits of deeper economic integration and more importantly participation in the Single 
Market.177 Yet, in Norway, the EEA led to strong internal divisions within the Syse 
coalition, which eventually led to its resignation as the anti-EEA Centre Party had strongly 
opposed such an agreement. The subsequent single party minority government led by the 
                                                          
177 Even though, in the case of Sweden, it quickly appeared that the EEA agreement was seen as too limited.  
188 
 
pro-European Labour Party, Brundtland III, supported the EEA government and thus 
followed its Finnish and Swedish peers.  
Once Sweden and Finland joined the European Union, the issue of participation in the 
EEA became obsolete, while it remained topical in Norway. Through the years, 
Norwegian governments saw EEA membership as the basis for the relationship between 
Norway and the European Union. On some occasions, however, governments have 
expressed some reservations and called for an evaluation of the existing agreement. This 
was the case for the Bondevik I and Stoltenberg II cabinets. These stances were mostly 
explained by the participation of parties opposed to the EEA in these governments; 
nevertheless, due to the relative strength of pro-EEA parties in these coalitions, the 
governments’ positions were mostly positive and did not jeopardise Norway’s 
participation in the economic area. As a consequence, the Norwegian governments’ 
positions on the EEA would confirm hypothesis 2, according to which a pro-integration 
government position is taken if the cabinet is composed of a majority of pro-integrationist parties. With 
regards to the collapse of the Syse government, conclusions go even beyond this 
hypothesis, as the government resigned due to divergences on the EEA. 
The third variable explored in this analysis, i.e. the type of government, does not appear 
to have affected government positions on this policy area, due to the prominence of pro-
EEA parties in each Nordic parliament. Finally, as indicated in Table 6.2, government 
partisanship does not seem to have had an impact on government position on 
participation in the EEA in either of the three countries studied. Indeed, left-wing, centrist 
and right-wing governments have all supported national involvement in this policy area. 
In sum, the fourth hypothesis does not apply in this case. 
 
6.2.2. European Union membership 
In order to offer a comprehensive comparative analysis, government positions on 
European Union membership should be divided into two periods: the first one covers 
the early 1990s when Sweden, followed by Finland and Norway, applied to join the EU. 
The second period focuses on the post-1995 years, following Finland’s and Sweden’s 
accession, and the Norwegian electorate’s decision to vote ‘No’ in the referendum.   
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In the early 1990s, the first Nordic application for EU membership came from Sweden. 
As previously demonstrated, such decision was mostly driven by economic incentives, 
but the domestic political situation (i.e. the composition of the Riksdag as well as the 
Social Democratic Party’s electoral strategies) also facilitated this process. Finland and 
then Norway followed Sweden’s example a few months later. It is interesting to note that 
in the three countries, governments were internally divided on the issue of membership 
when the applications were submitted; yet, they could all rely on a pro-European majority in their 
respective parliaments, thus confirming the first hypothesis. With regards to the second 
hypothesis (on the composition of government), divisions within coalition parties or 
internal conflict amongst party elites does not seem to have affected government 
positions in favour of membership. Instead, the majority position (and, within parties, the position 
advocated by the party leader) was respected and did not threaten the raison d’être of the government 
(unlike the Syse cabinet’s experience in Norway). On the other hand, the type of 
government does not seem to have affected these positions, as there is no variation 
depending on whether the government accounts for more or less than 50 per cent of 
MPs. Finally, government ideology does also not appear to have influenced government 
decisions to apply for an EU membership, as confirmed by Kim and Fording’s index of 
government partisanship: the Finnish centrist (Aho I), the Swedish left-wing and right-
wing (Carlsson II and Bildt) as well as the Norwegian left-wing (Brundtland III) cabinets 
all supported EU membership.   
In subsequent years and following Finland and Sweden’s accession to the European 
Union, membership became a fait accompli for the political elites in these countries. 
Besides the Swedish Green178 and Left parties, all well-established parties represented in 
their respective national parliaments as well as subsequent governments fully supported 
membership. As such, the issue of ‘membership’ lost in saliency from 1995 onwards. In 
Norway, the situation was different: following the 1994 referendum, most political parties 
(especially the Labour Party) adapted their position on European integration and, as a 
consequence, the weak Storting majority, which was in favour of applying for membership 
in the early 1990s, disappeared. Subsequent governments decided either to leave this issue 
off the table, or to openly reject an application in their programmes. This finding goes in 
the direction of hypothesis 1: parliaments composed primarily of parties opposing EU membership 
                                                          
178 Until 2008, when the Swedish Green Party removed withdrawal from the Union from the manifesto. 
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influenced government positions on this issue. Nevertheless, membership was still raised by the 
pro-European Conservative Party in subsequent years. This became problematic when 
the party was included in the Bondevik II coalition. This particular case constitutes the 
exception to hypothesis 2 (on the composition of government): even though the 
government was composed of a majority of Conservative ministers, the coalition 
agreement introduced a ‘suicide clause’ on this issue. As such, the majority position in the 
Storting prevailed on the majority position in the government.  
Another interesting finding in the Norwegian case relates to the governments’ positions 
and how the type of government in place also matters. In both mandates, the majority 
Stoltenberg II cabinet openly stated that it would not seek an EU membership, while the 
post-1995 minority governments (i.e. Bondevik I and II as well as Stoltenberg I) avoided 
mentioning the issue all together. This goes in the direction of hypothesis 4, according to 
which a majority government is expected to take stronger positions on European 
integration. 
With regards to the impact of ideology on government positions, it appears difficult to 
draw any clear conclusions that would support hypothesis 5. While the Stoltenberg II 
cabinet was more left-oriented than its predecessors (see values calculated on the 
partisanship index), there was no government support (even amongst the centrist 
cabinets) for submitting an application following the 1994 referendum. As a consequence, 
it seems that government ideology does not affect support for integration. 
 
6.2.3. Participation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
Participation in the AFSJ, conversely, became politically salient primarily in the mid-
1990s, when discussions over Schengen membership were raised by the five Nordic 
governments. As demonstrated earlier, participation in the Schengen area was mostly seen 
as a mean to ensure the future of Nordic co-operation, which dates back from the 
introduction of the Nordic Passport Union in 1958. As such, there was little opposition 
to such participation in the three countries analysed. Parties that were opposed to 
Schengen membership were, in a broader sense, opposed to any kind of institutionalised 
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European co-operation.179 This demonstrates the broad consensus on such co-operation 
amongst the Nordic political elites, notwithstanding certain contextual factors. As a result, 
it can be expected that the composition of both parliament and government influenced government 
positions on participation in Schengen. 
Again, the Norwegian experience is interesting to highlight. Indeed, unlike in Sweden, 
both of the anti-integrationist parties were included in four coalition governments (i.e. the 
Centre Party in Syse and Bondevik I; and in both of the two Stoltenberg II mandates). 
While the issue was not salient under Syse, participation in Schengen was discussed under 
the Bondevik I government, and led to strong opposition from Sp, whose MPs voted 
against this policy in the Storting. Yet, this position did not threaten the party’s 
participation in the government or the coalition itself, as it was tolerated by the Prime 
Minister and the opposition parties. In subsequent years, participation in Schengen was 
considered to be part of the Norwegian acquis, and even though both ‘anti’ parties came 
into power between 2005 and 2013, differentiated disintegration in the AFSJ remained off 
the table under the Stoltenberg II government, mostly due to the lack of any other anti-
Schengen parties in parliament (confirming hypothesis 1), and the predominance of the 
Labour Party in this coalition (confirming hypothesis 2). As a result, the type of cabinet 
and government ideology does not seem to have affected positions on participation in 
Schengen (or in the AFSJ to a broader extent), even under the majority left-wing 
Stoltenberg II government. 
 
6.2.4. Participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
In contrast to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the more politicised Common 
Foreign and Security Policy area has probably been the most debated issue in the three 
cases. Its centrality was due to Sweden and Finland’s principle of non-alignment as well 
as Norway’s ties with the United States through NATO. CFSP developments were mostly 
welcomed by Nordic governments from the mid-1990s onwards for three main reasons: 
the evolving context following the end of the Cold War; the need for a strong collective 
response in Europe meaning that neutrality was not seen as a viable option anymore; and 
                                                          
179 As mentioned in Chapter 5, in Norway, the Christian Democratic (KrF) and Liberal (V) parties initially 
opposed joining Schengen in 1997, before switching their position on the ‘Schengen II agreement’ in 1999. 
192 
 
the fact that CFSP-related policies were not considered by the political elites to harm 
national sovereignty. Following accession to the European Union in 1995, and even 
though Swedish governments were strongly supportive of developments in the CFSP in 
terms of deepening integration, the Finnish ‘rainbow governments’ showed signs of 
reluctance, mostly due to reservations expressed by the Centre Party and the Left Alliance. 
In Norway, and even though belonging to the ‘inner periphery’ of the European Union, 
successive governments defended closer co-operation regarding foreign and security 
policy through bilateral agreements and participation in EU-led peacekeeping operations.  
Within the framework of this thesis, the Nordic governments’ positions on the CFSP 
have been illustrated by participation in the European Union Battle Groups. Apart from 
the Battle Group 107 for Finland, the focus was mostly set on Finland’s, Sweden’s and 
Norway’s participations in the Nordic Battle Group in 2008 and 2011. In all three 
countries, contribution in these EUBGs was strongly supported by governments. In fact, 
and with regards to the variables explored in this study, the situation was relatively similar 
to the one surrounding participation in the Schengen area. First, governments could rely on a 
majority of pro-CFSP parties in their respective parliaments, thus confirming hypothesis 1. Second, 
even though some governments were composed of anti-integrationist or reluctant parties 
(e.g. KESK and VAS in Finland; C in Sweden; Sp and SV in Norway), the majority stance in 
favour of participation in the EUBGs was retained and did not put the raison d’être of the cabinets at 
risk (confirming hypothesis 2). Third, the type of government, however, did not appear 
to affect government positions on this issue, which would be in contrast to hypotheses 3 
and 4. As a result, the fact that a government is a minority or majority did not influence its position on 
participation in the CFSP. Finally, both left-wing and centrist cabinets still supported 
national involvement in the EUBGs, meaning that in contrast to hypothesis 5, governments’ 
support for participation in the CFSP did not decline as the ideological position moved away from the 
centre of the left-right political spectrum.  
 
6.2.5. Participation in the Economic and Monetary Union 
Similar to EU membership debates, participation in the third stage of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (or participation in the Eurozone) is the policy that shows the most 
contrasting views between the cases studied. In Norway, the issue never became politically 
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salient due to the country’s status as a non-member. The Finnish and Swedish 
governments adopted contrasting positions on this issue. In Finland, the Lipponen 
government decided, with the support of the Eduskunta, to join the Eurozone amongst 
the first wave of entrants in 1999; in contrast, the Swedish government initially decided 
to reject such membership in the late 1990s, but eventually put it to a referendum in 2003. 
Some of the domestic variables outlined previously would help explain these contrasting 
positions. 
Regarding the composition of parliaments, the situation in both countries diverges. In 
Finland, due to the political weight of the Social Democratic and National Coalition 
parties, the Eduskunta was composed of a slight majority of pro-EMU parties. Such 
majority was then enhanced with the support of the two remaining parties in government, 
the Green League and the Left Alliance. In Sweden, however, there was a clear absence 
of a majority that was in favour of joining the EMU in the late 1990s, mostly due to strong 
internal divisions within the ruling Social Democratic Party. The situation changed 
following the 2002 general election and the switch in SAP and KDS’ official stances on 
EMU in 2000. In sum, the composition of parliament affected government position on participation in 
the EMU (confirming hypothesis 1). 
In addition, the composition of the government also affected government positions on this issue 
(confirming hypothesis 2). In fact, both VAS and VIHR had to adapt their own party’s 
views on EMU membership in order to remain in the Lipponen coalition. In this 
particular case, it can thus be said that the government’s majoritarian position came to 
shape smaller parties attitudes towards integration within the coalition. The Swedish case 
slightly differs: as a single party government, Persson’s decision not to join the EMU as 
early as 1999 is partly explained by the absence of party cohesion on this issue. The 
decision to organise a referendum in 2003 was also the result of the SAP leadership’s 
decision to officially support EMU membership.  
Unlike the other policy areas examined in this thesis, the type of government played at least a 
minor role in shaping its position on participation in the EMU (relating to hypotheses 3 and 4). 
As a surplus majority coalition, the Lipponen government did not have to rely on external 
support within parliament; while in Sweden, the single party minority Persson government 
had to take into account the preferences of its parliamentary partners, especially those of 
the Centre Party in 1997 which were strongly opposed to an EMU membership. In the 
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2003 referendum, however, the type of government did not affect its position, as an 
agreement was reached with both its anti-EMU partners (MdG and Vp).  
As far as government ideology is concerned, the findings do not correspond to the thesis’ 
fifth hypothesis. In the Swedish case, and even though the strongly right-wing Persson 
government chose not to join the EMU in the late 1990s, the decision to organise a 
referendum in 2003 was taken under a left-wing cabinet. As such, the government’s ‘non-
centrist’ ideology did not play a role in shaping EMU-related decisions.   
 
6.3. Comparative conclusions 
In order to assess the relevance of the four selected Nordic variables on shaping 
government positions, this section will now briefly summarise the key comparative 
findings with regards to the five hypotheses. 
H1: If there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in the parliament, then the government will 
be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with the European Union. 
In all of the cases that have been analysed, it appears that the composition of parliament 
has played an important role in shaping government positions on participation in 
European policies. This finding is linked to the fact that all Nordic states adopted a 
parliamentary system of government. As a result, the majority parliamentary position on 
participation in European integration is reflected in their respective governments’ stances. 
This finding demonstrates the strong influence that the Nordic parliaments are able to 
exert in shaping government preferences on Europe and, to a broader extent, also on 
their state’s relationship with the European Union. Even though party positions on 
European integration differ from one country to the other, the governments tend to 
follow the majoritarian view in parliament, even if this contrasts with the majoritarian 
view in the government (e.g. the Bondevik I exception with regards to EU membership). 
H1 is thus confirmed. 
H2: If there is a majority of pro-European integration parties in the government, then the government will 
be in favour of deepening the country’s relationship with the European Union. 
In all three of the cases analysed, governments can be composed of parties that do not 
necessarily share the same views on Europe, exemplified by how the majoritarian view in 
195 
 
parliament was always respected. As a consequence, this second hypothesis is largely 
confirmed, but there are two notable exceptions. First, the Syse government collapsed 
due to strong disagreements over the EEA issue in 1990. Second, Bondevik II was mostly 
composed of Conservative ministers who tended to be pro-EU membership, but the 
‘suicide clause’ was introduced in the government’s programme in order to avoid any 
instability within the coalition. Nevertheless, the ‘government composition’-variable has 
generally played a role in shaping its stance on participation in European co-operation. 
H3: A minority government will avoid putting the issue of European integration on top of its agenda. 
H4: A majority government will conversely adopt a stronger position on European integration.  
This analysis has demonstrated that the ‘government type’-variable has played a partial 
role in shaping government positions on European integration. In contrast to hypothesis 
3, several minority governments did in fact take strong stances on European-related 
issues, but with the support of their parliaments. In other words, a minority government 
would not avoid putting the issue of European integration on top of its agenda: rather, it 
would rely on the majoritarian position in parliament before taking up such a stance, as 
illustrated by Sweden and Norway’s applications for membership (under Carlsson II and 
Brundtland III), and by Sweden’s decision not to join the EMU in 1997 (under Persson). 
This confirms the strength of national parliaments in shaping government’s positions on 
Europe (hypothesis 1) and dismisses H3. Majority governments, on the other hand, tend 
to take somewhat stronger stances on European co-operation, as illustrated by Lipponen’s 
decision to join the EMU but without holding a referendum and, in Norway, by 
Stoltenberg II’s negative stance on EU membership. This can be explained by the fact 
that they did not need to rely on external parliamentary support, as the government 
already accounted for more than half of MPs. H4 would thus be confirmed.  
H5: Government’s support for European integration will decline as it moves further to either the left or 
the right.  
In a majority of the cases, government ideology has not shaped government’s stances on 
European integration. Indeed, based on Kim and Fording’s measure of government 
partisanship, it appears that leftist, centrist and rightist governments have adopted their 
positions independent of their respective ideologies. There are two cases where 
government ideology could have played a role. The first one is the Norwegian Stoltenberg 
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II cabinet (leftist, -31.23 and -29.98), which mentioned its opposition to EU membership. 
However, as both the anti-integrationist parties in Norway (i.e. the Socialist Left and the 
Centre) were coalition members, the most likely scenario is that the assumptions made in 
hypothesis 2 prevails. The second one is the Swedish Persson cabinet’s decision not to 
participate in the third stage of the EMU in the late 1990s. In this case, a series of domestic 
political constraints prevailed, such as the internal divisions within the ruling party and 
the parliamentary situation. In all other cases, the degree of government partisanship does 




Chapter 7. Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has examined government positions on European integration in the Nordic 
states and examined the question: have Nordic government preferences on European integration been 
influenced by domestic political factors? Using a most similar systems research design and based 
on an analysis of three case studies (i.e. Finland, Sweden and Norway), the thesis has 
argued that whereas contextual factors explored in the existing literature played an 
important role in shaping the Nordic states’ relationship with the European Union, the 
role of domestic political variables should also be taken into consideration.  
In this thesis, an analysis of differentiated integration has been preferred to the traditional 
membership/non-membership dichotomy in order to explain government preferences 
on Europe. As such, this analysis went beyond most existing studies by focusing on 
government preferences on European integration in five policies/policy areas where 
differentiation takes place.  
The aim of this final chapter is to provide a general discussion of the thesis’ research 
results and contribution to the existing literature. It is divided into three sections. The first 
one summarises the thesis’ empirical contribution and its implications for the study of the 
Nordic states in comparative perspective. The second one explores its conceptual 
contribution, and how it challenges and completes the existing literature on 
party/government preferences on European integration. The third and final section of 
this chapter concludes this thesis by offering recommendations for future research. 
 
7.1. Empirical contribution to the existing literature 
Regarding the thesis’ main research question, the findings outlined in the empirical and 
comparative chapters have some implications for the study of the Nordic states and 
European integration.   
The main set of empirical contributions to the existing literature are related to the 
domestic political variables studied within the framework of this analysis, and discussed 
in section 6.3. First, the comparative analysis emphasised the strong influence that the 
Nordic parliaments have been able to exercise in terms of shaping government positions 
on Europe and, more broadly, their respective state’s relationship with the European 
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Union. Even though party positions differ from one country to the other and are not 
necessarily influenced by party family affiliation (see section 6.1), governments have 
tended to follow the majority stance in parliament, even if this contrasts with their ‘own’ 
majoritarian view in the government. As such, this analysis confirms that the Nordic states 
are truly parliamentary democracies (see e.g. Arter 1999; 2006; Bergman and Strøm 2011; 
Rasch 2011a; see also section 1.2). Second, in most cases, it appears that the majority view 
in a coalition shapes the governments’ positions on European integration. This also 
applies when a government is composed of parties that do not always share the same 
views on Europe. With the sole exception of the Syse cabinet in Norway in 1990, no 
coalition government resigned because of a European issue. Likewise, despite the 
presence of some anti-integrationist parties in parliament and, sometimes, at the executive 
level, no government has ever called for a form of European disintegration. This 
demonstrates the broad political consensus surrounding European issues in the Nordic 
states. Third, minority governments can still be in favour of deepening the country’s 
relationship with the European Union: the lack of majority at the executive level thus does 
not necessarily affect its stance on integration. Fourth, government ideology does not 
seem to affect support or opposition to Europe, as leftist, centrist and rightist 
governments generally supported developments at the European level.  
Two other sets of findings that do not directly relate to the domestic variables explored 
in this study should also be highlighted, as they help understanding the Nordic states’ 
experience in terms of European integration. These are the relationship between pro- and 
anti-integrationist parties, and government preferences on differentiated integration. 
 
Relationship between pro- and anti- integrationist parties 
 
In the Nordic states, it has been demonstrated that parties opposed to participation in the 
process of European integration are not marginalised. Indeed, some of them figure 
amongst the well-established parties, and have been part of a coalition government in 
some cases. This is however a recent phenomenon, which contradicts earlier analyses. For 
instance, Sitter (2001: 36) determined that “[p]arty-based Euro-scepticism in Scandinavia 
emerges very much as the politics of opposition, both because its presence is directly 
linked to opposition politics and because it shapes coalition politics”. Even though such 
a statement was accurate at the time of publication, the more recent Norwegian 
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Stoltenberg II coalition seems to contradict this finding, as the government was composed 
of the two anti-integrationist parties, namely the Socialist Left and the Centre, and as the 
agreement took a more negative stance with regards to the EU membership issue than its 
predecessors. In sum, the relationship between pro- and anti-integrationist parties has 
evolved over time. It now appears that opposition to Europe does not rule out 
participation in coalition governments. 
 
Government preferences on differentiated integration 
 
Tables 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2 show that some Nordic political parties support certain forms of 
differentiated integration. In most of these cases, parties defend the status quo in terms 
of their country’s experience of European integration, thus accepting the existing 
situation. However, some parties (i.e. Vp in Sweden, Sp and SV in Norway) have adopted 
a different stance by advocating for differentiated disintegration. As such, they do not accept 
the existing agreements between their respective states and European institutions, thus 
calling for a renegotiation or a re-examination of the relationship with Brussels. While 
such stances do not necessarily compromise the parties’ participation in coalition 
governments (e.g. Stoltenberg II), they have never been adapted at the executive level. In 
other words, no government has called for differentiated disintegration or to renegotiate 
existing agreements. As a consequence, it can be argued that disintegration is not 
considered as politically viable at the executive level. In the cases where a government 
shows signs of reluctance towards participation in European integration, it would rather 
call for a status quo. This confirms recent findings from Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013: 
33): “we can see evidence of Euroscepticism being significantly tempered by participation 
in government”.  
 
7.2. Conceptual contribution to the existing literature 
The findings of this thesis have several implications for the study of party and government 
preferences on European integration. These conceptual contributions to the existing 
literature are related to two main features: the impact that ideology plays on government 
positions and, in a broader sense, the study of party- and government preferences on 
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In contrast to hypothesis 5, it appears that governments’ support for European 
integration does not decline as they move further to either the left or right. Hence, the 
hypothesis related to governments’ non-centrism is dismissed. This partially contradicts 
the studies conducted by Aspinwall (2002; 2007). Indeed, whereas he determined that 
“centrist governments support integration whereas government composed of more 
extreme parties oppose it” (Aspinwall 2002: 106), this does not appear to be the case in 
terms of the Nordic states’ participation in the European Union or in the selected 
European policies.  
This thesis’ findings on the influence of government ideology can also be extended 
beyond the formulation of hypothesis 5. Indeed, while ideological non-centrism does not 
appear to play a role in shaping government positions on European integration, it also 
seems that leftist governments are not necessarily more supportive than rightists 
governments are in the selected Nordic countries, even in policy areas where 
differentiation does take place. This contradicts Aspinwall (2007: 112) who demonstrated 
that “in the case of government policy choice in the Council of Ministers, leftists choose 
co-operation, rightists choose autonomy”. Whereas this finding applies to the case of 
vertical integration (as established by the author), this thesis showed that it is not necessarily 
the case for government preferences on horizontal integration. This could have a strong 
impact on future research (see next section). 
 
Studying party and government preferences on European integration 
 
As discussed in section 2.4, analysing governments’ preferences on European integration 
has first required this study to consider party preferences, as well as engaging with the 
literature on party-based Euroscepticism. The scale and terminology used within the 
framework of this thesis was inspired by studies from Taggart and Szczerbiak; Kopecký 
and Mudde; and Hooghe et al. It proved to be a useful tool to establish party and 
government support for integration on EU / EEA membership as well as in the selected 
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policy areas where differentiation has taken place (i.e. CFSP, AFSJ and EMU). Some 
findings that are not directly related to the five hypotheses would also need to be outlined, 
as they could refine studies on elite preferences on European integration in the future.  
The empirical findings of this study demonstrate that it is rather difficult to theorise party 
and government preferences on European integration. That is why the thesis has not 
attempted to build a new categorisation of Euroscepticism. Instead, the scale that has 
been used demonstrates that party preferences on Europe significantly vary from one 
policy area to the other. It would be difficult therefore to categorise a party that supports 
participation in the AFSJ but opposes the CFSP as ‘Eurosceptic’ (‘soft’ or ‘hard’, in the 
words of Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001), and coming up with another category is likely to 
lead to more semantic confusion on this nebulous concept. Besides this apparent 
distinction, several other factors should be borne in mind. For instance, the numerous 
internal divisions on the European issue, which is reflected in the scale used, and as 
demonstrated in some cases (e.g. the Finnish Centre Party, the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party and the Norwegian Labour Party) are also likely to influence government positions.  
More generally, it seems appropriate to draw the distinction between party/government 
support for vertical (i.e. deepening) and party/government support for horizontal (i.e. 
widening) European integration. This thesis has focused on the expressed support for the 
state’s participation in policy areas where differentiated integration is likely to take place, 
thus emphasising the horizontal aspect of integration. Parties’ and governments’ support 
for vertical integration, however, could show different results, as demonstrated e.g. by 
Hooghe et al. (2002) and Aspinwall (2007). In addition, some parties change their stances 
on participation in a policy area over time, depending on the evolving context or on their 
own political strategy (e.g. VAS and VIHR in Finland). These elements should be borne 
in mind when it comes to considering party-based Euroscepticism. In sum, this thesis has 
raised the question whether it is really worth categorising political parties depending on 
their positions on European integration. Even though the tools offered by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak on the one hand, and by Kopecký and Mudde on the other are considered as 
useful tools to categorise opposition to European co-operation, the reality is much more 
complex than the dichotomy between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Eurosceptics, or between the 
‘Euroenthusiast’, ‘Europragmatist’, ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘Euroreject’ ideal-types. This thesis 
has shown that it is relevant to also include party and government positions on specific 
policy areas rather than viewing European integration as a whole. 
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Overall, this thesis suggests that while it is first essential to study preferences on Europe 
at the party level, it can also be useful to further focus on government attitudes. Whereas 
Tables 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2 summarise party positions on participation in the European 
integration process per policy area, these can be compared to Table 6.2 which outlines 
the various governments’ positions, the latter not necessarily being the reflection of the 
former. Hence, this analysis has modestly contributed to the literature on European 
integration by shining a light on governments’ preferences, which seem to be broadly 
downplayed. There is much that could be done on government-based Euroscepticism in 
the future, especially with regards to differentiated integration.  
 
7.3. Recommendations for future research 
The study of differentiated integration is becoming a trend (Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig 2012). With on-going debates on the future shape of European 
integration, as well as discussions on the potential for disintegration, many studies are 
likely to discuss this concept in the near future. By focusing on governments’ preferences 
on horizontal integration, this thesis can serve as a good basis that can lead to future 
research on these topics. The aim of this section is to offer tentative suggestions for 
further studies regarding the issues raised in this analysis. 
One key question that can be raised is the following: can these findings be applied outside 
of the Nordic region? Could we find similar patterns beyond these countries? With 
regards to the influence of national parliaments, for example, it would seem fair to 
consider such findings to be common to all parliamentary democracies participating in 
the process of European integration, both in the core and in the periphery of the EU. 
With regards to the composition of governments, it has been demonstrated those parties 
that show signs of opposition to Europe (including, more recently, the anti-integrationist 
parties in Norway) are viable as coalition partners. How does this impact on governments’ 
programmes beyond those of the Nordic states? Does the majority position in the 
coalition prevail? And if not, why not? Furthermore, is government ideology equally 
insignificant in other countries? These questions could be raised in future research. 
While a plethora of studies focusing on party positions on European integration (and 
party-based Euroscepticism) exist, studies that address government preferences are rather 
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limited. Even though this can be explained by the fact that parties constitute the basic 
unity forming governments, it is surprising that the existing literature often ignores the 
government programmes, which can sometimes differ from stances promoted in party 
manifestos. Offering a conceptualisation of government preferences could thus 
contribute to the literature in the near future. However, as demonstrated in this analysis, 
opposition to European integration can take several forms, and a series of important 
factors, such as internal divisions or variation per policy areas, should not be forgotten. 
Rather than offering a new classification of Euroscepticism as such (which would further 
complicate future case studies), it is suggested herein that the scale that has been used to 
capture variation in government (and party) positions, ranging from unanimous 
opposition (--) to unanimous support (++) for EU membership and/or participation in 
the specific policy areas, enables researchers to offer a clearer understanding of how the 
extent to which political elites are opposed to European co-operation. Furthermore, this 
averts terminological confusion, which was the main criticism of the existing 
categorisations of Euroscepticism (see section 2.4).  
In conclusion, government as well as party positions on European integration offer a 
goldmine for European studies scholars. The recent financial crisis has led to an increase 
in mass-level and elite Euroscepticism, which has further enabled some populist right 
parties to strengthen their positions in national parliaments. Recent and upcoming general 
elections will enable researchers to conduct studies that could challenge existing findings 
in the field. By offering a comparative analysis of three Nordic governments’ positions 
between 1990 and 2010, this thesis could also pave the way for redefining studies on elite 
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Appendix 1. Research notes (interviews) 
 
As discussed in section 2.3, in order to triangulate the data stemming from the official 
documents, a total of 26 elite interviews were conducted between October 2012 and 
March 2014. The majority of them (21) were conducted in person during my research stay 
at the ARENA Centre for European Studies from the University of Oslo, between 
October 2012 and July 2013. In addition, five interviews (with Swedish elites) were 
conducted by telephone and followed the similar method. The interviewee selection 
criteria targeted those who were assumed to have particular knowledge or insight of the 
areas the research was concerned with. These included members of national parliaments 
who were members of EU-related parliamentary committees, former ministers and/or 
party leaders, party secretaries, and policy advisers on international/European affairs with 
formal ties to the party (see Appendix 2 for a complete list). A total of 107 potential 
interviewees were contacted. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to arrange interviews 
with representatives from three parties: the Norwegian Centre Party; the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party; and the Swedish Left Party. Even though at least 10 representatives 
were contacted for each of these parties, none were available or willing to participate in 
this project. 
All interviewees were contacted (in English) by email at least one month before the 
meeting. A brief document summarising the purpose of the project was attached to this 
email (see Appendix 3). As some answers could have been sensitive (especially regarding 
internal divisions within the party), all of the interviews were conducted on a non-
attributable basis. Most face-to-face interviews lasted between 45 and 50 minutes. 
Interviews conducted by telephone lasted between 25 and 30 minutes. All were recorded 
with the consent of the participants, and a summary of the key statements used in this 
analysis were then sent for approval. In all cases, no changes were requested or suggested 




Appendix 2. List of interviews  
 




Interview with a MP from the Christian Democrats (14 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP and with a spokesperson from the National Coalition Party (14 May 
2013) 
Interview with a spokesperson from the Left Alliance (14 May 2013) 
Interview with a spokesperson from the Social Democratic Party (15 May 2013) 
Interview with a spokesperson from the Swedish People’s Party (15 May 2013) 
Interview with a spokesperson from the Centre Party (16 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP from the Finns Party (16 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP and a policy adviser from the Finns Party (17 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP from the Finns Party (17 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP from the Finns Party (21 May 2013) 
Interview with a policy adviser from the Green League (22 May 2013) 
Interview with a MP from the Centre Party (22 May 2013) 
 
Sweden 
Interview with a MP from the Moderate Party (20 February 2014) 
Interview with a policy adviser from the Christian Democrats (12 March 2014) 
Interview with a MP from the Green Party (25 March 2014) 
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Interview with a spokesperson from the Centre Party (7 April 2014) 
Interview with a former spokesperson from the Liberal People’s Party (11 April 2014) 
 
Norway 
Interview with a MP from the Progress Party (11 October 2012) 
Interview with a MP from the Progress Party (22 October 2012) 
Interview with a policy adviser from the Socialist Left Party (11 October 2012) 
Interview with a MP from the Conservative Party (12 October 2012) 
Interview with a MP from the Labour Party (23 October 2012) 
Interview with two spokespersons from the Conservative Party (7 November 2012) 
Interview with a former MP from the Labour Party (7 November 2012) 
Interview with a MP from the Liberal Party (5 June 2013) 
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Appendix 4. Structure of the interviews 
 
1. General information on the party 
 
x What type of party would you say that [name of party] is? 
- Where would you locate [name of party] on a left-right scale? 
- Has this position changed in the last 20 years? 
x Which party/parties is [name of party] closest to in [country]? 
x Does [name of party] co-operate with other Nordic parties? 
 
2. Party preferences on European integration 
 
x How would you describe the position of [name of party] on: 
- EEA/EU membership? 
- Participation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice/Schengen? 
- Participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Nordic Battle 
Group? 
- Participation in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union? 
x Has this view changed in the last 20 years? 
x Does [name of party] overall agree or disagree on these positions on European 
integration? 
- If disagreements, how divided is [name of party]?  
x Is [name of party] happy with the current range of agreements between [country] 
and the European Union? 
x Does [name of party] promote differentiated European integration? 
x [more specific questions depending on the cases] 
 
3. European integration in [country] 
 
x Who would you say takes the lead in shaping national politics regarding European 
integration? 
x How divided is [country’s] electorate on the issue of European integration? 
x Why does Euroscepticism exist/is so strong in [country]?  




Appendix 5. Measures of party and government ideology 
 
 
Note: The data presented in this Appendix are based on the original work from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project, which is available at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu. 
Whereas party values on the CMP left-right scale are available on this website, all 
calculations based on Kim and Fording’s index of government partisanship were made 
by the author of this thesis, based on the following formula (discussed in section 2.4): 
 
∑ {Ideologyi * (#Postsi/Total Posts)} 
Where:  
#Postsi = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i;  
Ideologyi = the ideology of party I (i.e. the value on the CMP scale); and 
Total Posts = the total number of posts (or ministerial portfolios). 
 
 
The total number of posts/ministerial portfolios for each cabinet is based on data 
available in academic publications, mostly from the European Political Data Yearbooks 
(European Journal of Political Research). For Finland, see Sundberg (1992; 1996; 2000; 
2004; 2008). For Sweden, see Sainsbury (1989); Pierre and Widfeldt (1992; 1999); Widfeldt 
and Pierre (1995); Widfeldt (2003a; 2007; 2011). For Norway, see Aardal (1990); Heidar 
(1994); Narud (1998); Aalberg (2002; 2010); Aalberg and Brekken (2006).
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Finland – party values  
 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 AVERAGE 
KOK -4.5 14.6 29.5 9.8 -20.6 5.76 
SDP 1.2 -13.7 -1.4 -24.7 -36.4 -15 
KESK 1.3 26.8 -1 -7.6 -15.1 0.88 
RKP -7.7 4.1 14.5 -19.9 -25.5 -6.9 
VAS -30.4 -14.9 -38.2 -45.9 -42.1 -34.3 
VIHR -38.6 -13.4 -6.3 -33.5 -21.5 -22.66 
PS 13.1 13.1 -5.9 -5.9 -6.5 1.58 
KD 5 24.3 19.4 7.8 -15.1 8.28 
AVERAGE -7.575 5.1125 1.325 -14.9875 -22.85  
 
Finland – government values 
 Aho I Aho II Lipponen I Lipponen II 
Jäätteenmäki / 
Vanhanen I 
Vanhanen II / 
Kiviniemi 
KOK - posts 6 6 5 6 8 0 
SDP - posts 0 0 7 6 0 8 
KESK - posts 8 8 0 0 8 8 
RKP - posts 2 2 2 2 2 2 
VAS - posts 0 0 2 2 0 0 
VIHR - posts 0 0 1 1 0 2 
PS - posts 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KD - posts 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL POSTS 17 16 18 18 18 20 
IDEOLOGY 
GOVERNMENT -1.5882353 -2 
-





Sweden – party values 
 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 AVERAGE 
M 36.7 43.8 40.2 37.4 38.1 4 2.5 28.9571429 
SAP -23.9 -6.2 23.8 -3.5 -18.3 -24.2 -32.3 -12.085714 
C -5.3 5.4 21.8 11.6 10.6 -4.5 -2.2 5.34285714 
Vp -37.4 -42.8 -27.3 -36 -33.7 -36 -12.2 -32.2 
MdG -18.4 -12.6 -6.3 -36.1 -26.1 -11.6 -9.2 -17.185714 
Fp -7.7 3.9 19.3 14.3 0.9 14.6 -4.8 5.78571429 
KDS  -4.5 14 4.8 6.3 0.8 8.1 4.91666667 
AVERAGE -9.3333333 -1.8571429 12.2142857 -1.0714286 -3.1714286 -8.1285714 -7.1571429  
 
Sweden – government values 
 Carlsson II Bildt 
Carlsson III / 
Persson a Persson b Persson c Reinfeldt a Reinfeldt b 
M - posts 0 9 0 0 0 11 13 
SAP - posts 22 0 22 20 22 0 0 
C - posts 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 
Vp - posts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MdG - posts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fp - posts 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 
KDS - posts 0 3 0 0 0 3 3 
TOTAL POSTS 22 21 22 20 22 22 24 
IDEOLOGY 






Norway – party values 
 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 AVERAGE 
H -7.1 14.4 3.7 9.8 13.4 -11.4 3.8 
A -36 -19.7 -18.1 -38.2 -33.3 -29.8 -29.183333 
Sp -19.9 -15.6 -10.6 -27.3 -17.6 -20.4 -18.566667 
SV -34.7 -32.4 -25.4 -44 -38 -40.1 -35.766667 
FrP 24.2 43.6 23.5 24 16.9 6.8 23.1666667 
KrF -21.4 2 -4.5 -18.6 -24.4 -11.1 -13 
V -20.6 -7.3 -7.9 -15.5 -23.8 -18.5 -15.6 
AVERAGE -16.5 -2.1428571 -5.6142857 -15.685714 -15.257143 -17.785714  
 





/ Jagland Bondevik I 
Stoltenberg 





H - posts 9 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
A - posts 0 19 19 0 19 0 10 12 
Sp - posts 5 0 0 6 0 0 4 4 
SV - posts 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 
FrP - posts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KrF - posts 5 0 0 9 0 6 0 0 
V - posts 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 
TOTAL POSTS 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 
IDEOLOGY 
GOVERNMENT -14.23157895 -36 -19.7 -7.1421053 -18.1 -3.1631579 -31.2315789 -29.98 
 
